STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. KAREEM T. JACKSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 13-18-18
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT SENECA COUNTY
January 22, 2019
[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2019-Ohio-170.]
Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 17 CR 0174 Judgment Affirmed
Alex K. Treece for Appellant
Derek W. DeVine for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, Kareem T. Jackson (“Jackson“), appeals the April 13, 2018 conviction and May 23, 2018 judgment of sentence of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{2} This case arises from a September 27, 2017 incident in which Jackson allegedly broke into the house he used to share with Renae Fearing (“Fearing“), his estranged girlfriend, threw her cellular telephone at the wall while she attempted to call law enforcement, struck her repeatedly, and stole her money. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 98-99).
{3} On September 27, 2017, a felony complaint was filed in the Tiffin Municipal Court charging Jackson with a single count of domestic violence in violation of
{4} The case proceeded to a jury trial on April 12 and 13, 2018. (Doc. No. 47). At the close of the State‘s case, Jackson made a motion for acquittal under
{5} On May 22, 2018, the trial court sentenced Jackson to 36 months in prison on Count One and 18 months in prison on Count Three and ordered that Jackson serve the sentences concurrently. (Doc. No. 55); (May 22, 2018 Tr. at 8). On May 23, 2018, the trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence. (Doc. No. 55).
{6} Jackson filed his notice of appeal on May 31, 2018. (Doc. No. 58). He raises two assignments of error for our review, which we address together.
The verdict of the trial court was against the sufficiency of the evidence as the state failed to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Assignment of Error No. II
The verdict of the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence when the credibility of the State‘s only witness was in question.
{7} In his assignments of error, Jackson argues that his domestic-violence and disrupting-public-services convictions are based on insufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{8} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 (1997). As such, we address each legal concept individually.
{9} “An appellate court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
{10} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.‘” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court‘s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
{12} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person‘s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist.”
{13} In addition, Jackson was convicted of disrupting public services in violation of
{14} “The language in
{15} “‘Property’ means any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, and any interest or license in that property. ‘Property’ includes, but is not limited to, * * * telecommunications devices * * *”
{16} In addition, under
{17} At trial, the State first offered the testimony of Fearing. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 107). Fearing testified that Jackson moved into her house in March 2017 and that the two were romantically involved and shared living expenses. (Id. at 109). She stated that on September 26, 2017, she sent a text message to Jackson ending their relationship, informing Jackson that she put his belongings on the porch of her house for him to retrieve, and requesting that Jackson
{18} Fearing testified that she woke up on the morning of September 27, 2017 to Jackson “pounding” on the doors and knocking on the window. (Id. at 112-113). At first, she attempted to ignore the knocking, as Jackson had come to her house and knocked on the doors the night before and eventually left when she did not answer the door. (Id. at 113). Fearing stated that she then heard a noise that “sounded like a door busted in.” (Id. at 113, 120).
{19} Fearing testified that prior to the incident on the morning of September 27, 2017, her back door was functional and able to be shut and locked and that following the incident, she could no longer shut or lock the back door. (Id. at 120). Fearing then identified State‘s Exhibit 4 as a photo of the doorframe of the back
{20} When she heard the sound of the door opening, Fearing picked up her cellular telephone to call 911. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 113). Fearing testified that as she was putting her passcode in to unlock her phone, Jackson came into her bedroom, threw Fearing‘s cellular telephone against the wall, and began striking her. (Id.). Fearing stated that Jackson hit her on her face, arms, and ribs with his fist while she yelled loudly, trying to get the attention of her roommate who Fearing later learned was not at home during the incident. (Id. at 113-115). Fearing testified that Jackson told her to “shut the * * * fuck up or he would kill [her].” (Id. at 115). Fearing stated that Jackson searched through her purse, took her cash, and left the house. (Id. at 116).
{21} Fearing stated that after Jackson left the house, she went outside so she could call the police from her neighbors’ house because she could not locate her cellular telephone. (Id. at 117). When Fearing reached her porch, her neighbor, Angela Brengartner (“Angela“) was outside and upon seeing Fearing, asked her if she was okay and if Jackson had hit her. (Id. at 118). Fearing testified that Angela yelled inside her house, asking her husband, Gene Brengartner (“Gene“), to call the police, but he already had law enforcement on the phone. (Id.).
{23} On cross-examination, Fearing identified Defendant‘s Exhibit A, which depicts Jackson‘s belongings set out on Fearing‘s porch. (Id. at 123); (Defendant‘s Ex. A). Fearing testified that she put Jackson‘s belongings on the porch on September 26, 2017 prior to sending Jackson the text message ending their relationship. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 124).
{24} Jackson‘s trial counsel reviewed State‘s Exhibit 4 with Fearing who stated that she found a missing metal piece from her splintered doorframe on the floor in her home following the alleged incident. (Id. at 126-127). Fearing identified Defendant‘s Exhibits F and G as photographs of Fearing‘s ribcage and
{25} Fearing identified Defendant‘s Exhibits H, I, J, and K as a series of photographs depicting Fearing‘s cellular telephone following the alleged incident. (Id. at 131-134). Defendant‘s Exhibit H depicts Fearing‘s phone with the back cover of the phone missing but with the internal battery still intact. (Defendant‘s Ex. H). Defendant‘s Exhibit I depicts Fearing‘s phone between her window and the headboard of her bed—the location it was found following the incident. (Defendant‘s Ex. I). Defendant‘s Exhibit J depicts the back cover of Fearing‘s phone in the location it was recovered following the incident, on her bedroom floor near her bed. (Defendant‘s Ex. J). Defendant‘s Exhibit K is a photo of the front of Fearing‘s phone following the incident with the screen intact but with a small piece of the upper left corner of the phone missing. (Defendant‘s Ex. K). Fearing testified that she located her phone between the headboard of her bed and her windowsill following the incident when her friend called her phone and the phone rang, allowing her to better ascertain its location. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 133-134).
{27} Fearing also identified Defendant‘s Exhibit M as a copy of the written statement Fearing gave to the police in the immediate aftermath of the incident on September 27, 2017 where she stated she was struck in the “face, arm, and ribs,” but did not state that she was struck in the neck. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 138-139); (Defendant‘s Ex. M). Upon review of Defendant‘s Exhibits L and M, Fearing admitted that there were “some differences” between the two documents. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 139).
{28} On re-direct examination, Fearing stated that she did not include certain details in both statements because she “didn‘t think to put it in the statement” and “[d]idn‘t think it was pertinent.” (Id. at 141).
{29} Next, the State offered the testimony of Gene, Fearing‘s next-door neighbor. (Id. at 142-143). Gene testified that on the morning of September 27, 2017 he was drinking coffee inside his house when he “heard a bunch of banging and noise.” (Id. at 144). Gene alerted his wife to the noise, went outside, and saw
{30} Gene testified that when he returned to his house, he sent his wife, Angela, to knock on Fearing‘s door to check on her because “something didn‘t seem right.” (Id.). Gene stated that Angela went to check on Fearing and returned to the house to tell him that Jackson had answered the door and told her that Fearing was sleeping. (Id.). After Angela reported her encounter with Jackson, Gene stated that Angela went back outside to smoke a cigarette. (Id. at 145-146). Gene testified that Angela came back inside and told him that she heard someone screaming and asked him to call the police. (Id. at 146). Gene stated that several minutes later, Fearing knocked on the door. (Id.). Gene testified that Fearing “looked like she had been beat[en] up” and had bruises on her face. (Id. at 146-147). Gene stated that Fearing stayed at his house while waiting for law enforcement to arrive. (Id. at 147).
