State v. JohnsonState v. Johnson
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Donald Lee Johnson, appeals from the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Plеas denying his pro se post-sentence motion to withdraw his no contest plea to a charge of aggravated possession of drugs.1 For the reasons outlined
{¶ 2} As relevant here, on September 19, 2011, Johnson entered a no contest plea to a charge of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of
{¶ 3} On October 31, 2011, the trial court held a sentencing hearing wherein it sentenced Johnson to an aggregate term of 13 years in prison, eight of which were to be served on the aggravated possession of drugs offense. The trial court also ordered Johnson tо pay $19,000 in fines, $10,000 of which were mandatory. The trial court‘s sentencing entry correctly stated that the eight-year prison sentence imposed for the aggravated possession of drugs offense was “a mandatory рrison term” in accordance with
{¶ 4} On September 2, 2014, this court affirmed Johnson‘s conviction and sentence on direct appeal in State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-11-212, 2014-Ohio-3776. As part of this appeal, Johnson did not allege the trial court erred when it did not specifically inform him at the plea hearing that the sentence to be imposed resulting from his no contest plea to aggravated possession of drugs was a mandatory prison term. Instead, Johnson merely аrgued “the trial court erred in imposing fines upon him because he is indigent, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue against the fines.” Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶ 5} Over a year later, on March 7, 2016, Johnson filed a pro se post-sentеnce
{¶ 6} Johnson now appeals from the trial court‘s decision, raising a single assignment of error for review.
{¶ 7} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT‘S
{¶ 8} In his single assignment of error, Johnson argues the trial court erred by denying his pro se post-sentence motion to withdraw his no contest plea to the aggravated possession of drugs charge. In support of this claim, Johnson argues the trial court erred by finding the doctrine of res judicata barred his claim since his plеa was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily when the trial court failed to inform him that the sentence imposed for that charge would be mandatory, thus making him ineligible for early judicial release. We disagree.
{¶ 9} Pursuant to
{¶ 10} We review a trial court‘s decision on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Powell, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2009-05-028, 2009-Ohio-6552, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment. State v. Miller, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-01-007, 2016-Ohio-7360, ¶ 7. Rather, it suggests the “trial court‘s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Perkins, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2005-01-002, 2005-Ohio-6557, ¶ 8. A decision is unreasonable when it is “unsupported by a sound reasoning process.” State v. Abdullah, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-427, 2007-Ohio-7010, ¶ 16, citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990).
The Doctrine of Res Judicata
{¶ 11} The doctrine of res judicata provides that “a final judgment of conviction bars a
Johnson‘s Claim is Barred by Res Judicata
{¶ 12} As notеd above, Johnson argues the trial court erred by denying his pro se post-sentence motion to withdraw his no contest plea to aggravated possession of drugs because his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily where the trial court failed to inform him that the sentence imposed would be mandatory, thus making him ineligible for early judicial release. However, as this court has stated previously, this failure does not result in a sentence being rendered void. Vancleve, 2016-Ohio-7546 at ¶ 18 (“a trial court‘s failure to specify that a sentence is mandatory does not make the sentence void“). Rather, this failure merely renders a sentence voidable. State v. Green, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-09-187, 2017-Ohio-2800, ¶ 12, citing State v. Floyd, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-09-077, 2017-Ohio-687, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Gannon, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 15CA16, 2016-Ohio-1007, ¶ 17. Consequently, the doctrine of res judicata still applies. Id.
{¶ 13} After a thorough review of the record, and just as the trial court found, we find Johnson was well aware that the sentence imposed for aggravated possession of drugs would be mandatory, thus making him ineligible for early judicial relеase, prior to him entering his no contest plea. As the record reveals, although not specifically informed by the trial court at his plea hearing, Johnson‘s signature appears on the no contest plеa form, a form that does explicitly state the prison sentence imposed for that offense would be mandatory. Johnson further acknowledged on the record that he had read and reviewed this form with his trial cоunsel prior to entering his no contest plea. Johnson, therefore, being fully aware of the trial court‘s contradictory statements regarding the mandatory nature of this sentence, could have, and should have, raised this issue as part of his direct appeal.
{¶ 14} Despite this, Johnson claims that it was impossible for him to raise this issue since the transcript of the plea hearing was incomplete. However, as the trial court сorrectly noted, “[e]ven if appellate counsel would not have been made aware of the error through the transcript of the plea hearing, [Johnson] had knowledge of the error and the opportunity to bring said error to the attention of appellate counsel to be argued on appeal.” We agree with the trial court‘s rationale, which is further supported by the fact that the trial court‘s sentencing entry correctly stated that the sentence imposed for the aggravated possession of drugs offense was “a mandatory prison term” in accordance with
{¶ 15} Alternatively, as noted above, prior to filing his motion to withdraw, this court affirmed Johnson‘s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. As stated by thе Ohio Supreme Court, such a motion “does not confer upon the trial court the power to vacate a judgment which has been affirmed by the appellate court, for this action would affect the deсision of the reviewing court, which is not within the power of the trial court to do.” State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 98 (1978). In other words, absent a remand from a higher court, a trial court is without jurisdiсtion to decide a motion to withdraw a plea once the appellate court has affirmed the appellant‘s conviction on direct appeal. State v. Kwambana, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-08-060, 2017-Ohio-1406, ¶ 16; State v. Asher, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-12-234, 2015-Ohio-724, ¶ 7. However, because the trial court determined that the doctrine of res judicata applied, and because Johnson is appearing pro se in this matter raising that very issue as his single assignment of error, further discussion of that issue was warranted under these limited circumstances. Accordingly, whether under the doctrine of res judicata or based on the law of the case, Johnson‘s single assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 16} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and RINGLAND, J., concur.