State v. JohnsonState v. Johnson
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Per Curiam (per curiam)
Defendant Jerry Johnson was charged by grand jury indictment with aggravated rape, in violation of
The offense of which defendant was convicted occurred on September 16, 1972. At the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of trial and conviction, aggravated rape was punishable either by death or by life imprisonment without probation, parole or suspension of sentence. Also at this time,
In 1976, however, Selman v. Louisiana, supra, declared unconstitutional Louisiana‘s mandatory death penalty for aggravated rape. The sentences of defendants previously convicted under the mandatory penalty scheme were vacated, this Court concluding that the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon a valid conviction for aggravated rape was the most severe constitutional penalty established by the legislature for a lesser included offense at the time was committed. State v. Selman, supra.
Defendant in the present case errs in characterizing his situation as analogous to that of defendants convicted of aggravated rape following the 1973 amendments to
A similar situation existed following the revision of Louisiana‘s capital sentencing scheme in the wake of the Selman decision. In State v. Drew, 360 So.2d 500 (La.1978), the defendant was convicted of an aggravated rape committed on October 18, 1976. At the time of conviction, the defendant could have been sentenced to death but, upon unanimous recommendation of the jury,
... that the invalidity of the death penalty provision of La.R.S. 14:42 (1975) does not render invalid that entire statute and La.Code Crim.P. arts. 905 et seq., as applied to the instant aggravated rape case. We further find that the proper sentence in the instant case is life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, the alternative sentence provided by La.Code Crim.P. art. 905.6. Since the defendant was not sentenced to death, but was in fact sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence, no resentencing is necessary. Id., at pp. 507-508. (Emphasis added).
Defendant‘s further contention that his life sentence is disproportionate to those being served by defendants subsequently convicted of the same offense is likewise without merit. It is well settled that a defendant is to be tried under the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. The mere fact that a statute may be subsequently amended so as to modify or lessen the possible penalty to be imposed does not extinguish liability for the offense committed under a previous valid statutory scheme. State v. Narcisse, 426 So.2d 118 (La.1983); State v. Sawyer, 350 So.2d 611 (La.1977); State v. Paciera, 290 So.2d 681 (La.1974).
The jury in the present case recommended a term of life imprisonment, an entirely legal sentence not invalidated by the Supreme Court‘s subsequent holding in Selman. State v. Drew, supra. The reduction of this executory sentence by the trial court to twenty years’ imprisonment was illegal,
SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED.