STATE OF OHIO v. CIERA N. JOHNSON
No. 106141
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
October 4, 2018
2018-Ohio-4023
S. Gallagher, J., E.T. Gallagher, P.J., and Stewart, J.
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-17-616092-B
Michael P. Maloney
24441 Detroit Road, Suite 200
Westlake, Ohio 44145
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O‘Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Blaise D. Thomas
Angela Thomas Fain
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
Justice Center - 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Appellant Ciera Johnson appeals her conviction and sentence. Upon review, we affirm.
{¶2} Johnson was charged under a multi-count indictment with offenses related to the shooting death of the victim. A codefendant, Anthony Simmons, also was charged under the indictment. Another individual, Timothy Dancy, who was charged under an initial indictment as a codefendant, entered a plea bargain with the state and testified in this case.
{¶3} At trial, Dancy‘s testimony provided a detailed account of the crimes and Johnson‘s involvement. According to Dancy, before the shooting Dancy, Simmons, and Johnson were at Simmons‘s house. They all wanted to “smoke weed,” but none of them had money. They agreed they would rob the victim for his weed, and Simmons suggested they kill him.
{¶4} Dancy testified that in response to Simmons‘s suggestion that they kill the victim, Johnson stated that “it was all right” and that she “didn‘t give a f*** about him.” Dancy stated that after this conversation, Johnson called the victim, told him she wanted to buy some weed, and asked where to meet him. After Johnson made the phone call, Dancy and Simmons went to the victim‘s home. Dancy testified that he and Simmons shot the victim numerous times in the victim‘s driveway and they took $150 to $240 from him. Dancy also testified to events that transpired following the murder and robbery.
{¶5} The victim‘s cell phone records confirmed a call was placed to him from Johnson‘s phone near the time of the shooting. Detective Diaz testified that Johnson admitted she had made a call to the victim to purchase marijuana. There also was evidence of text messages exchanged between Simmons and Johnson after the murder, in which they discuss the house being “hot,” Johnson hiding appellant‘s gun inside the house, and Simmons getting a new cell phone. The day Simmons was arrested, he sent a message to Johnson stating “they got me. I love you.”
{¶6} The jury found Johnson guilty of one count each of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, murder, and felonious assault, along with forfeiture specifications. She was found not guilty of firearm specifications and not guilty of the aggravated murder charge in Count 2. The trial court merged Counts 3, 4, and 5 with Count 1, aggravated murder (
{¶7} On appeal, appellant raises four assignments of error for our review. Appellant‘s first assignment of error claims as follows:
I. The trial court erred in denying appellant‘s Criminal Rule 29 motion for acquittal when there was insufficient evidence to prove the elements of conspiracy or complicity to commit aggravated murder and murder.
{¶9} Johnson, as an accomplice, was convicted of aggravated murder pursuant to
(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another * * * while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit * * * aggravated robbery * * *.
{¶10}
(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
* * *
(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense;
(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code;
* * *
(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal
offender. A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.
Thus, the complicity statute requires, inter alia, that the defendant aid and abet or conspire with another in the commission of the offense with the same culpability required for the principal offense.
{¶11} “[T]o support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to
{¶12} A charge of complicity also may be brought pursuant to
{¶13}
(A) No person, with purpose to commit or to promote or facilitate the commission of aggravated murder, * * * shall do either of the following:
(1) With another person or persons, plan or aid in planning the commission of any of the specified offenses;
(2) Agree with another person or persons that one or more of them will engage in conduct that facilitates the commission of any of the specified offenses.
{¶14} In this case, the state produced sufficient evidence to show that Johnson, with purpose to cause the death of the victim, aided and abetted Simmons and Dancy in committing the aggravated murder. The record reflects that Johnson, through her remarks and actions, supported and encouraged the decision to kill the victim; she cooperated with the principal offenders and assisted in the commission of the crime by calling the victim to arrange to meet him under the guise of buying marijuana; and she shared the criminal intent of the principals, who left to meet and kill the victim after Johnson made the call. Indeed, “[p]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from
{¶15} The state also presented sufficient evidence to show Johnson, with purpose to commit or to promote or facilitate the commission of aggravated murder, conspired with the principal offenders to commit the offense. The record shows that Johnson was involved in planning the aggravated murder with her coconspirators, Dancy and Simmons, and that she agreed with and engaged in conduct that facilitated the commission of the offense. Further, proof of the conspiracy was shown not only from Dancy‘s testimony, but also from the victim‘s phone records and testimony from Detective Diaz, both of which corroborated Dancy‘s testimony concerning the call placed from Johnson to the victim near the time of the shooting. Johnson‘s call to the victim constituted a substantial overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
{¶16} Our review of the record reflects that the state‘s complicity case against Johnson and her conviction for aggravated murder were supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.1
II. The jury‘s verdict on conspiracy or complicity to commit aggravated murder and murder were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶18} When reviewing a claim challenging the manifest weight of the evidence, the court, reviewing the entire record, must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence should be reserved for only the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id.
{¶19} The record in this case contains testimony and evidence that established Johnson, with the required criminal intent, supported, assisted, encouraged, and cooperated with Simmons and Dancy in the aggravated murder of the victim; agreed with and helped facilitate the commission of the crimes; and committed a substantial overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Dancy testified that prior to the shooting, Johnson, Simmons, and Dancy were hanging out and plotting how to obtain marijuana because they wanted to “smoke weed” but had no money. In response to Simmons‘s suggestion that they kill the victim, Johnson stated that “it was all right” and that she “didn‘t give a f*** about him.” Testimony and phone records
{¶20} Having reviewed the entire record in this case, we are unable to find that the jury clearly lost its way or that this is the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.2
{¶21} Appellant‘s third assignment of error claims as follows:
III. The trial court erred in admitting evidence and testimony about co-defendant Anthony Simmons’ affiliation with the Heartless Felons.
{¶22} Appellant challenges the trial court‘s admission of evidence and testimony concerning Simmons‘s affiliation with the Heartless Felons. Johnson argues that the crimes charged were unrelated to any gang activity and that the evidence as it related to Simmons reflected upon her as his coconspirator. She argues that the evidence was improperly allowed, was prejudicial, and compromised her ability to defend her case.
{¶24} During the questioning of Dancy, he also was asked questions concerning the Heartless Felons and Simmons‘s affiliation to the gang. Dancy testified that Simmons is a member and identified a tattoo on Simmons‘s arm that indicated an affiliation with the Heartless Felons. Objections were then noted on the record.
{¶25} “The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and unless it has clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been materially prejudiced thereby, an appellate court should not disturb the decision of the trial court.” State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 2001-Ohio-1290, 754 N.E.2d 904. Moreover, insofar as no objection was raised to much of this testimony, we review for plain error. Under
{¶26} Here, as aptly noted by the trial court, evidence of Simmons‘s association with the Heartless Felons was brought up numerous times without any objection, and it was not until the state sought to admit additional photographic evidence of Simmons‘s Heartless Felons tattoo that appellant raised an objection. Further, there was no testimony presented linking the crimes to gang activity and the questioning concerning any affiliation of Simmons to the gang was relatively brief in the scope of the voluminous record presented.
{¶27} Even if the court erred in admitting the subject evidence, the record reflects that Johnson‘s culpability as a coconspirator and her complicity in the crimes were supported by substantial other evidence in the case. The testimony from Dancy and Detective Diaz, along with the corroborating phone records, proved appellant‘s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon our review, we are unable to find that Johnson was materially prejudiced. Moreover, even if the offending evidence had been excluded, the outcome of her trial would not have changed. The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶28} Appellant‘s fourth assignment of error claims as follows:
IV. The trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements of the co-defendant.
{¶31} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR