State v. KeithState v. Keith
ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
BROCK A. SCHOENLEIN, Atty. Reg. No. 0084707, 371 West First Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Leroy Keith pled no contest in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas to attempted rape of a child under the age of 13, a second-degree felony. The parties agreed that the court would sentence Keith to a mandatory term of imprisonment between five and eight years; the trial court imposed a sentence of seven years. Keith
{¶ 2} Keith appeals from his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his second motion to suppress DNA evidence and in informing him at the plea hearing that his sentence was mandatory. For the following reasons, the trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 3} Between December 8 and 9, 2012, Keith, who was 18 years old, engaged in sexual conduct with T.G., who was younger than 13 years old. The alleged rape was reported to police on December 13, 2012.
{¶ 4} On January 14, 2013, Detectives Jerome Dix and Elizabeth Aly arrested Keith, transported him to the police station, and interviewed him. During the interview, Keith initially denied having sex with T.G. Detective Dix also obtained a saliva sample from Keith, without a court order and without Keith‘s consent. After the DNA sample was taken, Keith made incriminating statements. The interview was video-recorded.
{¶ 5} In April 2013, Keith was indicted for rape of a child under the age of 13, in violation of
{¶ 6} On August 8, 2013, the trial court granted the motion to suppress. The court suppressed the DNA sample and any subsequent test results of that specimen on the ground that Dix was not statutorily authorized to collect the DNA sample from Keith. The trial court noted that
{¶ 7} The court further concluded in its suppression decision that Keith‘s incriminating statements to Detective Dix were not voluntarily made due to misstatements of the law by Dix regarding the elements of rape. The court found that Keith‘s admission that he had consensual sexual conduct with T.G. was based on the false impression that force was an essential element of rape and that it would not be rape if Keith had had consensual sexual conduct with T.G.
{¶ 8} On August 26, 2013, Detective Dix obtained a search warrant for a DNA sample from Keith. Two days later, Dix presented the search warrant to Keith and obtained a swab of his saliva. The sample was submitted to the Montgomery County Regional Crime Lab, where it was compared with DNA found on T.G.‘s underwear.
{¶ 9} On December 13, 2013, Keith filed a second motion to suppress, seeking to suppress the second DNA sample. Keith argued that the police should not be able to remedy the suppression of evidence by later obtaining a search warrant for the same evidence.
{¶ 10} A hearing on that motion was held on February 7, 2014. At the hearing, Detective Dix testified that he was aware that a prior DNA swabbing for Keith had been suppressed and that he obtained a search warrant for a new DNA sample. Dix stated that he first approached the common pleas trial judge in this case regarding the search warrant he had drafted, and based on the judge‘s instructions, he went to a Dayton Municipal Court judge.
{¶ 11} Dix stated that he provided the municipal court judge with information
{¶ 12} On March 10, 2014, the trial court overruled the second motion to suppress. Relying primarily on State v. Fugate, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2006-CA-111, 2007-Ohio-6589, the trial court initially concluded that the police were not precluded from obtaining a second DNA sample pursuant to a search warrant when the first sample was obtained unlawfully. The court indicated that it had reviewed the four corners of the search warrant affidavit, and it concluded that the affidavit “sufficiently sets forth facts that provided [the municipal court judge] a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed to believe that Keith‘s DNA would reveal evidence he committed the crime of rape.” The court further found that, although Dix had informed the judge of the procedural background of the case, “this did not negate the probable cause established in the affidavit” and the warrant was “untainted by the earlier DNA sample obtained illegally from Keith.”
{¶ 13} In July 2014, the State and Keith reached a plea agreement in which Keith
{¶ 14} For reasons that are unclear, the trial court held another hearing on September 25, 2014. Although the hearing was not transcribed, Keith apparently signed a waiver of indictment, a waiver of one-day service, a form explaining his obligations as a Tier III sex offender, a new plea form, and notice of appeal rights, all of which were filed. The State filed a bill of information. The new plea form and the bill of information both indicated that the indicted charge was amended to attempted rape by force, in violation of
{¶ 15} On September 30, 2014, the trial court filed an amended termination entry, convicting Keith of attempted rape by force and imposing the same sentence that was previously imposed. On October 10, 2014, Keith filed an “amended notice of appeal,” indicating his appeal from the original August 13 judgment.
{¶ 16} Keith raises two assignments of error.
II. The July 2014 Judgment Entry was Final
{¶ 17} As an initial matter, the parties assert that Keith ultimately pled no contest
{¶ 18} As discussed above, Keith was indicted for rape of a child under the age of 13, in violation of
{¶ 19} Pursuant to
{¶ 20} Having been indicted on rape of a child under the age of 13, Keith was necessarily and simultaneously charged with attempted rape of a child under the age of 13. The State was not required to present a bill of information to charge Keith with attempted rape of a child under of the age of 13 to effectuate Keith‘s plea. Rather, with
{¶ 21} Even assuming that there were some error in the indictment at the time of Keith‘s plea, Keith was represented by counsel, he entered a negotiated plea, and he failed to object to the State‘s failure to amend the indictment or provide a bill of information. There is no indication that Keith was prejudiced by any procedural error.
{¶ 22} In August 2014, Keith was sentenced, and the trial court entered a judgment entry imposing a mandatory term of seven years in prison. Having entered a valid, final judgment (which, additionally, was on appeal), the trial court lacked the authority to accept a new plea agreement and to resentence Keith in September 2014. The September 2014 judgment entry is a nullity.
III. Motion to Suppress Second DNA Sample
{¶ 23} In his first assignment of error, Keith claims that the trial court erred in overruling his second motion to suppress. He argues that (1) “no substantial basis existed” for the municipal court judge‘s finding of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, (2) “no good faith basis existed when Detective Dix executed the search warrant,” and (3) the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply.
{¶ 24} In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court “assumes the role of the trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994); State v. Knisley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22897, 2010-Ohio-116, ¶ 30. Accordingly, when we review suppression decisions, we must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Retherford
{¶ 25} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provide that search warrants may only be issued upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person and/or things to be seized. See also State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 11.
{¶ 26} In authorizing a search warrant, the issuing magistrate‘s duty is to determine whether “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place * * *.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Jones at ¶ 13. “[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for * * * conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.” Gates at 238-239, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-Ohio-1565, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 35. Ordinarily, “a probable cause inquiry must be confined to the four corners of the affidavit.” State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 333, 683 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist.1996). In reviewing whether a search warrant has been issued upon probable cause, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, at ¶ 15.
{¶ 27} Trial courts and appellate courts “should accord great deference to the magistrate‘s determination of probable cause, and doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.” State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus; Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, at ¶ 14.
{¶ 28} Detective Dix‘s affidavit in support of the search warrant provided the following facts:
On 12/14/2012 [T.G.] a 12yr old minor came to the Care House and participated in a forensic interview with this detective. During that interview, [T.G.] disclosed that on or about December 8th, 2012, while at [a Dayton apartment], she engaged in penile to vaginal intercourse with Leroy Keith, Jr., who is 18 years of age. During this interview, [T.G.] provided this detective with the under ware [sic] she was wearing the night of December 8th, 2012. The underwear was later submitted to the Montgomery County crime laboratory for analysis‘s [sic.]. The underwear was analyzed and was found to have semen on them.
{¶ 29} On appeal, Keith argues that there is no information in the affidavit to establish why the complainant is credible. He cites authority that where a confidential or anonymous informant is the source of hearsay, there must be some basis in the affidavit to indicate the informant‘s credibility.
{¶ 30} “Courts have generally recognized three categories of informants: (1) the identified citizen informant, (2) the known informant, i.e., someone from the criminal world who has a history of providing reliable tips, and (3) the anonymous informant.” State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 36, citing Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 300, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999). “[A] tip from an identified citizen informant who is a victim or witnesses a crime is presumed reliable, particularly if
{¶ 31} Detective Dix‘s information was based on information provided by an identified citizen informant, T.G., not an anonymous or confidential informant. T.G. was the complainant, and she provided Detective Dix with details of the alleged offense and the underwear she was wearing. Her information is presumed to be reliable, and it provided a sufficient basis for the municipal court judge to find probable cause to issue a search warrant for a sample of Keith‘s DNA.
{¶ 32} Finally, we agree with the trial court that the State was not precluded from seeking a search warrant for a second sample of Keith‘s DNA after the trial court suppressed the first sample, see Fugate, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2006-CA-111, 2007-Ohio-6589, at ¶ 12, and that the search warrant was not invalid under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
{¶ 33} Here, the evidence demonstrates that the search warrant affidavit did not rely on any evidence obtained as a result of the improper collection of a DNA sample from Keith in January 2013. In seeking a search warrant from the municipal court in August 2013, Dix orally informed the judge about the procedural history of the case, including that a prior DNA sample had been taken and suppressed and that the police “had notification back from the crime lab that [there] was a semen sample that was in the victim‘s underwear and that * * * a second sample needed to be collected for comparison.” Dix further testified that he did not believe a comparison had been performed between Keith‘s first DNA sample and the semen sample. Dix also stated that he did not inform the municipal court judge about Keith‘s incriminating statements, which had also been
{¶ 34} Because we conclude that the search warrant was based on probable cause and was not invalid as fruit of the poisonous tree, we need not address Keith‘s arguments that good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and the inevitable discovery doctrine do not apply.
{¶ 35} Keith‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Voluntariness of Defendant‘s Plea
{¶ 36} In his second assignment of error, Keith claims that his plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently, because the trial court incorrectly informed him that any prison term imposed for attempted rape must be mandatory. Keith‘s appellate counsel states in his brief that he could find no authority that requires a sentence for rape or attempted rape to be a mandatory term.
{¶ 37} Initially, the State appears to concede that Keith‘s sentence for attempted rape was not required to be mandatory. This concession is premised on its apparent belief that Keith pled no contest to attempted rape by force, in violation of
{¶ 38} Pursuant to
{¶ 39} In August 2014, Keith was convicted on his no contest plea to the lesser offense of attempted rape of a child under the age of 13, in violation of
{¶ 40} The State asserts that the trial court was required to impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to
{¶ 41} A juvenile adjudication is equivalent to a conviction for purposes of
{¶ 42} According to the presentence investigation, Keith has a 2010 juvenile adjudication for aggravated robbery, an offense that would be a first-degree felony if committed by an adult. Keith was committed to the Department of Youth Services as a result of the offense. The aggravated robbery adjudication constituted a prior first-degree felony for purposes of
{¶ 43} Keith‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 44} The trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed.
FAIN, J., concurs.
DONOVAN, P.J., concurs in judgment only.
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Andrew T. French
Brock A. Schoenlein
Hon. Dennis J. Langer