State v. JarvisState v. Jarvis
WHITMORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Timothy Jarvis, appeals from his conviction in the Summit Country Cоurt of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I
{¶2} On the evening of August 7, 2009, Kelli Lipovsky left her son with her upstairs neighbor and invited a friend, Josh Gidley, to her apartment. Lipovsky and Gidley purchased a bottle of tequila and drank most of the bottle together. The two then walked to a nearby bar and drank more alcohol. Feeling nauseous, Gidley took Lipovsky‘s keys and returned to her apartment while Lipovsky stayed at the bar. Sometime after midnight, Lipovsky decided that she
{¶3} When Lipovsky and Jarvis reached Lipovsky‘s home, they observed Gidley resting in a chair on the porch. Lipovsky left Gidley on the porch and went to retrieve her son. Because her son was sleeping and she was too intoxiсated to carry him, Lipovsky asked her neighbor‘s brother to carry him downstairs and place him in Lipovsky‘s bed. Lipovsky got into bed with her son and began to fall asleep on her side. She soоn startled, however, as she felt Jarvis next to her, rubbing her side and breathing in her ear. Lipovsky stood up, instructed Jarvis to leave, followed him out, and locked the door behind him. Gidley, still sitting on the pоrch, saw Jarvis come outside. According to Gidley, the door slammed behind Jarvis and he appeared upset. He then saw Jarvis walk over to Lipovsky‘s front window, push it open, and crаwl through it.
{¶4} Lipovsky, still fully clothed, fell asleep in bed with her son after removing Jarvis from her home. She awoke the next morning on her living room couch, naked below the waist. Fearing that she had been assaulted, Lipovsky went to the hospital. DNA testing confirmed and Jarvis later admitted that he had sexual intercourse with Lipovsky. According to Jarvis, the intercourse was consensual. Lipovsky did not recall the events that occurred after she fell asleep with her son.
{¶5} On August 26, 2009, Jarvis was indicted on one count of aggravated burglary, in violation of
{¶6} Jarvis now appeals from his conviction and raises two assignments of error for our review.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT‘S MOTION FOR A CRIMINAL RULE 29 MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFIENT (sic) EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE APPELLEE TO CONVICTION (sic) THE APPELLANT OF SEXUAL BATTERY.”
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Jarvis argues that his sexual battery conviction is based on insufficient evidence. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove that he knew Lipovsky was impaired to the extent that she could not consent to sexual intercourse. We disagree.
{¶8} In order to determine whether the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction, this Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 274. Furthermore:
“An appellate court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to exаmine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thе relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the сrime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; see, also, State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386.
“In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386.
{¶9}
“No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when *** [t]he offender knows that the othеr person‘s ability to appraise the nature of or control the other person‘s own conduct is substantially
impaired[; or] *** [t]he offender knows that the other person submits because the other person is unaware that the act is being committed.” R.C. 2907.03(A)(2) -(3) .
“A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a сertain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.”
{¶10} Jarvis does not dispute that he engaged in sexual intercourse with Lipovsky. His only argument is that the State failed to offer any evidence, demonstrating that he knew Lipovsky was substantially impaired or unawarе of her behavior.
{¶11} Even if Jarvis did not personally observe Lipovsky consume large amounts of alcohol, he did walk her home from a bar close to 2 a.m. There also was testimony that Lipovsky was 5‘7” in height, weighed 138 pounds, and drank a significant amount of alcohol in a relatively short period. According to Lipovsky and Gidley, they split most of a bottle of tequila before they left the apartment and continued to drink once they arrived at a nearby bar. Lipovsky testified that she was intoxicated to the extent that she could not carry her son dоwnstairs when she came home. Both her upstairs neighbor, Karen Nixon, and Nixon‘s brother, Kenneth, testified that Lipovsky appeared intoxicated when she came to Nixon‘s apartmеnt for her son. Kenneth confirmed that he carried Lipovsky‘s son downstairs because he “knew she was too inebriated to do it herself.” Lipovsky also testified that she removed Jarvis from her home and did not remember anything that happened after she fell asleep with her son. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the State presеnted sufficient evidence that Jarvis knew Lipovsky was substantially impaired and/or unaware of her conduct at the time he had sexual intercourse with her. See State v. Hill, 9th Dist. No. 09CA009709, 2011-Ohio-1154, at ¶14-20 (upholding sexual battery сonviction where victim fell asleep after drinking, did not remember having sexual intercourse with the defendant, and the defendant claimed the act was
Assignment of Error Number Two
“THE APPELLANT‘S CONVICTION OF SEXUALLY (sic) BATTERY IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶12} In his secоnd assignment of error, Jarvis argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶13} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence an appellate court:
“[M]ust review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and а new trial ordered.” State v. Otten (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340.
A weight of the evidence challenge indicates that a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of the issue than supports the other. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. Further, when reversing a conviction on the basis that the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as the “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the factfinder‘s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Id. Therefore, this Court‘s “discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175; see, also, Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340.
{¶14} Jarvis argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence because Lipovsky‘s claim that she could remember “multiple occurrences on the evening and
III
{¶15} Jarvis’ assignments of error are overrulеd. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT