State of Ohio v. Tanelle M. Jefferson
Court of Appeals No. L-16-1182
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
August 18, 2017
[Cite as State v. Jefferson, 2017-Ohio-7272.]
Trial Court No. CR0201601280
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: August 18, 2017
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Claudia A. Ford, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant.
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JENSEN, P.J.
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I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Tanelle Jefferson, appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 12.5 years in prison following a jury trial in
A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On February 12, 2016, appellant was indicted on one count of felonious assault in violation of
{¶ 3} Thereafter, appellant entered pleas of not guilty to the afоrementioned charges, and the matter proceeded to discovery. Following pretrial proceedings and motion practice, a two-day jury trial commenced on July 18, 2016.
{¶ 4} At trial, the state first presented the testimony of appellant‘s wife, Jeanette Ervin. Ervin and appellant were married in December 2015. According to Ervin, the marriage “started out fun,” but eventually became abusive. Specifically, Ervin stated: “Well, after being together for a while, I noticed some changes in [appellant]. He would always grab on my clothes, rough me up, and he had that temper about [himself] and I would have tо fight him off.” Due to the abuse that was existent within their marriage, appellant and Ervin resided separately.
{¶ 5} Three months into the marriage, Ervin decided that it was time to end her relationship with appellant. After Ervin informed appellant of her decision to end the
{¶ 6} When Ervin informed appellant that she was leaving him, he told her that she was not gоing anywhere. Ervin then attempted to exit appellant‘s home. At trial, Ervin recounted the ensuing incident as follows:
And as I‘m trying to get out the door, the front door, he‘s blocking me. So I break and run through the dining room to the kitchen to go down these steps to get away from him. And he put his foot on the back door and said, you‘re not going anywhere.
All of a sudden he [started] screaming and hollering and I‘m just begging him, please. I called him Tee Jay. Tee Jay, let me go. I want to go home, leave me alone. I don‘t want to be here with you anymore. Let me go.
He kept saying, no, screaming and hollering, still got ahold of my clothes, to my clothes. I go back up the steps to the kitchen and the voice that came out of him was something like I‘ve never heard before, like demons. He was just screaming and hollering at me.
And I knew at that point something bad is getting ready to happen because I already knew he had that gun.
So I tried to keеp quiet and not say anything and I‘m – he got me backed up there against this thing and I‘m like Tee Jay, let me go; I want to go home. So I managed – he kept telling me I wasn‘t going to go. I managed to get around him, go through the dining room. He‘s going to grab me again. Still got my clothes. By that time this weapon, this gun, hits the floor. I say, it‘s time for me tо break and run for my life.
I ran out that door so fast. I was trembling. I was scared to death. I feared for my life.
As I‘m running out the door going down the steps I hear a pow. I‘m like, oh, my God, he done shot at me, am I shot? I run around to my car. I‘m shaking. I‘m trembling. I‘m falling down to my knees. The [key is] dropping out of my hand. I‘m trying to get in my car to get away and I look through my car window to see where he was at after he shot at me. He‘s standing on this porch like it‘s nothing. He [turns] around and he walks back in the house.
{¶ 7} Upon further questioning, Ervin acknowledged that she did not actually witness appellant shoot at her because she was running away from him at the time. Nonetheless, appellant was insistent that she heard appellant fire a shot from where he was standing on the front porch of his home. When asked how she could be certain that appellant fired a shot at her, Ervin stated: “Because I heard the pow and I knew he had a gun. And he was angry.”
{¶ 8} As its next witness, the state called Brian Heath. Heath and his partner, Scott Bruhn (whom the state called as its third witness), were the first officers to arrive on the scene after Ervin called 911. Initially, Heath set up a perimeter around appellant‘s house. Meanwhile, Bruhn questioned Ervin, who informed him that appellant had just shot at her and was still inside the home. Eventually, Heath and Bruhn took appellant into custody. Upon further questioning, Ervin explained to Bruhn that appellant had shot at her from the front porch of the home.
{¶ 9} After learning that appellant fired a shot at Ervin from his front porch, Bruhn alerted the detective bureau and began searching the area around the porch for a shell casing. Bruhn was accompanied by another officer, Michael Watson. Ultimately, Watson discovered one Hornady .25 ACP caliber spent shell casing on top of the grass five to six feet from the edge of the front porch. According to Watsоn, the location of the shell casing was consistent with Ervin‘s contention that appellant fired at her while standing on the front porch.
