State v. JonesState v. Jones
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 24, 2019
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jennifer Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Lee Jones, pro se.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Lee Jones, appeals pro se from the trial court‘s decision denying his
Trial court abused its discretion when it denied Jones‘s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. - Trial court erred when it denied Jones‘s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a hearing where Jones presented sufficient operative facts to support aforementioned motion.
{¶ 2} After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment denying Jones‘s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, because Jones has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the existence of a manifest injustice.
I. Procedural and Factual History
{¶ 3} In December 2007, Jones was named in a five-count indictment in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-07-504454-A. He was charged with kidnapping in violation of
{¶ 4} In August 2008, Jones was named in a five-count indictment in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-08-514849-A. He was charged with rape in violation of
{¶ 5} In November 2008, the trial court held a consolidated plea hearing. Following an extensive
{¶ 6} In December 2008, Jones was sentenced to a 20-year prison term in Case No. CR-07-504454-A. Jones was further sentenced to a 10-year prison term in Case No. CR-08-514849-A. The sentences imposed in each case were ordered to run consecutively to each other, and consecutive to a 10-year prison term imposed in an unrelated case. Accordingly, the trial court imposed a total prison sentence of 40 years.
{¶ 7} Jones did not file a direct appeal in either case. However, in November 2018, nearly ten years after sentencing, Jones filed a consolidated motion to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to
{¶ 8} In support of his claims, Jones submitted affidavits from himself; his mother, Carrie Jones (“Carrie“); and his brother, Freddie Jones (“Freddie“). Collectively, the affidavits alleged that (1) trial counsel privately led Jones, Carrie, and Freddie to believe Jones would be sentenced “to 2-3 years of probation for his 2007 and 2008 cases“; (2) Jones is “mentally challenged“; and (3) Jones wished to proceed with a trial, but pleaded guilty due to trial counsel‘s “false promises.”
{¶ 9} In December 2018, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw without a hearing. The court stated, in relevant part:
As defendant‘s motion was not made until ten years after sentencing, the court finds that this motion is not timely. Defendant has not presented any evidence to demonstrate that he was unable to learn of any factual basis for his claims. The court finds that case law cited by defendant is not applicable to the circumstances herein, inasmuch as a hearing is not required as to a motion made after sentencing.
Contrary to claims asserted in affidavits in support of defendant‘s motion, there was no claim made and there is no evidence presented as to defendant being mentally challenged or having a learning disability. Furthermore, defendant was advised on the record at the time of his plea that probation was not possible in either case. Additionally,
defendant was assisted at all times by retained counsel and was so advised. Defendant‘s competency/sanity examination finds a history of psychotic disorder, “in remission” and “mild mental retardation,” which were not found to render defendant not competent.
{¶ 10} Jones now appeals from the trial court‘s judgment.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 11} Collectively, Jones argues in his first and second assignments of error that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without holding an evidentiary hearing. We address his assignments of error together.
{¶ 12}
Under
Crim.R. 32.1 , a defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice. A manifest injustice is a fundamental flaw in the proceedings that results in a miscarriage of justice or is inconsistent with the requirements of due process. State v. Sneed, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80902, 2002-Ohio-6502, ¶ 13. This heightened standard is in place because “a defendant should not be encouraged to plead to test the potential punishment and withdraw the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe.” Cleveland v. Jaber, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103194 and 103195, 2016-Ohio-1542, ¶ 18.
State v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105375, 2018-Ohio-1081, ¶ 39, citing State v. Colon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104944, 2017-Ohio-8478, ¶ 7.
{¶ 13} The determination of whether a defendant has demonstrated a manifest injustice is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Colon at ¶ 9, citing State v. Blatnik, 17 Ohio App.3d 201, 202, 478 N.E.2d 1016 (6th Dist.1984), State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph two of the syllabus,
{¶ 14} A trial court is not required to hold a hearing on every postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Vihtelic, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105381, 2017-Ohio-5818, ¶ 11, citing State v. Chandler, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-452, 2013-Ohio-4671, ¶ 7. “A hearing is required only if the facts alleged by the defendant, accepted as true, would require that the defendant be allowed to withdraw the plea.” Vihtelic at id., citing Chandler at id., and State v. Rodriguez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103640, 2016-Ohio-5239, ¶ 23. The trial court‘s decision whether to hold a hearing on a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Vihtelic at id.
{¶ 15} On appeal, Jones reiterates the arguments raised in his motion to withdraw, asserting that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 16} Under certain circumstances, ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute a manifest injustice warranting a withdrawal of a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Montgomery, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103398, 2016-Ohio-2943, ¶ 4. However, where a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she waives ineffective assistance of counsel except to the extent that the ineffective assistance of counsel
{¶ 17} As stated, Jones did not file a direct appeal from his convictions and sentence following the trial court‘s acceptance of his plea in Case Nos. CR-07-504454-A and CR-08-514849-A.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.
{¶ 18} In State v. Dent, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100605, 2014-Ohio-3141, this court explained the applicability of res judicata to a
The doctrine of res judicata, however, prohibits all claims raised in a
Crim.R. 32.1 postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea that were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal. State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 59; State v. Conner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98084, 2012-Ohio-3579, ¶ 7. This concept extends to situations involving defendants who failed to file the direct appeal. State v. Walters, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3482, 2013-Ohio-695, ¶ 14; State v. Maggianetti, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10-MA-169, 2011-Ohio-6370, ¶ 15; State v. Aquino, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99971, 2014-Ohio-118, ¶ 12; State v. Wilson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26511, 2013-Ohio-1529, ¶ 7; State v. Britford, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-646, 2012-Ohio-1966, ¶ 13.
Id. at ¶ 4; see also State v. Mackey, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 14CA3645, 2014-Ohio-5372, ¶ 15, citing State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.3d 9, ¶ 59 (“Ohio courts of appeals have applied res judicata to bar the assertion of claims in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that were or could have been raised at trial or on appeal“); State v. Muhumed, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-1001, 2012-Ohio-6155, ¶ 15 (“res judicata applies * * * to issues raised in a post-sentencing
{¶ 20} With that said, however, we recognize that arguments regarding threats or promises made by an attorney that rely upon evidence dehors the record are generally not barred by res judicata. Hodges at ¶ 16; Kraatz at ¶ 11. In this case, the primary basis of Jones‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that trial counsel “informed” him that he would be sentenced to probation if he accepted the state‘s proposed plea agreement. The affidavits submitted in support of his motion to withdraw allege that counsel‘s advisement was made during private conversations between trial counsel, Jones, and Jones‘s family members. Accordingly, for the purposes of this appeal, we find Jones‘s ineffective assistance of counsel arguments predicated on off-the-record conversations with defense counsel are not barred by res judicata.
{¶ 22} Finally, we are cognizant that
{¶ 23} Based on the foregoing, we find Jones has not alleged any facts that could reasonably support the conclusion that withdrawal of his guilty plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones‘s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a hearing.
{¶ 24} Jones‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 25} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR