State v. JordanState v. Jordan
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 2, 2023
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Kirkland, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Victoria Ferry, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{1} Tony Jordan appeals his robbery, grand theft, and aggravated robbery convictions, which included attendant firearm specifications, claiming the
{2} Jordan, when he was 15 years old and under the supervision of the juvenile court for other offenses, robbed a 42-year-old female victim outside of her apartment at gunpoint. Jordan and his accomplice, Marquise Gholston, grabbed the victim by her hair and demanded her phone, money, and car keys. The victim‘s car was parked nearby, so the attackers fled in the stolen vehicle. The next morning, Jordan and Gholston, along with two other, unnamed individuals, forced their way into another victim‘s apartment; the victim was 69 years old at the time of the home invasion. A gun was placed against the victim‘s head while the attackers searched the home for valuables, ultimately stealing cash, a large flat screen television, and a Honda SUV. Shortly after the burglary and robbery, the stolen SUV was discovered by police officers who attempted a traffic stop. A lengthy chase ensued but ended when the assailants crashed the vehicle near a local salvage yard. Gholston was apprehended in the passenger seat of the car, but Jordan fled. A K-9 unit tracked and located Jordan, who was then arrested.
{3} The matter proceeded in juvenile court with separate case numbers pertaining to each victim. Jordan waived the probable cause determination, but following the amenability hearing, the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction to the general division court after considering the factors set forth in
{4} Upon having the matter transferred to the general division court, Jordan pleaded guilty to the following: robbery, in violation of
The court imposes a prison sentence at the Lorain Correctional Institution of 4 year(s). Defendant is sentenced in count 2 [(robbery)] to 3 years; in count 3 [(grand theft)] to 9 months, in count 11 [(grand theft)] to 9 months, and in count 6 [(aggravated robbery)] to 1 year on the gun specification, to run prior to and consecutive to the underlying offense, to which he is sentenced to 4 years. The minimum term on count 2 is 3 years, the maximum term is 4.5 years. The minimum term on count 6 is 4 years on the underlying offense, and the maximum term is 6, with the total maximum term being 5 years (with the gun specification) with the maximum term being 7 years.
According to the parties, the above sentencing entry establishes an aggregate stated minimum term of five years, up to a maximum term of seven years under the Reagan Tokes Law.1
{5} In this appeal, Jordan advances two assignments of error, which will be considered in reverse order for the sake of simplicity. In the second assignment of error, Jordan preserves his continuing objection to the non-life indefinite sentencing structure codified under the Reagan Tokes Law, advancing the same arguments regarding the separation of powers, right to due process, and right to trial by jury rejected by the en banc court in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 17-51, 103, 123 (8th Dist.). Inasmuch as Jordan has limited his constitutional challenge to the issues resolved in Delvallie, those arguments are summarily overruled.
{6} In the sole substantive argument presented for review, Jordan claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion by transferring Jordan‘s case to the felony division for prosecution, claiming that it was an “unreasonable” decision when “the safety of the community could be adequately protected” by, and there were adequate resources within, the juvenile system such that Jordan was amenable to the care or rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system.
{7} A juvenile court‘s amenability determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Crosby, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107392 and 107551, 2019-Ohio-2217, ¶ 28, citing State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99044, 2013-Ohio-3725, ¶ 9, and In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629. An abuse of discretion, as that term has been defined, implies “not merely error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency. The exercise of an honest judgment, however erroneous it may appear to be, is not an abuse of discretion.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 11 (2d Ed.1910). Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion only when it “exercis[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” State v. Austin, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-210140 and C-210141, 2021-Ohio-3608, ¶ 5, quoting Johnson at ¶ 35.
{9} In this appeal, Jordan‘s argument is twofold but limited to the third finding under
{10} First and foremost, the review being sought is outside the scope of the appellate standard of review. Even if it were presumed for the sake of discussion that the juvenile court placed little weight on the expert‘s belief regarding Jordan‘s rehabilitative potential, there is no dispute that the juvenile court considered the expert‘s opinion as to Jordan‘s potential responsiveness to the treatment afforded in the juvenile justice system. The sole question for the juvenile court is the weight to be given that consideration in accordance with the statutory scheme requiring the court to weigh the totality of the analysis under
{11} No one factor under
{12} Inasmuch as Jordan claims that the trial court erroneously concluded that there was not sufficient time to rehabilitate Jordan, an offender‘s “disagreement with the way the juvenile court weighed the factors is not a reason to reverse the court‘s decision.” Cunningham at ¶ 100, citing State v. Ramsden, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2020-11-016, 2021-Ohio-3071, ¶ 23 (“[G]iven that it is the juvenile court, and not [the appellate] court, that has the discretion to determine how much weight
{13} With respect to the statutory factors under
{14} The trial court, in consideration of the statutory factors weighing against transfer under
{15} In this appeal, of the eight factors considered weighing against the transfer, Jordan only disputes the juvenile court‘s consideration of one isolated factor, whether there was sufficient time to rehabilitate Jordan. Only one other statutory factor arguably weighed against the transfer: that Jordan was diagnosed with bipolar disorder; however that was mitigated by Jordan‘s IQ (both of which fall
{16} Thus it is undisputed in this appeal that there is competent, credible evidence demonstrating that (1) under
{18} Jordan‘s assignment of error to the contrary is overruled. The convictions are affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., CONCURS;
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY