State v. JonesState v. Jones
(Nos. 2007-2310 and 2007-2311 — Submitted October 14, 2008 — Decided February 4, 2009.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2007-CA-00139, 2007-Ohio-5818.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2007-CA-00098, 2007-Ohio-5817.
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
A law-enforcement officer who personally observes a traffic violation while outside the officer’s statutory territorial jurisdiction has probable cause to make a traffic stop; the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (State v. Weideman (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 501, 764 N.E.2d 997, followed.)
O’CONNOR, J.
{¶ 1} Today we determine whether an officer’s extraterritorial traffic stop in contravention of
Relevant Background
{¶ 2} On the night of September 27, 2006, Sergeant Mitchell Hershberger of the East Canton Police Department responded to an accident at 113 East Nassau Street in East Canton. A witness told Sergeant Hershberger that a red Ford Ranger had collided with a full-size van. The drivers had exchanged words and afterwards left the scene, with the Ford heading west on Nassau Street.
{¶ 3} Sergeant Hershberger noticed some debris left behind from the Ford. Approximately ten minutes later, he received another dispatch advising him that the Ford was hiding in the area of the former Coyote Restaurant, located about a half mile from East Canton. Hershberger went to the restaurant but did not find the Ford. Believing that the vehicle could be headed towards Canton, Sergeant Hershberger next drove out to Trump Road, about another half mile away.
{¶ 4} When Sergeant Hershberger arrived at Trump Road, he began heading back east, checking various businesses for the Ford. While he was checking a car wash, a motorist told Sergeant Hershberger that a vehicle heading west without any headlights almost hit him.
{¶ 5} Sergeant Hershberger got back on the road, continuing to go east towards East Canton, and eventually saw the Ford. Upon finding the truck, he observed that its front end was smashed and its headlights were not on. Sergeant Hershberger stopped the Ford, which appellee Adam Jones was driving, because the vehicle did not have its headlights on.
{¶ 6} After he had pulled over the vehicle, Sergeant Hershberger asked Jones and his passenger, appellee Shawn Skropits, whether they had any weapons in the truck, and appellees said that they did. In addition, Jones told Sergeant
{¶ 7} Sergeant Hershberger arrested appellees and charged each of them with one count of carrying a concealed weapon and one count of unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance. Appellees moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that because the stop violated
{¶ 8} Following the denial of their motions to suppress, appellees pleaded no contest to the charges, were found guilty by the trial court, and were sentenced to community control.
{¶ 9} Appellees appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The court of appeals reversed in a divided opinion, holding that there was neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to support Sergeant Hershberger’s stop. The dissent, however, would have affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress based on State v. Weideman (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 501, 764 N.E.2d 997.
{¶ 10} The state appealed the reversals, and we exercised jurisdiction and consolidated the cases. State v. Skropits, 117 Ohio St.3d 1450, 2008-Ohio-1427, 883 N.E.2d 1075 (cause consolidated); State v. Jones, 117 Ohio St.3d 1438, 2008-Ohio-1279, 883 N.E.2d 456 (appeal accepted and cause consolidated); State v. Skropits, 117 Ohio St.3d 1423, 2008-Ohio-969, 882 N.E.2d 444 (appeal accepted).
Analysis
{¶ 11} Our decision in Weideman and the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Virginia v. Moore (2008), 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559, are dispositive of this matter. Read together, Weideman and Moore
{¶ 12} We held in Weideman that “[w]here a law enforcement officer, acting outside the officer’s statutory territorial jurisdiction, stops and detains a motorist for an offense committed and observed outside the officer’s jurisdiction, the seizure of the motorist by the officer is not unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment.” 94 Ohio St.3d 501, 764 N.E.2d 997, syllabus.
{¶ 13} The facts of Weideman closely mirror those of the present case. In Weideman, a police officer outside of his jurisdiction stopped a vehicle that he had observed traveling left of center. Id. at 502, 764 N.E.2d 997. The trial court denied Weideman’s motion to suppress, but the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that because the officer had been outside of his jurisdiction, the arrest was unlawful under
{¶ 14} We reversed the appellate court’s judgment. Specifically, we held that “[t]he state’s interest in protecting the public from a person who drives an automobile in a manner that endangers other drivers outweighs [the defendant’s] right to drive unhindered.” Weideman, 94 Ohio St.3d at 506, 764 N.E.2d 997. But because the stop was not per se unreasonable, it follows that a court could find that an extraterritorial stop is unreasonable based on the unique facts and circumstances of a particular case.1
{¶ 16} Moore moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Id. at 168, 128 S.Ct. at 1602, 170 L.Ed.2d 559. The trial court denied the motion, but the Supreme Court of Virginia ultimately reversed the ruling. Id. The United States Supreme Court then reversed that judgment, reinstating the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. Id. at 178, 128 S.Ct. at 1608, 170 L.Ed.2d 559
{¶ 17} Moore explained that “when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 171, 128 S.Ct. at 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559. The court further acknowledged that although states could legislate a higher standard on searches and seizures, those laws do not alter the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
{¶ 18} Applying Virginia’s law to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court observed that although the statute provided a greater degree of protection than that
{¶ 19} In the case before us, it is undisputed that there was a violation of
{¶ 20} The appellate court’s focus on the fact that Sergeant Hershberger was outside his jurisdiction and on his reasons for being there is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. The sole focus of the inquiry should have been on the stop itself because the violation of
{¶ 21} Although it could have done so,5 the General Assembly chose not to provide any remedy for a violation of
{¶ 22} Likewise, we must reject appellees’ entreaties that we develop a balancing test for determining when to impose a suitable sanction for a law-enforcement officer’s violation of the territorial limits on arrest powers. Generally, establishing a remedy for a violation of a statute remains in the province of the General Assembly, not the Ohio Supreme Court. State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 246, 2006-Ohio-5202, 855 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 37. The Fourth Amendment simply does not require this result. Moore, 553 U.S. at 178, 128 S.Ct. at 1608, 170 L.Ed.2d 559.
Conclusion
{¶ 23} We share the concerns that appellees express about law-enforcement officers who violate the territorial requirements of
{¶ 24} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur separately.
O’DONNELL, J., concurring.
{¶ 25} The sole issue before the court is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a police officer’s extraterritorial traffic stop. The majority reverses the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and holds that the trial court properly denied Jones’s and Skropits’s motions to suppress the evidence. I concur with that result based on the following three-part analysis.
(1) Whether an officer’s extraterritorial stop in violation of
{¶ 26} As the court of appeals stated in its decision, “Revised Code § 2935.03(A)(1) governs a police officer’s jurisdiction to arrest. It is undisputed in this case that the arresting officer was outside of his territorial jurisdiction when he made the arrest as the subject vehicle was located outside of the East Canton border.” State v. Jones, Stark App. No. 2007-CA-00139, 2007-Ohio-5818, ¶ 16. Thus, it may be assumed that the officer violated
{¶ 27} In Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 18 O.O.3d 435, 416 N.E.2d 598, this court unanimously answered the question in the negative. There, the court assumed that a Kettering police officer violated
{¶ 28} “It is clear * * * that the exclusionary rule will not ordinarily be applied to evidence which is the product of police conduct violative of state law but not violative of constitutional rights.
{¶ 29} “We turn now to examine the facts in this case to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred. We find none. At the outset, it is readily apparent that [the officer] had probable cause to arrest the defendant after observing his erratic driving behavior.” Id. at 234-235, 18 O.O.3d 435, 416 N.E.2d 598.
{¶ 30} Thus, a violation of
(2) Whether an extraterritorial stop in violation of
{¶ 31} In State v. Weideman (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 501, 764 N.E.2d 997, a Ravenna police officer left his territory to conduct a routine errand, and while outside of the city limits, he observed a driver traveling left of center. Id. at 502, 764 N.E.2d 997. In violation of
{¶ 32} This court answered in the negative: “Where a law enforcement officer, acting outside the officer’s statutory territorial jurisdiction, stops and detains a motorist for an offense committed and observed outside the officer’s jurisdiction, the seizure of the motorist by the officer is not unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the officer’s statutory violation does not require suppression of all evidence flowing from the stop.” 94 Ohio St.3d at 506, 764 N.E.2d 997. Rather, the only issue is whether the officer had probable cause, and “[t]he trial court did not err when it concluded that defendant‘s manner of operating her motor vehicle gave [the officer] sufficient probable cause to make the stop.” Id.
{¶ 33} Our conclusion in Weideman is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Virginia v. Moore (2008), 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559. There, a police officer stopped and arrested Moore on the belief that he was driving on a suspended license, but Virginia law provided that an officer could not arrest a driver for this offense. Id. at 167, 128 S.Ct. at 1602, 170 L.Ed.2d 559. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the officer’s violation of the state statute necessarily resulted in a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court held that it did not: “[W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.” Id. at 171, 128 S.Ct. at 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559.
{¶ 34} Thus, in this case, the officer’s extraterritorial stop and arrest of Jones and Skropits in violation
(3) Whether the officer had probable cause to stop Jones and Skropits.
{¶ 35} Here, the police officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had personally observed that the headlights on Jones and Skropits’s truck were nonfunctional, in violation of several sections in
{¶ 36} It could be argued that the broken headlights were mere pretext and that the real reason for stopping Jones and Skropits was the officer’s subjective belief that they were involved in a “hit-skip” accident in East Canton, a violation that the officer did not observe. The United States Supreme Court, however, has consistently rejected subjective analyses and other claims of pretext in the context of probable cause. See Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806, 813-814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, quoting United States v. Robinson (1973), 414 U.S. 218, 221, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, fn.1 (“we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers * * *. [A] traffic-violation arrest * * * [will] not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was ‘a mere pretext for a narcotics search’ “); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan (2001), 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994, quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (” ‘subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis’ “); Bond v. United States (2000), 529 U.S. 334, 338, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365, fn. 2 (“the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer‘s actions violate the Fourth Amendment“).
{¶ 38} I respectfully concur.
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
John D. Ferrero, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Mark Caldwell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Tammi R. Johnson, Stark County Public Defender, and Steven A. Reisch, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee Adam David Jones.
George Urban, for appellee Shawn Michael Skropits.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin Mizer, Solicitor General, and Todd Nist, Assistant Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio.