STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. CHAZ JACKSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 1-19-83
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
November 9, 2020
2020-Ohio-5224
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR 2017 0184
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Jana E. Emerick for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, Chaz Jackson (“Jackson“), appeals the December 16, 2019 judgment entry of sentence of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{2} This case stems from the November 21, 2016 shooting death of Ryan VanBuskirk (“VanBuskirk“), which occurred during a drug transaction between VanBuskirk and Jackson, who was accompanied by Rione Gray (“Gray“). The transaction originated when Terry Volbert (“Volbert“) received a call from VanBuskirk on November 21, 2016 seeking drugs. (Nov. 5-7, 2019 Tr., Vol. II, at 220, 222). Volbert, who used drugs and frequently purchased drugs from Gray, “called [Gray‘s] phone and [Jackson] and [Gray] said they had some” drugs so Volbert “set up a deal” for VanBuskirk with Jackson and Gray. (Id. at 226). Because VanBuskirk did not know Jackson or Gray, Volbert planned for his girlfriend, Melissa Ream (“Ream“), to accompany VanBuskirk “to show him who was who.” (Id. at 227-228). VanBuskirk and Ream encountered Jackson and Gray on Catalpa Street in Lima to conduct the drug transaction during which Jackson shot and killed VanBuskirk.
{3} On June 15, 2017, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Jackson on three counts: Count One of involuntary manslaughter in violation of
{4} The case proceeded to a jury trial on November 5-7, 2019. (Doc. No. 204). Prior to the commencement of trial, the State requested that the trial court dismiss Count Two of the indictment, which the trial court granted. (Nov. 5-7, 2019 Tr., Vol. I, at 1-2). (See also Doc. No. 190). On November 7, 2019, the jury found Jackson guilty of involuntary manslaughter (the predicate offense being an unindicted drug-trafficking felony) and the firearm specification but not guilty of murder.2 (Doc. Nos. 202, 203, 204).
{5} On December 16, 2019, the trial court sentenced Jackson to 11 years in prison as to the involuntary-manslaughter charge and 3 years in prison as to the firearm specification.3 (Doc. No. 213). The trial court further ordered that Jackson serve the terms consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 14 years in prison. (Id.).
Assignment of Error No. II
Appellant‘s Due Process rights were violated by a conviction of involuntary manslaughter that was not supported by sufficient evidence.
Assignment of Error No. III
Appellant‘s conviction for involuntary manslaughter was not supported by the weight of the evidence.
{7} In his second and third assignments of error, Jackson argues that his involuntary-manslaughter conviction is based on insufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Jackson disputes the issue of identity as to his involuntary-manslaughter conviction, arguing that someone else committed the offense. That is, Jackson contends that the evidence supporting that he committed the offense is not credible.
Standard of Review
{8} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 (1997). Therefore, we address each legal concept individually.
{10} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
Sufficiency of the Evidence Analysis
{11} As an initial matter, the record reveals that Jackson failed to renew his
In order to preserve the issue of sufficiency on appeal, this court has held that “[w]hen a defendant moves for acquittal at the close of the state‘s evidence and that motion is denied, the defendant waives any error which might have occurred in overruling the motion by proceeding to introduce evidence in his or her defense. In order to preserve a sufficiency of the evidence challenge on appeal once a defendant elects to present evidence on his behalf, the defendant must renew his
Crim.R. 29 motion at the close of all the evidence.”
State v. Hurley, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-13-02, 2014-Ohio-2716, para 37, quoting State v. Edwards, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-03-63, 2004-Ohio-4015, para 6. Based on this
{12} “However, ‘[w]hether a sufficiency of the evidence argument is reviewed under a prejudicial error standard or under a plain error standard is academic.‘” Id. at para 38, citing Perrysburg v. Miller, 153 Ohio App.3d 665, 2003-Ohio-4221, para 57 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17891, 2000 WL 966161, *8 (July 14, 2000). “Regardless of the standard used, ‘a conviction based on legally insufficient evidence constitutes a denial of due process, and constitutes a manifest injustice.‘” Id., quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387. Accordingly, we will proceed to determine whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Jackson‘s convictions. See id. See also State v. Velez, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-10, 2014-Ohio-1788, para 68, citing State v. Wimmer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-98-46, 1999 WL 355190, *1 (Mar. 26, 1999).
{13} Jackson was convicted of involuntary manslaughter under
{14} The predicate-felony offense in this case is trafficking in drugs under
{15} However, Jackson does not dispute the evidence concerning the underlying elements of the involuntary-manslaughter offense of which he was convicted; rather, he disputes only the issue of identity as to the conviction. See State v. Missler, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-14-06, 2015-Ohio-1076, para 13. See also State v. Littlejohn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101549, 2015-Ohio-875, para 30. Thus, we will
{16} In support of his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, Jackson argues that a rational trier of fact could not have found that he was involved in the drug transaction because “there was no physical evidence tying Jackson to the crime scene.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 20). The record belies Jackson‘s argument. Importantly, the State presented direct evidence that Jackson was the person who committed the offense at issue in this case—namely, two eyewitnesses (Ream and Gray) identified Jackson as the person who shot VanBuskirk during the drug transaction. (See Nov. 5-7, 2019 Tr., Vol. II, at 253, 276). (See also id. at 342-343). Likewise, Detective Steven J. Stechschulte (“Detective Stechschulte“) of the Lima Police Department, who investigated the case, testified that Ream identified Jackson in a photo lineup as the shooter. (See id. at 280, 344-345). Further, Gray and Volbert testified to arranging the drug transaction with VanBuskirk and testified to
{17} Nevertheless, Jackson contends that there is insufficient evidence that he was the person who committed the offense because his “presence was based solely on the testimony of Ream and Gray, neither of whom had any credibility.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 20). Jackson‘s credibility argument is misplaced. The credibility and weight of the evidence is primarily the role of the trier-of-fact—in this case, the jury. State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5048, para 106, citing DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, at paragraph one of the syllabus. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not resolve evidentiary conflicts or assess the credibility of witnesses; rather, we determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, at paragraph two of the syllabus; Jones, 2013-Ohio-4775, at para 33.
{18} Accordingly, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a
{19} Having concluded that Jackson‘s involuntary-manslaughter conviction is based on sufficient evidence, we next address Jackson‘s argument that his involuntary-manslaughter conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{20} Similar to his sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, Jackson argues that the evidence identifying him as the person who shot VanBuskirk during the drug transaction lacks credibility and reliability. In particular, Jackson contends that he “was only tied to the crime scene by Ream and Gray, who lacked any semblance of credibility” because “Ream was a drug addict, a convicted robber, and admitted she would say anything that Volbert told her” and “Gray was candid that he would do anything to benefit himself and cut a deal to testify against Jackson.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 22-23). More specifically, Jackson argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because the trier of fact lost its way in failing to account for the alibi defense presented through the testimony of Keilna Petaway (“Petaway“), who was in a romantic relationship with Jackson at the time of VanBuskirk‘s shooting death.
{22} Notwithstanding Ream‘s and Gray‘s weak credibility, the jury also observed Jackson‘s and Petaway‘s testimony “and we are mindful of the jury‘s ‘superior first-hand perspective in judging the demeanor and credibility of witnesses.‘” State v. Suffel, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-14-05, 2015-Ohio-222, para 33, quoting State v. Phillips, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-79, 2014-Ohio-5162, para 125, citing DeHass at paragraph one of the syllabus. Indeed, based on Petaway‘s romantic relationship with Jackson, the trier of fact was free to credit or discount Petaway‘s testimony because the trier of fact is “patently in the best position to gauge the truth.” State v. Parsons, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-16-08, 2017-Ohio-1315, para 63, quoting State v. Smith, 5th Dist. Licking No. 14 CA 83, 2015-Ohio-1610, para 24, citing State v. Durbin, 5th Dist. Holmes No. 13 CA 2, 2013-Ohio-5147, para 53. See
{23} In other words, even though Petaway and Jackson claimed to have been together on November 21, 2016, the jury was also able to compare Jackson‘s and Petaway‘s testimony against the balance of the State‘s evidence presented at trial, and “it is well within the province of the trier-of-fact to determine [Jackson‘s and Petaway‘s] credibility in making those statements including the prerogative to find [Jackson‘s and Petaway‘s] denials not to be truthful.” State v. Voll, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-12-04, 2012-Ohio-3900, para 27. For instance, the jury was able to compare Petaway‘s testimony that she learned that Jackson was a suspect in VanBuskirk‘s shooting death from Facebook “within a day or so” of November 21, 2016 against Detective Stechschulte‘s testimony that the Lima Police Department did not post Jackson‘s name as a suspect in VanBuskirk‘s murder on Facebook until November 27, 2016. (See Nov. 5-7, 2019 Tr., Vol. II, at 374-375, 377, 397). The jury was also able to compare Petaway‘s and Detective Stechschulte‘s testimony against Jackson‘s testimony that he learned that he was a suspect “a few days after his daughter‘s birthday,” which is on November 24. (See id. at 382, 386).
{24} Moreover, the evidence that we summarized in our sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis supporting Jackson‘s conviction is weightier than the evidence
{25} Jackson‘s second and third assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error No. I
The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to use evidence of other actions by appellant in violation of
{26} In his first assignment of error, Jackson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence under
{27} “Generally, ‘[a] trial court is given broad discretion in admitting and excluding evidence, including “other bad acts” evidence.‘” State v. Wendel, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-16-08, 2016-Ohio-7915, para 23, quoting State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 11 JE 7, 2013-Ohio-2314, para 7, citing State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 265 (1984). However, “[t]he admissibility of other-acts evidence pursuant to
{28} Accordingly, this court reviews de novo whether a trial court admitted improper character evidence and applies an abuse-of-discretion standard to evidentiary decisions regarding the admission of other-acts evidence for permissible purposes. See id., citing Leonard, The New Wigmore: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events, Section 4.10 (2d Ed.2019) (because “[d]etermining whether the evidence is offered for an impermissible purpose does not involve the exercise of discretion * * *, an appellate court should scrutinize the [trial court‘s] finding under a de novo standard” of review) and State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, para 17 (the trial court is precluded by
{29} “De novo review is independent, without deference to the lower court‘s decision.” State v. Hudson, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-38, 2013-Ohio-647, para 27, citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147 (1992). An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980).
Analysis
{30} ”
{31} “Other acts can be evidence of identity in two types of situations. First are those situations where other acts ‘form part of the immediate background of the alleged act which forms the foundation of the crime charged in the indictment,’ and which are ‘inextricably related to the alleged criminal act.‘” State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St. 3d 527, 531 (1994), quoting State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 73 (1975).
{32} “Other acts may also prove identity by establishing a modus operandi applicable to the crime with which a defendant is charged.” Id. “‘Modus operandi’ literally means method of working.” Hartman at para 37. “‘Other acts’ may be introduced to establish the identity of a perpetrator by showing that he has committed similar crimes and that a distinct, identifiable scheme, plan, or system was used in the commission of the charged offense.” Lowe at 531, quoting State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St. 3d 137, 141 (1990). “Evidence of modus operandi is relevant to prove identity: ‘Evidence that the defendant had committed uncharged crimes with the same peculiar modus tends to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the charged crime.‘” Hartman at para 37, quoting 1 Imwinkelried, Giannelli, Gilligan,
{33} In State v. Williams, the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the three-step analysis trial courts should conduct in determining whether “other acts” evidence is admissible under
{34} On appeal, Jackson contends that the following evidence constitutes improper “bad acts” evidence: (1) Patrolman Benjamin Thompson‘s (“Patrolman Thompson“) of the Lima Police Department testimony that he was familiar with the residence located at 721 East Third Street -the address at which Jackson resided- because “that was a problem house” for law enforcement; (2) Volbert‘s testimony that he bought drugs from Jackson; (3) Detective Stechschulte‘s testimony that he has had prior interactions with Jackson and has “seen Mr. Jackson in possession of a firearm,” specifically “in his left hand“; and (4) three Facebook photographs depicting Jackson with a firearm and displaying a gang sign and posing with a large amount of money. (Nov. 5-7, 2019 Tr., Vol. I, at 151, 155); (Nov. 5-7, 2019 Tr., Vol. II, at 242-243, 350-352); (State‘s Exs. 54, 55, 56). Specifically, Jackson contends that the “other acts” evidence was inadmissible to establish his identity as the person who committed the offense at issue in this case because
the prior acts in this case do not establish any unique modus operandi, let alone one that ties into the current offense. Living in a problem house, selling drugs, holding guns and cash are all common activities among drug dealers (and drug addicts, for that matter), and do not establish any sort of behavioral fingerprint that would tie Jackson to this shooting.
(Appellant‘s Brief at 15-16).
{36} To decide whether a defendant‘s substantial rights were affected by the improper admission of
{37} Here, we cannot say that Jackson was prejudiced by the admission of any of the other acts evidence to which he objects. Most significant, the record reflects that the other acts evidence to which Jackson objects did not contribute to his involuntary-manslaughter conviction -that is, the jury acquitted Jackson of the most serious charge that he was facing (murder). See State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26055, 2015-Ohio-5491, para 107 (Hall, J., dissenting). In other words, based on our review of the record, there is no indication that the other acts evidence was considered by the jury as substantive evidence.
{38} Notwithstanding the indication that the jury did not rely on the other acts evidence as substantive evidence, we conclude that even absent the other acts evidence to which Jackson objects, the remaining evidence provides overwhelming evidence of guilt. See State v. Gordon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106023, 2018-Ohio-2292, para 80. As we summarized in our discussion in Jackson‘s sufficiency-of-the-evidence and manifest-weight-of-the-evidence assignments of error, the State presented formidable evidence of guilt. See also See State v. Tackett, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2018-A-0052, 2019-Ohio-5188, para 109 (Trapp, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Based on all the other evidence presented at trial extensively detailed in the majority‘s discussion of the assignments relating to
{39} For these reasons, Jackson‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{40} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr