STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ramon A. JUMA, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20100492-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah
Jan. 26, 2012.
2012 UT App 27
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges ORME, THORNE, and ROTH.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ROTH, Judge:
¶ 1 Defendant Ramon A. Juma appeals his conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, see
¶ 2 Juma first argues that the traffic stop that led to the discovery of thirty-three pounds of marijuana in the trunk of his rental car was not justified from its inception because the detaining officer did not have
¶ 3 The officer stopped the car in which Juma was traveling because, on approaching Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) maintenance trucks that were stopped at the side of the highway, the driver failed to “reduce the speed of the [car]” and did not “make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to” the trucks. See
¶ 4 “[A] police officer‘s subjective intent and thoughts are irrelevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry, as well as an improper basis for invalidating” a traffic stop. See generally Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 17, 194 P.3d 925. Rather, “whether reasonable suspicion exists [is] based upon the facts known to the police officer at the time of the” stop. Id. Thus,
if the [suspect]‘s conduct gives the officer reasonable, articulable suspicion, “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothesized by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer‘s action does not invalidate the action as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”
Id. (quoting Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588). An officer‘s subjective state of mind—except for the facts known to him or her—is irrelevant to the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion; indeed, the officer‘s subjective legal basis for a traffic stop need not be the offense for which the known facts actually establish reasonable, articulable suspicion. Cf. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588 (“[O]ur cases make it clear that an arresting officer‘s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. That is to say, [the officer‘s] subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” (citations omitted)).
¶ 6 Juma has not challenged the district court‘s factual findings that the driver did not slow down and move over for the UDOT maintenance trucks, thereby creating “an unsafe condition.” See generally State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 5, 194 P.3d 925 (“We review for clear error the factual findings underlying a district court‘s decision to deny a motion to suppress.“). We are therefore bound by those factual findings in our review of this matter. See generally id. ¶ 19 (explaining that the “court is bound by the district court‘s [factual] finding” that “was not properly challenged . . . nor . . . clearly erroneous“). And the district court‘s unchallenged factual findings are sufficient to support its conclusion that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver had committed an actual traffic violation by failing to “reduce . . . speed” and “provide as much space as practical” for the UDOT maintenance trucks. Accordingly, the traffic stop was justified at its inception.
¶ 7 Juma next argues that the officer detained him longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the initial traffic stop. See generally id. ¶ 9 (explaining that for a “brief, investigatory stop of a vehicle” to be valid “the detention following the stop [must be] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 17, 229 P.3d 650 (“Once a traffic stop is made, the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). During the course of the traffic stop the officer gathered additional facts that, due to his training and experience, led him to suspect that Juma and the driver of the car were drug traffickers. After issuing a warning citation and returning identification and other paperwork to Juma and the driver, the officer deployed his certified drug-detection canine, who was present in the officer‘s patrol car. Upon walking around Juma‘s car, the drug-detection canine “aggressively indicated the presence of drugs by barking and scratching on the rear passenger door.” See generally Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 29, 229 P.3d 650 (explaining that “a dog sniff is not a search under the Fourth Amendment” and “a drug-trained dog may walk the perimeter of a lawfully detained vehicle even if police have no reasonable suspicion that the vehicle occupants are engaged in drug-related activity so long as the
¶ 8 Juma does not address whether the totality of the facts gathered by the officer during the course of the traffic stop established additional reasonable, articulable suspicion of further illegal activity so as to justify the brief continued detention that resulted from deployment of the drug-detection canine.2 Rather, he argues that if the officer “had some new or heightened suspicion regarding” further illegal activity, “he would not have . . . conclud[ed] . . . the stop” by issuing a warning citation and returning identification and paperwork. Indeed, the State “agrees that, when the [officer] issued a warning citation, the original purpose of the traffic stop was completed and the [officer] could not further detain [Juma and the driver] on that basis.” (Emphasis added.) However, given that during the course of the traffic stop the officer developed the additional reasonable suspicion that Juma and the driver might be transporting drugs, he therefore had a lawful basis to temporarily continue to detain them to investigate that further illegality, even though the original basis for the stop had run its course. See generally id. ¶ 13 (“If, during the scope of [a] traffic stop, the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion.“); State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 31, 63 P.3d 650 (“Any further temporary detention for investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, because the officer had additional reasonable suspicion of further illegal activity he could temporarily detain Juma and the driver to investigate his suspicions by deploying his drug-detection canine.
¶ 9 Finally, Juma argues that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search of his car that occurred after the officer‘s drug-detection canine indicated the presence of drugs, thus making the search illegal. See generally State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ¶ 13, 173 P.3d 213 (explaining that, generally, “law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant before conducting a search“). “However, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement provides that [i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, . . . [it is] permi[ssible for] police to search the vehicle without” a warrant. See id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, having probable cause that drugs were in Juma‘s car, see generally United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206, 1223 (10th Cir.2011) (“[I]t is well-established that a dog sniff provides the requisite probable cause to search a vehicle for drugs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 435, 181 L.Ed.2d 282 (2011), the officer was not required to obtain a warrant before searching it.
¶ 10 Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 11 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges.
ROTH, Judge