STATE OF OHIO v. PARIS A. JACKSON
CASE NO. 1-18-38
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
Date of Decision: May 6, 2019
[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2019-Ohio-1697.]
Trial Court No. CR2018 0047
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Reed D. Searcy for Appellant
Jana E. Emerick for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Paris Jackson (“Jackson”), brings this appeal from the July 12, 2018, judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court sentencing him to an aggregate nine-year prison term after Jackson was convicted in a bench trial of Felonious Assault in violation of
Procedural History
{¶2} On March 15, 2018, Jackson was indicted for Felonious Assault in violation of
{¶3} On May 29, 2018, Jackson’s case proceeded to a bench trial. The State presented the testimony of four witnesses, including Owens, who said she saw Jackson shoot at the dealer she called “J” or “Jason.” In addition, the State introduced fourteen exhibits into evidence, along with a video of the alleged altercation from nearby apartment surveillance cameras. Jackson cross-examined the State’s witnesses and challenged Owens’ testimony based on inconsistent statements she had made previously to law enforcement and at a preliminary hearing.
{¶4} At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, Jackson made a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, which was denied. He then rested his case without presenting any further evidence, and renewed his motion for acquittal, which was again denied. The parties proceeded to closing arguments, and then the trial court recessed to consider the matter. When court reconvened, the trial court found Jackson guilty of all three counts against him and the firearm specification.
{¶6} A judgment entry memorializing Jackson’s sentence was filed July 12, 2018. It is from this judgment that Jackson appeals, asserting the following assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
The trial court erred in finding appellant guilty as there was not a sufficient amount of evidence for the trial court to find that the State had established all of the elements of each charge and specification contained in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.
Assignment of Error No. 2
The trial court’s decision finding appellant guilty on all counts contained in the indictment was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶7} As both assignments of error deal with a discussion of the evidence, we will address them together.
First and Second Assignments of Error
Standard of Review
{¶9} Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Id. When an appellate court reviews a record upon a sufficiency challenge, “ ‘the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶10} By contrast, in reviewing whether a verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387. In doing so, this Court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id.
Controlling Statutes
{¶12} In this case, Jackson was convicted of Felonious Assault in violation of
{¶13} Jackson was also convicted of Carrying a Concealed Weapon in violation of
{¶14} Finally, Jackson was convicted of Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle in violation of
Evidence Presented
{¶15} At trial, the State presented the testimony of Kristina Owens, who indicated that on the afternoon of February 1, 2018, she was driving her silver Hyundai Sonata in Lima when she saw Jackson out walking and Jackson asked her for a ride.1 Owens testified that Jackson was wearing a blue and white jacket, but she did not see Jackson carrying a firearm when he got into her car. Jackson asked if Owens knew how to acquire marijuana, and Owens indicated that she called a man named “J” or “Jason” to procure the marijuana for Jackson. Owens took Jackson to meet Jason in the parking lot of apartments behind Fourth Street in Lima.
{¶16} Owens testified that she drove to the designated parking lot to meet Jason and that Jason arrived in an SUV. Owens testified that Jackson got out of her
{¶17} On cross-examination, Owens acknowledged that she had initially testified in a preliminary hearing that she did not see who shot at whom, and that she thought Jason might have had a gun at the scene. She also testified that during an initial interview with a detective she stated that she did not think Jackson was specifically shooting at Jason. In addition, she testified that during an earlier statement she indicated she had not really seen what happened. However, Owens emphasized at trial that she did actually see Jackson point a gun right at Jason and pull the trigger.
{¶18} The State also presented the testimony of Patrolman Adrian Ramirez, who responded to the area of the Fourth Street apartments on a call of shots fired shortly after 3 p.m. on the date of the incident. Although the vehicles involved in the altercation were gone, Patrolman Ramirez was able to acquire security footage from the manager of the nearby apartment complex.
{¶20} Patrolman Ramirez testified that he was also involved with locating Owens in her silver Hyundai Sonata in the days following the incident. At the time she was located, Owens was driving her vehicle and Jackson was again in the passenger seat, wearing a blue coat matching the coat in the video of the incident.
{¶21} The State also presented the testimony of Patrolman Stephen Torres who went to the parking lot where the shooting occurred. Patrolman Torres found two spent 9mm shell casings at the scene three to five feet apart from each other in the area where the vehicles had been on the video. Patrolman Torres testified that although both casings were 9mm shells, they were from different manufacturers.
Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Felonious Assault
{¶23} Jackson argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he possessed a firearm at the scene of the incident, let alone that he knowingly committed an overt act towards an assault on “Jason.” He argues that the shell casings found at the scene were mismatched, could have been from a prior crime in such a high crime area, and that there was no testing done on Jackson’s jacket for gun residue.