{¶ 10} For its fourth witness, the state called Nathaniel Sahdala. Sahdala also responded to the scene after Ervin called 911. After appellant was arrested and tаken into custody, Sahdala entered appellant‘s home. Upon entry, Sahdala entered the dining room, where he observed a portion of carpet that was folded over with the rear half of a handgun visible underneath the carpet. Sahdala then rolled back the rest of the carрet that was folded and discovered two additional firearms, both of which were loaded.
{¶ 11} As its final witness, the state called detective Sherri Wise. Wise arrived at appellant‘s residence and was involved in the removal of the firearms from the dining room. Wise eventually interviewed appellant at the police station, where appellant admitted to having fired a weаpon earlier in the day. Initially, appellant insisted that he shot a possum. However, the type of animal that was allegedly shot changed several times during the course of Wise‘s interrogation of appellant. Further, appellant claimed that he shot the animal with a Winchester rifle, which was not located at the residence. Ultimately, the three handguns that were removed from the residence were tested and found to be operable. Notably, Wise corroborated the previous testimony that the .25 caliber handgun that was removed contained ammunition matching the spent shell casing found on the lawn adjacent to the front porch.
{¶ 12} At the close of the state‘s case-in-chief, appellant moved for an acquittal under
B. Assignments of Error
{¶ 13} On appeal, appellant assigns the following errors for our review:
- The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant in denying his Rule 29 motion.
- The jury‘s verdiсt was against the manifest weight of the evidence introduced by the state at trial.
II. Analysis
{¶ 14} In appellant‘s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his
{¶ 15} A motion for acquittal under
{¶ 16} Initially, the state argues that appellant waived his right to challenge the trial court‘s denial of the
{¶ 17} Under
{¶ 18} In denying appellant‘s
{¶ 19} During her testimony аt trial, Ervin testified that she clearly heard a gunshot ring out from the area around the front porch as she was running out of the residence. Prior to this point, appellant was enraged at the thought of Ervin terminating the marriage, and had already violently reacted by biting Ervin and attempting to prevent her from leаving the residence. During the incident, Ervin observed a handgun sitting on a nearby table. After arriving at her vehicle following the gunshot, she looked back and saw appellant reentering the residence from the front porch.
{¶ 20} During the ensuing investigation, authorities recovered several firearms inside the residencе. One of these firearms contained ammunition that matched a .25 caliber spent shell casing that was discovered lying on top of the grass next to the front porch. Appellant attempted to explain the spent shell casing by admitting to having shot at a possum earlier in the day. However, acсording to detective Wise, appellant‘s story changed several times during the interrogation.
{¶ 21} Construing the foregoing evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable
{¶ 22} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his conviction for felonious assault was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 23} When reviewing a manifest weight of the evidence issue, we sit as a “thirteenth juror.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). That is, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of witnesses. Id. Our role is to determine “whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. We reverse a conviction on manifest weight grounds for only the most “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id. at 387.
{¶ 24} In advancing his manifest weight argument, appellant notes that police were unable to recover the actual round that he allegedly fired. Appellant also cites to the fact that the state failed tо test the .25 caliber handgun to determine how recently it had been fired, and also failed to test him for gunshot residue upon his arrest. Finally, appellant takes issue with the fact that no alcohol bottle was found at the residence to corroborate Ervin‘s testimony that appellant had been drinking.
{¶ 25} Upon examination of the entire record in this case, we do not find that the issues raised by appellant present the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. The officers who testified at the trial explained that they did not expect to find the round that was fired from the .25 caliber handgun because of its size and the amount of distance it could have traveled. Testing of the firearm to ascertain how recently it was fired was largely unnecessary in light of Ervin‘s statements that appellant shot at her from the front porch paired with the discovery of the spent .25 caliber shell casing. The same holds true as to the testing of appellant for gunshot residue. Finally, we find that the failure of authorities to locate the bottle of alcohol appellant had allegedly been drinking was unremarkable in light of the focus of their investigation; namely, the discovery of evidence that would support Ervin‘s claim that appellant shot at her.
{¶ 26} In light of the foregoing, we find that appellant‘s conviction for felonious assault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, appellant‘s second assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 27} For the foregоing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Arlene Singer, J. JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE
James D. Jensen, P.J. CONCUR. JUDGE