State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymon L. Johnson, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19AP-296 (C.P.C. No. 18CR-2499)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Rendered on August 13, 2020
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2020-Ohio-4077.]
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
On brief: Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Barbara A. Farnbacher, for appellee.
On brief: Todd W. Barstow, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Raymon L. Johnson, appeals from a judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty, pursuant to jury verdict, of receiving stolen property. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} By indictment filed May 23, 2018, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, charged Johnson with one count of receiving stolen property in violation of
{¶ 3} At a jury trial beginning February 19, 2019, Don Olson, an officer with the Columbus Division of Police, testified that around 2:00 a.m. on May 20, 2018 he and his partner, Officer William Phillips, noticed an improperly parked tan Toyota Sienna minivan at the intersection of Cordell Avenue and Cleveland Avenue. The officers observed that the
{¶ 4} Officer Olson testified he and his partner ran the license plate on the minivan and the plate came back as belonging to a different vehicle. The vehicle was unlocked, and Officer Wilson opened the passenger door, retrieved the wallet, wrote down the name on the identification in the wallet, and then placed the wallet on the passenger seat. While Officer Wilson was going back to the police cruiser to run the name obtained from the identification inside the wallet, Officer Olson saw Johnson come back around the building and walk toward the officers and the minivan. Officer Olson testified that he asked Johnson his name but Johnson did not respond; instead, Johnson “quickly dove” toward the open passenger door and reached inside the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 81.) At that point, the officers detained him. The officers were wearing body cameras and activated the cameras after detaining Johnson. The state played the body camera footage from the interaction during the trial.
{¶ 5} Once the officers had detained Johnson, they searched him and found a key to the minivan in Johnson‘s pocket. Johnson told the officers the key belonged to his friend who he claimed owned the vehicle. Johnson provided his name and insisted that the wallet was his. When the officers asked him why the identification in the wallet had someone else‘s name, Johnson replied that the identification belonged to his friend who died.
{¶ 6} Officer Phillips testified that when he searched the van, he found bolt cutters and a large vent in the back. The officers also found bolt cutters on Johnson‘s person when they searched him. Officer Phillips further testified that he looked around at the nearby buildings and noticed a vent missing from the back of one of the buildings and there was a wooden box underneath. Officer Phillips said it looked like someone had attempted to climb into the building through the vent opening.
{¶ 7} The officers transported Johnson to police headquarters, and Detective Charles Jervis continued to interview Johnson. Johnson admitted that he had been inside
{¶ 8} The owner of the vehicle, Raquel Dowdy-Cornute, testified that her vehicle was stolen approximately one and one-half months before it was recovered, that she reported the theft to the police, and that she did not know Johnson. Additionally, Colin Vent, the person whose identification was found inside the wallet, testified that someone broke into his home on March 4, 2018, stealing both his wallet and identification. Vent testified he did not know Johnson.
{¶ 9} At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the sole count of receiving stolen property, and the jury further found the property was a motor vehicle. At an April 3, 2019 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Johnson to 18 months in prison and imposed a fine of $5,000. The trial court journalized Johnson‘s conviction and sentence in an April 4, 2019 judgment entry. Johnson timely appeals.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 10} Johnson assigns the following error for our review:
The trial court erred and deprived appellant of due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution andArticle One Section Ten of the Ohio Constitution by finding him guilty of receiving stolen property as that verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence and was also against the manifest weight of the evidence.
III. Analysis
{¶ 11} In his sole assignment of error, Johnson argues his conviction for receiving stolen property is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶ 12} Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Id. The relevant inquiry for an appellate court is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to
{¶ 13} The jury convicted Johnson of one count of receiving stolen property in violation of
{¶ 14} Johnson asserts there was insufficient evidence to prove he had knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle was stolen. Pursuant to
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person‘s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
{¶ 15} When determining whether a person acts knowingly, has knowledge of the circumstances, has knowledge of a particular fact, or has reasonable cause to believe the property was stolen, the trier of fact must determine the person‘s state of mind from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged crime. State v. Ingram, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1124, 2012-Ohio-4075, ¶ 22; State v. Collins, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-130, 2012-Ohio-372, ¶ 12, citing State v. Arthur, 42 Ohio St.2d 67, 68 (1975). Culpable mental states are frequently determined from the totality of the circumstantial evidence. Ingram at ¶ 22; State v. Stanley, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-323, 2007-Ohio-2786, ¶ 31 (noting that “absent an admission” by the defendant, the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the defendant‘s actions, determine whether a defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance).2
{¶ 17} Here, Johnson did not provide a satisfactory explanation for his possession of the vehicle. Though he claimed his friend had been allowing him to drive the vehicle, he could not provide the name of the vehicle‘s owner and did not know where the owner was. He additionally provided a story about the wallet that was found inside the vehicle. He said that the identification in the wallet belonged to his deceased friend. However, Vent testified at trial that he did not know Johnson and that the identification belonged to him and was stolen from his house earlier that same month. The officers testified that the vehicle was discovered parked on a sidewalk with an interior light on in a part of town where stolen cars
B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 18} When presented with a manifest weight argument, an appellate court engages in a limited weighing of the evidence to determine whether sufficient competent, credible evidence supports the jury‘s verdict. State v. Salinas, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1201, 2010-Ohio-4738, ¶ 32, citing Thompkins at 387. “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder‘s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). Determinations of credibility and weight of the testimony are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, the jury may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve them accordingly, “believ[ing] all, part, or none of a witness‘s testimony.” State v. Raver, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-604, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964).
{¶ 19} An appellate court considering a manifest weight challenge “may not merely substitute its view for that of the trier of fact, but must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-770, 2014-Ohio-2501, ¶ 22, citing Thompkins at 387. Appellate courts should reverse a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the most “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.‘” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 20} Johnson argues his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence because he told officers that he did not know the vehicle was stolen. However, the presence of conflicting testimony does not render a verdict against the manifest weight of the
{¶ 21} For these reasons, we conclude the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence support Johnson‘s conviction. Accordingly, we overrule Johnson‘s sole assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 22} Based on the foregoing reasons, the sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence support Johnson‘s conviction for receiving stolen property. Having overruled Johnson‘s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
NELSON, J., concurs.
BRUNNER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
BRUNNER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 23} I concur in judgment with the majority, but I respectfully dissent from its reasoning on several key points. I make these distinctions because model jury instructions are based on case law, and I believe that, were they to be crafted from the majority holding in this decision, the rights of the criminally accused would be affected and as such, diminished.
{¶ 25} Also, in paragraph 18 of the majority decision, in discussing manifest weight of the evidence, the majority states, “[w]hen presented with a manifest weight argument, an appellate court engages in a limited weighing of the evidence to determine whether sufficient competent, credible evidence supports the jury‘s verdict. State v. Salinas, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1201, 2010-Ohio-4738, ¶ 32, citing Thompkins at 387.” In light of my concerns about sufficiency versus manifest weight of the evidence, I would add to the quote supported by Salinas, the rest of the sentence from which the above quote was extracted: “to permit reasonable minds to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Salinas at ¶ 32.
{¶ 26} Second, the particular use of State v. Ingram, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1124, 2012-Ohio-4075 by the majority in paragraph 15 of its decision unnecessarily and improperly expands its application. The relevant sentence from Ingram is only this: “‘A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.’ Id. at ¶ 22, quoting
{¶ 27} The exact language from ¶ 22 of Ingram is this: “Culpable mental states are frequently demonstrated through circumstantial evidence.” Left unchecked, the language used in the majority decision extends a descriptive declaration to this maxim in paragraph 15 of the majority: “‘absent an admission’ by the defendant, the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the defendant‘s actions, determine whether a defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance.” As applied to Johnson and as may be applied
{¶ 28} Finally, I would more clearly explain in paragraph 13 of the majority decision that, because the stolen property involved was found by the jury to be a motor vehicle, an enhanced maximum penalty of 18 months imprisonment was imposed for this fourth-degree felony conviction (as opposed to the general penalty of a maximum of 12 months for a general fifth-degree felony for receiving stolen property).
{¶ 29} I therefore respectfully concur with the judgment of the majority in paragraph 22 that “the sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence support Johnson‘s conviction for receiving stolen property,” but I dissent from the path the majority took to arrive at these conclusions.