State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond M. Johnson, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15AP-1021 (C.P.C. No. 14CR-2390)
No. 15AP-1022 (C.P.C. No. 13CR-6559)
No. 15AP-1023 (C.P.C. No. 14CR-1258)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
November 29, 2016
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2016-Ohio-7945.]
HORTON, J.
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on November 29, 2016
On brief: Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michaеl P. Walton, for appellee. Argued: Michael P. Walton.
On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and George M. Schumann, for аppellant. Argued: George M. Schumann.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
HORTON, J.
{¶ 1} In this appeal from his criminal sentence, defendant-appellant, Raymond M. Johnson, argues that his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because the trial court failed to advise him of his right to confront witnesses, as required by
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} In three separate indictments, Johnson was charged with committing the following offenses: two counts of murder with firearm specifications under
{¶ 3} On the morning of Johnson‘s scheduled trial, October 5, 2015, a plea agreement was reached. (Oct. 5, 2014 Tr. at 2.) Johnson рled guilty to one of the murder counts, having a weapon while under disability, permitting drug abuse, and failure to appear, and the state dismissed all other charges against him. (Tr. at 9, 13, 20-22.)
{¶ 4} During the plea colloquy, the trial court advised Johnson that by pleading guilty, he was giving up: the right to a jury trial; his right to have the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of all offеnses for which he had been charged; the right to not be compelled to testify; the right to have individual charges, such as the firearm specification, tried before the bench instead of a jury; the right to compulsory process; and the right to appeal any trial errors. (Tr. at 17-19.) After advising Johnson of these rights, the trial court accepted his guilty pleas and imposed sentence. (Tr. at 20, 26, 29-30.)
{¶ 5} Johnson now appeals, asserting the following assignment of error:
The trial court erred by еntering judgments of conviction based upon guilty pleas that were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} A trial court has a duty to strictly comply with
{¶ 8} Jоhnson argues that the trial court failed to advise him of his right to confront witnesses at trial, and that his plea was therefore invalid under Veney. After reviewing the transcript of the plea colloquy, we agree. The trial court advised him of all the cоnstitutional rights required by
{¶ 9} The state appears to concede that the trial court failed to inform Johnson of his Confrontation Clause right, as
{¶ 10} We do not read Barker as a repudiation of Veney or the standard it requires of the trial court when accepting a guilty plea under
{¶ 11} The Barker court only cited Vonn once, and did so when stating the following:
Thus, when a trial court аddresses all the constitutional rights in the oral colloquy, a reviewing court should be permitted to
consider additional rеcord evidence to reconcile any alleged ambiguity in it. We further note that this interpretation comports with fеderal law, which does not require automatic vacation of a plea when a judge fails to inform a defendant of a Boykin right. Boykin, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. See United States v. Vonn (2002), 535 U.S. 55, 59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90.
Barker at ¶ 24.
{¶ 12} This fleeting reference to Vonn provides no support for the state‘s argument that, after Barker, a plain error standard applies to review of guilty pleas under
{¶ 13} Here, in contrast to Barker, the trial court did not “address[] all the constitutional rights in the oral colloquy,” as it failed to even mention the defendant‘s Confrontation Clause right. Barker would only apply in this case if the trial court had informed Johnson of his Confrontation Clause right in a manner that did not conform to the exact language of
{¶ 14} Because the trial court omitted any mention оf Johnson‘s Confrontation Clause rights as required by
Guilty pleas vacated; judgment reversed and cause remanded.
TYACK and KLATT, JJ., concur.