State v. KasedaState v. Kaseda
Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 11 CR 000100.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Karen A. Sheppert, Assistant Prosecutor, 105 Mаin Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Aaron T. Baker, 38109 Euclid Avenue, Willoughby, OH 44094 (For Defendant-Appellant).
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Timothy D. Kaseda, appeals from a judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, finding him guilty of one count of Violating a Protection Order pursuant to a jury verdict. Mr. Kaseda challenges the sufficiency of the state‘s evidence, along with the manifest weight of the evidence. We find that the state presented sufficient evidence on every element of the charge to withstand a motion for
Substantive Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} In January 2011, a protection order was in place naming Mr. Kaseda as respondent and Ruby Williams as the protected individual. Ms. Williams is the mother of Mr. Kаseda‘s girlfriend, Brenda Williams, and grandmother to all four of his children. The protection order prohibited Mr. Kaseda from coming within 500 feet of Ms. Williams or members of her family residing with her at her Nebraska Street residence in Painesville, Ohio. Brenda was not part of this protection order, and continued to reside with Mr. Kaseda and their four children in Eastlake. The four grandchildren did, however, spend substantial time over at Ms. Williams’ home.
{¶3} On January 10, 2011, Ms. Williams called the Painesville Police Department and reported a disturbance at her home. This occurred just after Brenda had pulled into Ms. Williams’ driveway, with Mr. Kaseda in the passenger seat. Three officers were dispatched to the scene. Officer Jeff Baldrey knocked on the front door, once backup arrived, and entered the home in search of Ms. Williams and Mr. Kaseda. Frоm inside the home, Officer Baldrey observed that the back door of the house was wide open.
{¶4} Officer Shane Rahz went around the side of the house and also observed the wide-open back doоr. He further observed a fresh pair of footprints in the snow, descending the steps from the back door and crossing the backyard. The footsteps were spaced as if the individual had been running. Together, the officers followed the footprints to a house two doors down from Ms. Williams’ home. The officers knocked on
{¶5} Mr. Kaseda wаs indicted on one count of Violating a Protection Order in violation of
{¶6} In his defense, Mr. Kaseda presented testimony from Brenda, who stated that although he was in the car with her when she arrived at her mother‘s house, he quickly realized he was in violation of the protection order, and ran off to the home two doors down, where her sister‘s boyfriend lived. The sister, Michaelene, was in fact on the protection order as well. She testified that Mr. Kaseda never entered Ms. Williams’ home that evening. At the close оf his case, Mr. Kaseda renewed his
{¶7} Mr. Kaseda was sentenced in accordance with a joint reсommendation, and received a six-month sentence of incarceration, which was to be served
{¶8} “Appellant‘s conviction of recklessly violating a protection order was without sufficient evidence and agаinst the manifest weight of the evidence.”
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶9} A trial court shall grant a motion for acquittal when there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.
{¶10} A sufficiency challenge requires this court to review the record to determine whether the state presented evidence on each of the elements of the offense. This test involves a question of law and does not permit us to weigh the evidence. State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1983).
{¶11} Mr. Kaseda was charged under
{¶12} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, it is clear that any rational trier of fact could have found Mr. Kaseda guilty of violating the protection order beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the state presented sufficient evidence to withstand a
Manifest Weight
{¶13} “Unlike sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence raises a factual issue. ‘The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and сreated such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.‘” State v. Higgins, 11th Dist. No. 2005-L-215, 2006-Ohio-5372, ¶35, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
{¶14} “The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Fritts, 11th Dist. No. 2003-L-026, 2004-Ohio-3690, ¶23, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, (1st Dist.1983).
{¶15} “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragrаph one of the syllabus. When examining witness credibility, “the choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of
{¶16} “When reviewing a judgment under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, a court has an obligation to presume that the findings of the trier of fact are correct. * * * This presumption arises because the [jury] had an opportunity to view the witnesses and observе their demeanor in weighing the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Reeves, 11th Dist. No. 2006-T-0099, 2007-Ohio-4765, ¶14, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 79-81 (1984).
{¶17} A review of the record reveals that the jury did not clearly lose its way in finding Mr. Kaseda guilty. Although Mr. Kaseda argues that the bulk of the evidence against him is circumstantial, as the police did not actually observe him within Ms. Williams’ home and Ms. Williams did not testify as to what occurred in her home that night, this does not change the value of the evidence. “[T]here can be no bright-line distinction regarding the probative force of circumstantial and direct evidence. * * * Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value.” Jenks, supra, at 272.
{¶18} At trial, the state рresented evidence, both in the form of officer testimony and photographic evidence, that the back door to Ms. Williams’ home was wide open, and fresh footsteps left in the snow clearly left a distinctive path of rapid travel from the back door, across the backyard, and into a house two doors down from Ms. Williams’ home. Mr. Kaseda answered the door when the officers knocked. Both оfficers testified
{¶19} Officer Rahz also stated that he noticed a particular square pattern in the fresh footsteps in the snow leading to Mr. Kaseda‘s location. He observed a similar pattern оn the bottom of Mr. Kaseda‘s shoes.
{¶20} Direct evidence, in the form of police testimony, established that Mr. Kaseda was less than 500 feet away from Ms. Williams’ residence, and circumstantial evidence, in the form of the footprints in the snow, indicated that Mr. Kaseda had, in fact, been at or in Ms. Williams’ residence. This was enough to convince the jury of Mr. Kaseda‘s guilt, and we cannot find that the jury lost its way in coming to that determination. We cannot say that the jury so clearly lost its way that it created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that a new trial is required; therefore, Mr. Kaseda‘s sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶21} The decision of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.,
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
concur.