{¶24} Jackson also claims that the act of merely pointing a deadly weapon at another individual without additional evidence is insufficient to convict a defendant of Felonious Assault under
Q. * * * Did you ever see Paris Jackson point a firearm at this other individual and pull the trigger?
A. Yes.
A. Yes.
(Tr. at 81). Courts have made clear that pointing a firearm at an individual and firing it is sufficient for Felonious Assault under
{¶25} When considering the question of sufficiency of the evidence related to Felonious Assault, we are directed to look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Leonard at ¶ 77, quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. The testimony of Kristina Owens that Jackson pointed a firearm directly at Jason and shot at him is sufficient to establish a Felonious Assault as charged in this matter. Although Jackson argues that there was no evidence beyond Owens’ statement that he had a firearm at the scene of the crime, and that Owens’ testimony was inconsistent and not credible, Owens’ credibility is an issue for weight of the evidence rather than sufficiency.
{¶26} In sum, Owens’ testimony, combined with the video footage, the shell casings at the scene, and the damage to Owens’ windshield is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the Felonious Assault charge as alleged.
Carrying a Concealed Weapon, and Illegal Handling
of a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle
{¶27} Jackson next argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish the firearm specification, his conviction for Carrying a Concealed Weapon, and for Illegal Handling of a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle.
{¶28} Regarding the concealed firearm, Owens testified that she did not see a weapon on Jackson when he got into her vehicle wearing a blue and white coat. However, she testified that in the parking lot of the Fourth Street apartments, Jackson pulled a firearm out of his pocket or his pants, pointed it at Jason, and fired at him. Owens’ testimony was corroborated to an extent by the video footage, which showed Jackson seemingly pointing something at Jason. In addition, two shell casings were later located at the scene, and there was damage to Owens’ windshield from a bullet fragment.
{¶29} All of this evidence is indicative of Jackson having a firearm concealed while he was in Owens’ motor vehicle and ultimately using the firearm in the commission of the offense. Again, Jackson argues that Owens’ testimony was not credible, and that she was inconsistent in her retelling of the incident, but this is an issue for weight of the evidence rather than sufficiency. Therefore, Jackson’s arguments as to sufficiency of the evidence are not well-taken, and his
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶30} Jackson next argues that even if there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the crimes as charged, his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. In fact, Jackson contends that his convictions were “grossly” against the manifest weight of the evidence because the convictions were based primarily on the testimony of Kristina Owens and there were several factors that severely limited the reliability of her testimony.
{¶31} Specifically, Jackson argues that Owens’ testimony was contradicted by her own prior inconsistent statements, including her prior sworn testimony at a preliminary hearing. Jackson argues that Owens made a number of statements at the preliminary hearing, and in her interview with Detective Stechschulte, that were inconsistent with her testimony at trial. He argues that Owens testified that she put her head down in her car because she heard gunshots, that she was on the phone during the shooting, and that she initially told Detective Stechschulte that she did not really see who fired the shots. Jackson also points to Owens’ testimony at the preliminary hearing wherein she had stated that she did not believe that Jackson was aiming at Jason with his gun, and that she believed Jason also had a firearm.
{¶33} Regarding the credibility of Owens’ testimony, Owens was thoroughly cross-examined as to her earlier statements in this case and she unequivocally testified at trial that Jackson argued with Jason outside of the vehicles in the parking lot, that Jackson pulled out a firearm, that he pointed it directly at Jason, and he fired the weapon at him. Moreover, on the witness stand, Owens was shown the video recording of the incident and she testified to what was happening as it played. Furthermore, on re-direct, Owens testified that she did not want to be involved in these proceedings, and that she told the truth at trial.
{¶34} Jackson argues that in “many ways” his case is similar to State v. Shamblin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93APA07-965, 1994WL109685, because Owens’ credibility was so questionable in this matter. In Shamblin, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed a conviction where a defendant was convicted of Felonious Assault for actions in a bar fight, because there were serious questions as
{¶35} Shamblin has no relevance here because Owens clearly and unequivocally identified Jackson as the shooter, and Jackson was even found in her vehicle again days after the incident. This case is actually more similar to State v. Brooks, supra, wherein it was determined that the act of pointing a firearm at an individual and shooting it constitutes the “attempt to cause physical harm to another[.]” Brooks at ¶ 18; see also State v. Mincy, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060041, 2007-Ohio-1316, ¶ 68 (“In cases involving firearms, evidence that the defendant discharged or tried to discharge a firearm is “strongly corroborative” of an intention to cause harm. [FN omitted] More subtly but similarly corroborative of an attempt to cause harm is evidence of an act of pointing a gun at someone, combined with a threat that would indicate the actor’s intention to use the gun.”).
{¶36} Finally, it is well-settled that credibility determinations are primarily for the trier-of-fact, and the trial court’s guilty determinations on the charges in this case imply that the trial court found Owens credible, at least when combined with the video footage of the scene, the shell casings that were located there, and the damage to Owens’ windshield caused by a bullet. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). When combining all these pieces of evidence,
{¶37} In sum, the standard of review directs this Court to reverse a conviction on manifest weight only when the evidence weighs heavily against conviction. State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119. After a review of the record and the exhibits presented, we cannot find that the trial court erred in this matter. Therefore, Jackson’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶38} For the foregoing reasons, Jackson’s assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/jlr