LYNCH ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. GALLIA COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ET AL., APPELLEES; GALLIA COUNTY VETERANS SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 96-876
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
July 16, 1997
79 Ohio St.3d 251 | 1997-Ohio-392
Submitted April 2, 1997 at the Athens County Session — APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Gallia County, No. 95CA13.
[Cite as Lynch v. Gallia Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 1997-Ohio-392.]
Veterans—
(No. 96-876—Submitted April 2, 1997 at the Athens County Session—Decided July 16, 1997.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Gallia County, No. 95CA13.
{¶ 1} In March 1995, the Gallia County Veterans Service Commission (“VSC“), appellant, submitted a revised proposed budget of $168,561 to the Gallia County Board of Commissioners (“Board“), appellee. After holding a budget hearing, the Board decided to appropriate only $127,559.40 to the VSC.
{¶ 2} In April 1995, appellants Rhonda Lynch and Steven Swords, two former VSC employees, filed a complaint against the VSC and the Board. Lynch and Swords claimed that they were terminated from employment with the VSC because the Board refused to fully fund the VSC‘s budget request. Their suit alleged violations of
{¶ 4} In its summary judgment motion, the Board argued that amended
{¶ 5} The trial court agreed with the VSC. In doing so, the court considered the language of
{¶ 6} The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. In construing
{¶ 7} The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
Downes & Hurst, Rufus B. Hurst and Cheri B. Hass; Beran, Piper, Tarkowsky, Fitzgerald & Theis Co., L.P.A., and Bruce A. Curry, for appellees Gallia County Board of Commissioners.
Mowery, Brown & Blume and J. Rick Brown, for appellant Gallia County Veterans Service Commission.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Andrew M. Kaplan and Scott A. Carroll, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio State Association of Veterans Service Commissions.
Ronald J. O‘Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Bonnie L. Maxton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Franklin County Board of Commissioners.
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
{¶ 8} In this case we are asked to decide whether
{¶ 9}
“On or before the last Monday in May in each year, the veterans service commission shall meet and determine in an itemized manner the probable amount necessary for the aid and financial assistance of persons entitled to such aid and assistance and for the operation of the veterans service office for the ensuing year. After determining the probable amount necessary for such purposes, the commission shall prepare and submit a budget in the manner specified in division (C) of section 5705.28 of the Revised Code to the board of county commissioners which may review the proposed budget and shall appropriate funds to the commission pursuant to Title III, section 5705.05, and sections 5705.38 to 5705.41 of the Revised Code. The board, at its June session, shall make the necessary levy, not to exceed five-tenths of a mill per dollar on the assessed value of the property of the county, to raise the amount that the board approves. The veterans service commission may, prior to the first day in October, in any year, submit to the board of county commissioners a written request for a hearing before the board to discuss the commission‘s budget request for the ensuing fiscal year. Upon receiving this request, the board shall provide for such a hearing at a regular or special meeting of the board to be held no later than fourteen days prior to the board‘s adoption of a permanent appropriation measure under section 5705.38 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 11} The prior version of the statute, as amended in 1988, specifically stated that the board of county commissioners may “review and revise the budget requests.”1 (Emphasis added.) The 1994 amendment, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV,
{¶ 12} When confronted with amendments to a statute, an interpreting court must presume that the amendments were made to change the effect and operation of the law. Leader v. Glander (1948), 149 Ohio St. 1, 5, 36 O.O. 326, 328, 77 N.E.2d 69, 71. However, a reviewing court must not construe a statute so as to supply words that are omitted. State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323. In aiding a court,
“(A) The object sought to be attained;
“(B) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
“(C) The legislative history;
“(D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects;
“(E) The consequences of a particular construction;
“(F) The administrative construction of the statute.”
{¶ 13} Up until 1988, the statute gave the board of county commissioners no discretion over the veterans service commission‘s budget. Former
{¶ 14} In 1962, this court interpreted this version of
{¶ 15} This was the law until 1988. On September 14, 1988,
{¶ 16} In State ex rel. Veterans Service Office of Pickaway Cty. v. Pickaway Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 461, 575 N.E.2d 206, the court confirmed this intention. In its opinion, this court emphasized the significance of the General Assembly‘s addition of the phrase “review and revise the budget
{¶ 17} Thus, prior to the 1994 amendment, the General Assembly had passed complete budget control from the veterans service commissions in 1953 to the boards of county commissioners in 1988. To effect that change, the General Assembly relied on the deletion and addition of key words. The most important of those words was “revise.”
{¶ 18} However, the Board argues that when read in context, the new changes do not reflect an intention by the General Assembly to divest control from the boards of county commissioners. Specifically, the Board mentions other additional language in the statute. For example, the term “proposed” that modifies the term “budget,” and the phrase “amount that the board approves,” demonstrate the intent that the Board retain discretion to approve all, or only a portion of, the VSC‘s budget request. If the Board were required to approve any amount the VSC requests, the Board argues, such words or phrases would not be needed.
{¶ 19} Additionally, the Board argues that the addition of the phrase “shall appropriate funds” is taken out of context by the VSC. When read in its entirety, the new language reads, “shall appropriate funds to the commission pursuant to Title III, section 5705.05, and sections 5705.38 to 5705.41 of the Revised Code.” Thus, the Board believes that, when read as a whole, the language only requires the Board to appropriate funds in accordance with the other statutory mandates of the Revised Code. The Board asserts that had the General Assembly wanted the Board to appropriate all funds requested by the VSC, it could have returned to the language of the 1953 statute, which used the words “the board * * * shall make the necessary levy.”
{¶ 20} The Board also distinguishes the fact that the General Assembly eliminated the word “revise” when referring to the Board‘s powers, by pointing out
{¶ 21} The Board‘s interpretation assumes that
{¶ 22} For instance, to be lawful, a budget must comply with a number of requirements. These include the Revised Code sections to which
{¶ 23} For example, a budget proposal must be in the proper form prescribed by the taxing authority or State Auditor pursuant to
{¶ 24} Other sections of
{¶ 26} We believe this interpretation of
{¶ 27} Semetko reviewed the statute which had been interpreted by this court in BinderSemetko, the Lucas County Soldiers’ Relief Commission had departed from the procedures and duties set forth in
{¶ 28} Although Semetko reviewed a prior version of
{¶ 29} The history of
{¶ 30} The return of budgetary authority to the veterans service commissions will not bring about the dire consequences predicted by the Board. Under the law established by this court, neither the boards of county commissioners nor the veterans service commissions will be permitted to abuse their discretion. See, e.g., Binder, Pickaway County, and State ex rel. Durkin v. Youngstown City Council (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 132, 134, 9 OBR 382, 384, 459 N.E.2d 213, 215.
{¶ 31} Understandably, as the Board states, the legislature has an interest in putting the veterans service commission “on equal footing with other departments and agencies within the counties,” but the statutory language and history belie such an intent in
{¶ 32} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the decision of the trial court is reinstated.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
COOK, J., dissents.
COOK, J., dissenting.
{¶ 33} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and adopt its opinion on the issue appealed here.