This appeal arises from Dean Clay Miller, Jr.’s conviction for burglary, assault with intent to commit robbery, possession of methamphetamine, and being a persistent violator. This case is primarily concerned with two issues: (1) whether a persistent violator enhancement must be alleged in the information to give a court subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) whether the defendant’s sen *831 tenee was excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion.
Miller pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, burglary, and assault with the intent to commit robbery. He also pled guilty to being a persistent violator. Miller argues that the district eoui’t lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State did not allege the persistent violator enhancement in the information. He also argues that if the court did have subject matter jurisdiction, the sentence was excessive in light of his mental health condition and other mitigating factors. We hold that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to sentence Miller. We also hold that the district court acted consistent with I.C. § 19-2523 and I.C § 19-2521 and did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Miller.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Miller was arrested on September 24, 2007, in Pocatello, Idaho, for assault, burglary with the intent to commit robbery, and possession of methamphetamine. Miller had been on a three-week methamphetamine binge, and said he was fleeing pursuers. Miller claimed he had been running a long time and entered the victims’ home in an attempt to escape. The home belonged to a family consisting of the parents and three children, one of whom was an infant. He entered their home through an unlocked side door in the garage, found a shotgun, and entered the bedroom where the parents were sleeping with the baby. Also in the home were the victims’ two other children. The parents awoke, finding Miller there, wearing a mask and gloves and pointing the shotgun at them. He told them he was going to wait until morning when the banks opened, and force them to withdraw all of their money. At one point, Miller looked out the window, and the father was able to strike Miller in the head with the shotgun. This distracted Miller long enough for the mother and baby to escape. The father also ran outside and told his neighbor to get his guns and come help. His neighbor grabbed his .45 pistol, and the two approached the house, where they noticed that Miller had entered the garage. The neighbor entered and confronted Miller, and there was a short standoff. The father told his neighbor not to shoot Miller because the shotgun was unloaded. Miller dropped the shotgun and then held a knife up to his throat and wrist, threatening to kill himself. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and subdued Miller. Only then was the father able to reenter his home and get to his other two children. When the police searched Miller they found methamphetamine in his pocket.
The original charges filed against Miller were for burglary, kidnapping in the first degree, assault with intent to commit robbery accompanied by a firearms enhancement, and possession of a controlled substance. The State was granted leave to amend the information to include a persistent violator enhancement, though no amendment was ever filed. However, the state did file a Notice to Defendant to Seek Persistent Violator Enhancement (“Notice to Defendant”). Miller subsequently pled guilty to the burglary, assault and possession charges, along with being a persistent violator. The other charges were dismissed. When Miller pled guilty to being a persistent violator, the district court and the prosecutor referred to part III of the Information. There was never a part III filed, but presumably they were referring to the Notice to Defendant.
Miller has a history of psychological problems, so the court ordered a psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524. That evaluation stated that Miller suffered from anxiety and depression, and that he met the criteria for “Major Depression and Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified with Antisocial Traits and Substance Abuse.” That evaluation also noted that Miller approached the psychological tests “in an effort to emphasize his psychological problems.” The symptoms of these disorders had been compounded by his drug use, but he was prescribed numerous psychotropic medications throughout his life.
Based on his admission that he was a persistent violator, Miller received enhanced sentences consisting of concurrent indeterminate life terms, with twenty-eight years fixed, for burglary and assault with intent to *832 commit robbery. Miller was sentenced to a concurrent seven year fixed term for possession of methamphetamine.
Miller appealed on two grounds: first, that the district court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him as a persistent violator because the enhancement was not included in the information; and second, that the sentence was excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals heard the case and issued a decision on June 14, 2010. It held that the district court had jurisdiction to sentence Miller as a persistent violator but that the sentence for the burglary and assault charges was excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion. It upheld the sentence of seven years for the possession charge and reduced his sentence to a term of fifteen years determinate with indeterminate life for the burglary and assault charges. This Court granted the State’s petition for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a decision by the Court of Appeals, this Court directly reviews the decision of the district court, while giving serious consideration to the intermediate appellate decision.
State v. Arthur,
Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that can be raised at any time and over which appellate courts exercise free review.
State v. Jones,
III. ANALYSIS
A. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to sentence Miller as a persistent violator where the information did not include the enhancement.
Miller argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him as a persistent violator because the enhancement was not included in the information. Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case is conferred by the filing of an “information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed in the State of Idaho.”
State v. Rogers,
An information is valid if it “first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.”
Hamling v. United States,
The persistent violator enhancement is not a separate offense; rather, it “merely provides for greater punishment ... than that which might have been inflicted had there not been two prior convictions.”
Clark v. State,
This Court has held that “[wjhere it is sought to punish a defendant in a felony case as a persistent violator of law, the former convictions relied on must be alleged in the indictment or information.”
State v. Lovejoy,
While few courts have considered the issue, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the indictment or information does not need to specify the prior felonies upon which an enhancement is based.
State v. Cheek,
Idaho Criminal Rule 7(c) states that “[i]n all cases wherein an extended term of imprisonment is sought as the result of a prior conviction or convictions, the indictment or information shall set forth the facts on which the extended term of imprisonment is sought.” However, this is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction but one of notice, and notice can be given in other forms. Thus, the question in this case becomes whether the notice was sufficient. Notice is a matter of due process, and must be raised before trial or it is waived.
State v. Jones,
Miller was given more than three months’ notice that the State was seeking the persistent violator enhancement. The State filed its Notice to Defendant on January 28, 2008. Miller’s plea hearing was held on May 12, 2008. Over three months is sufficient notice.
See State v. Severson,
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Miller to concurrent sentences of life, with twenty-eight years determinate, for burglary and assault with intent to commit robbery with a persistent violator enhancement, as well as seven years determinate for possession of a controlled substance.
1. Standard of Review
Miller argues that the sentence the trial court imposed was excessive. “Where the sentence imposed by a tidal court is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Window,,
2. Analysis
From the sentencing hearing, it is apparent that the district court appropriately perceived sentencing as a matter of discretion, and this is not refuted by Miller. The district court correctly stated that it was within its discretion to impose probation or a prison sentence depending on the circumstances as outlined in I.C. § 19-2521. Also, it is apparent from the record that the district court appropriately perceived the limits of its discretion and sentenced the defendant within those boundaries. The district court sentenced the defendant to twenty-eight years determinate and indeterminate life for the burglary and assault charges. This is within the statutory limits for those charges with a persistent violator enhancement, which is five years to life. I.C. § 19-2514. Likewise, the sentences imposed for the other charges were within statutory limits, and Miller does not contest this. The record also demonstrates that the district court applied the correct legal principles with regard to the policies behind imposing a prison sentence. The court recognized that it was to look at protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution in imposing its sentence. However, Miller argues that the district court did not exercise reason in its discretion because it did not appropriately factor in his mental condition or the mitigating circumstances surrounding his case.
When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, “the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.”
State v. Hooper,
*835 a.Nature of the Offense
The nature of the offense is considered primarily to determine whether the severity of the sentence is warranted.
See Shideler,
Miller’s crimes are serious. He entered a home in the middle of the night. Upon entering, he discovered a shotgun and used it to threaten the occupants of the house, where children, including an infant, were present. He told them he was going to wait until the banks opened and force them to withdraw all of their money. While the shotgun was not loaded and everyone walked away from the incident uninjured, the severity of these crimes warrants a prison sentence.
Possession of methamphetamine, although less egregious, is still a serious crime. Miller has been convicted of three drug-related offenses prior to this one. Also, his previous two felonies were connected to his drug abuse. Since Miller’s criminal tendencies and his drug abuse seem to coincide, a severe sentence with regard to the possession of methamphetamine is also reasonable.
b.Protection of the Public Interest
Protection of the public interest is primarily related to the sentencing goal of protecting society from the offender in the future, and to a lesser extent the deterrent value of punishment on the i’est of society.
