STATE OF OHIO v. ENOCH JAEGER
C.A. No. 17CA0072-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
July 30, 2018
2018-Ohio-2994
SCHAFER, Presiding Judge.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE Nо. 16-CR-0624
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: July 30, 2018
SCHAFER, Presiding Judge.
{1} Appellant, Enoch Jaeger, appeals his convictions in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas for vandalism, breaking and entering, theft, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
{2} In September and October 2016, there were a series of breаking and entering offenses committed at gas station convenience stores in Medina County. During each offense, two men would use a large rock or block of concrete to smash open the glass door of the store then enter it carrying large garbage cans. Once inside, they quickly collected cartons of cigarettes inside the garbage cans then exited less than a minute later.
{3} On October 12, 2016, Mr. Jaeger and an accomplice attempted to commit a similar offense. The gas station they targeted, however, had been the site of one of the еarlier offenses and had modified its front door in response. The men, therefore, were unable to break
{4} The Grand Jury indicted Mr. Jaeger for one count of vandalism, four counts of breaking and entering, three counts of theft, and one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Following a number of continuanсes of the trial date, a jury found him guilty of the offenses. The trial court sentenced Mr. Jaeger to five years imprisonment. Mr. Jaeger has appealed, assigning three errors. We have reordered the second and third assignments of error for ease of disposition.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
The trial court err[ed] by denying [Mr. Jaeger]‘s motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations.
{5} Mr. Jaeger argues that the trial court should have dismissed the charges because the State violated his right to a speedy trial. A trial court‘s determination of speedy trial issues presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Fields, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0045, 2013-Ohio-4970, ¶ 8. “When reviewing an appellant‘s claim that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, this Court applies the de novo standard of review to questions of law and the clearly
{6} “The right of an accused to a speedy trial is recognized by the Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Ohio.” State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 219 (1980). “The statutory speedy trial provisions,
{7}
{8} An accused may waive his right to a speedy trial, so long as the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. O‘Brien at 9. Such a waiver must be in writing or expressly made in open court on the record. State v. King, 70 Ohio St.3d 158 (1994), at syllabus.
{9} The trial court originally scheduled Mr. Jaeger‘s trial for January 10, 2017. Upon motions of Mr. Jaeger‘s counsel, the trial date was continued to February, then March, then May, then June, and, finally, to July 24, 2017. Mr. Jaeger acknowledges that his attorney moved for many of the continuances. He argues that the last one, however, should not be charged to him. According to the transcript of the June hearing, Mr. Jaeger had accepted a plea agreement. After arriving on the day of trial to change his plea, however, Mr. Jaeger informed the prosecution that he had changed his mind about their agreement. The court inquired whether the trial could still go ahead later that day or the next, but the prosecutor answered thаt they did not have a jury and that its witnesses were not present. Mr. Jaeger‘s counsel then told the court that, since it was Mr. Jaeger who had changed his mind, he was moving for a continuance of the trial. Mr. Jaeger is bound by his counsel‘s request even if it was without his consent. State v. McBreen, 54 Ohio St.2d 315 (1978), syllabus.
{10} Mr. Jaeger argues that even if his trial was held within the time limits set out in
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
The trial court err[ed] when the jury found [Mr. Jaeger] guilty without the greater weight of the evidence.
{11} Mr. Jaegеr next argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the offenses. A challenge to the sufficiency of a criminal conviction presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). In carrying out this review, our “function * * * is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to detеrmine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. After such an examination and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we must decide whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Although we conduct a de novo review when considering a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the appellate court does not resolve evidentiary conflicts or assess the credibility of witnesses as those functions belong to the trier of fact. State v. Tucker, 9th Dist. Medina No. 14CA0047-M, 2015-Ohio-3810, ¶ 7.
{12} Mr. Jaeger argues that the State failed to prove that he was involved in all of the offenses. Although he admits to being involved in attempting to break into а gas station before his arrest on October 12, 2016, he argues that there was no evidence connecting him to the other offenses.
{13} The State presented video recordings of the incidents from the gas stations’ surveillance systems. There were two men during each offense, wearing similar clothing each time. One of the men was acknowledged to be Mr. Jaeger‘s accomplice. The other man was taller and wore a blue sweatshirt that had the letters “EXP” across the front of it. He also wore gray pants and pointed dress shoes during the offenses. After law enforcement stopped Mr. Jaeger and the accomplice on October 12, 2016, they found a blue sweatshirt with the letters EXP across the front of it on the seat behind where Mr. Jaeger had been sitting. The car also contained gloves, hats, and facial coverings similar to the ones used during the offenses. Mr. Jaeger was wearing gray pants and pointed dress shoes at the time of the stop.
{14} According to Mr. Jaeger, because the faces of the offenders were covered, it could have been different individuals wearing the blue sweatshirt and other clothes during each offense. Detective Paul Schismenos testified, however, that he had studied the movements and mannerisms of the person wearing the blue sweatshirt and they were consistent from one incident to the next. The person wearing the blue sweatshirt was also of a consistent height and body shape from incident to incident. He аlso testified that the two men worked together in the same way during each break-in.
{15} The evidence establishing that Mr. Jaeger was involved in all of the offenses is circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at paragraph оne of the syllabus. Upon review of the record, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that it was sufficient, if believed, to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jaeger was one of the men committing each of the gas statiоn break-ins.
{16} Mr. Jaeger also argues that the State failed to prove that he was involved in a criminal enterprise. The jury convicted Mr. Jaeger of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under
{17} Mr. Jaeger‘s argument focuses again on his assertion that he was only involved in one of the offenses. As previously noted, however, there is circumstantial evidence that Mr. Jaeger was one of the two men that committed each brеaking and entering offense. Mr. Jaeger also told law enforcement that he could provide the names of all of the individuals involved in the sale of the stolen cigarettes. Upon review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Jaeger was a member of an enterprise that engaged in a pattern of corrupt activities. Mr. Jaeger‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{18} Mr. Jaeger also argues that his convictions are against the weight of the evidence. A sufficiency challenge is legally distinct from a manifest weight challenge. Thompkins, 78
{19} Mr. Jaeger‘s manifest weight argument is similar to his sufficiency argument. He argues that there was no physical evidence tying him to any of the offenses except the one attempted break-in and that, if he was not involved in the оther offenses, he could not be convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.
{20} On cross-examination, Mr. Jaeger did not challenge Detective Schismenos‘s testimony that the man wearing the blue sweatshirt had the same height and build in each surveillance video, moved in the samе way and had the same mannerisms, or that the two men appeared to work together in the same way during each offense. There were also no other shoes found with Mr. Jaeger at the time of his arrest, which would have been expected if the accomplice had simply recruited different men to wear the same blue sweatshirt, gray pants, and pointed dress shoes outfit during the offenses. Upon review of the record, we cannot say that the jury lost its way and committed a manifest miscarriage of justice when it found that Mr. Jaeger was one of the two men involved in eaсh of the offenses or that he engaged in a pattern of corrupt activity. Mr. Jaeger‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by thе Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
RICHARD BARBERA, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