State v. Stormoen,
c.Miller’s Character
Miller argues that his sentence is excessive and that his family support, history of substance abuse, and the circumstances of his prior convictions should serve as mitigating factors. Even where the district court appropriately understands its discretion and sentences a defendant according to the applicable legal principles, an unreasonably excessive sentence can still be an abuse of discretion, and this Court can reduce the sentence. For example, in
Shideler,
the defendant robbed a bank at gunpoint, stole $22,000, and fired two shotgun blasts at a pursuing vehicle.
Here, Miller argues that his substance abuse should have been considered as a mitigating factor. Miller has an extensive history of drag and alcohol abuse starting from a very early age. He has used drugs to cope with his mental health issues and his prior burglary convictions were linked to drag use. Miller reported being sober and complying *836 with the terms of his probation for around two years prior to these convictions. It was not until his relapse that he again committed a crime.
In
State v. Osborn,
this Court stated that, although not a defense to the crime, “substance abuse is a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.”
However, the district court did not consider Miller’s substance abuse to be a mitigating factor. The court stated, “Even if I believe that your choices were controlled by the drugs you were on, which I don’t believe, you were the one that chose to take those drugs. You were the one that chose to abscond from probation and to resume using illegal drugs.”
Miller also argues that the support of his family should be considered as a mitigating factor. The district court took Miller’s familial support into consideration when issuing its sentence but not as a mitigating factor. The court read the letters of support and heard testimony from Miller’s father and friend. The court stated “[w]hile they’re certainly helpful to giving me some background on who you could be and as pleas for mercy, they’re not particularly helpful to me regarding my decision of what justice requires of you.”
Finally, Miller argues that the sentence is excessive based on his criminal history. He argues that, although he has two prior burglary felonies, those were charged a month apart, and until this, he had not had any significant problems with probation. The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts consider.
State v. Owen,
d. Miller’s Mental Condition
The district court recognized that Miller’s mental health status might be a significant factor at sentencing, so it ordered a psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524. “The defendant’s mental condition is simply one of the factors that must be considered and weighed by the court at sentencing.”
State v. Strand,
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; (b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment; (c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; (d) The availability of treats ment and level of care required; (e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at large, or the absence of such risk; (f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the offense charged.
I.C. § 19-2523(l)(a)-(f). The statute does not require that a defendant’s mental condition be the controlling factor at sentencing, nor does it require the district court to specifically reference all of the factors.
Strand,,
In
Strand,,
the sentencing was postponed to conduct a psychological evaluation, and the record showed the court had reviewed the evaluation and quoted parts of it.
Id.
In
*837
addition to the defendant’s mental health, the district court considered his juvenile record, his failed treatment in the past, his refusal to take responsibility for his actions, and his long history of anger.
Id.
at 461-62,
The district court in this ease recognized that Miller’s mental health was a significant factor. Here, as in Strand, the district court continued Miller’s sentencing so it could order a psychological evaluation, and it explicitly referenced to the evaluation and quoted from parts of it. The district court concluded that “the evaluation says there is no notable functional impairment inability, no impairment in working with legal representation, and no need for mental health treatment so long as Mr. Miller avoids substance abuse.” These comments squarely address elements in I.C. § 19-2523(1). Even though the district court is not required to specifically reference the factors, the extent of mental illness and functional impairment, as well as the prognosis for rehabilitation are all present.
In reaching its decision, the district court considered Miller’s mental illness stating, “[bipolar is certainly a condition. It is certainly a diagnosis. I don’t doubt that you have it, but it is not an excuse. There are bipolar people that succeed every day in society.” While the comment has no bearing on I.C. § 19-2523, it demonstrates that the judge considered Miller’s mental health. Rejection of mental illness as a significant factor does not indicate that mental health was not considered. The court went on to discuss the seriousness of Miller’s crime, his progression from misdemeanors to felonies, and the objectives of protecting society, deterrence, and punishment. By appropriately considering these factors, as well as Miller’s mental health, the district court issued a sentence consistent with I.C. § 19-2521 and I.C. § 19-2523.
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to sentence Miller as a persistent violator. Based upon Miller’s unconditional plea of guilty he has waived any due process objections.
We hold that the district court adequately considered Miller’s mental condition under I.C. § 19-2523 and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Miller. We affirm the district court’s judgment.