{31} On cross-examination, Gene stated that on the morning of September 27, 2017 he saw Jackson exit Fearing‘s house to put a shoe box on the front porch and then reenter the house. (Id. at 148). Gene testified that he gave a written
{32} The State‘s next witness, Angela, Gene‘s wife, testified that on the morning of September 27, 2017, she awoke to her husband telling her he heard a noise outside and asking her to investigate. (Id. at 151-152). Angela stated that she saw a person at Fearing‘s house while she was outside smoking a cigarette, but she initially assumed he lived at the house and was returning from work. (Id. at 153). Angela testified that upon Gene‘s request, she walked over to Fearing‘s house and knocked on the door. (Id. at 154). Angela stated that nobody answered the door right away, so she continued to knock. (Id.). Eventually, Jackson answered the door and told Angela that Fearing was sleeping. (Id.). Angela stated that she told Jackson to tell Fearing to come and see Gene when she wakes up. (Id. at 154-155). Angela identified Jackson in open court as the individual that answered Fearing‘s door on the morning of the incident. (Id.).
{33} Angela stated that she returned to her home following her interaction with Jackson and that, shortly thereafter, she stepped outside her house to smoke another cigarette. (Id. at 155-156). Angela testified that while she was outside she “heard screaming and crying” coming from Fearing‘s house and that she went back into her house and asked Gene to call the police. (Id.).
{35} On cross-examination, Angela identified Defendant‘s Exhibit N as a copy of the written statement Angela made to the police immediately following the incident. (Id. at 157). Angela admitted that she did not include her interaction with Jackson in the report because she was “shook up” in the aftermath of the incident and did not remember her encounter with Jackson until later. (Id. at 157-158). (See Defendant‘s Ex. N). Angela stated that she had never spoken to or seen Jackson prior to the day of the incident and that she had a friendly, “neighborly” relationship with Fearing. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 159-160).
{36} The State‘s next witness was Suzanne Brengartner (“Suzanne“), Gene and Angela‘s adult daughter, who lives with her parents in the house next door to Fearing. (Id. at 161-162). Suzanne described her relationship with Fearing as “just a neighbor” and stated that while they have conversations occasionally, they do not have a close relationship. (Id. at 163). Suzanne testified that on the morning of September 27, 2017, she got out of bed to use the bathroom when she heard banging coming from Fearing‘s house. (Id. at 163-164). Suzanne looked out the bathroom window, which overlooks Fearing‘s porch, and saw Jackson “banging on the door.”
{|37} On cross-examination, Suzanne stated that although she had never interacted with Jackson, she knew that he lived in Fearing‘s house because she had seen him enter the house on previous occasions. (Id. at 169). Suzanne then identified Defendant‘s Exhibit O as a copy of the written statement Suzanne made to the police immediately following the incident. (Id. at 170-172). (See Defendant‘s Ex. O).
{38} Finally, Sergeant Robert Bour (“Sgt. Bour“), a road patrol sergeant with the Tiffin Police Department, testified that he was dispatched to Fearing‘s house on the morning of September 27, 2017. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 173-176). Sgt. Bour described Fearing as being “distraught” when he encountered her
{39} Sgt. Bour testified that Fearing told him that after Jackson entered her bedroom, she was preparing to use her cell phone to call law enforcement when Jackson “grabbed her phone and threw it against the wall which caused the phone to break” and to become lodged in a location where she could not locate it. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 180-181). Sgt. Bour was present when Fearing‘s cell phone was located and stated that her phone was “absolutely not” easily accessible
{40} On cross-examination, Sgt. Bour stated that he was with Fearing when her cell phone was located following the incident and that the phone was located when it rang, allowing them to better ascertain its location. (Id. at 190). Sgt. Bour stated that he did not fingerprint Fearing‘s cell phone after it was found because Fearing was able to render the device operable and needed access to it following the incident. (Id. at 184). Sgt. Bour identified Defendant‘s Exhibits P and Q as photographs which depict Fearing‘s back door following the incident. (Id. at 185-187). (See Defendant‘s Exs. P, Q).
{41} Thereafter, the State moved to admit State‘s Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4 and rested. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 194-195). State‘s Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4 were admitted with no objection noted on the record. (Id.). The trial court then read the parties’ Stipulation Exhibit into the record. (Id. at 194-195). The document, which was signed by the State, Jackson, and Jackson‘s trial counsel, stipulates that Jackson had been previously convicted of five counts of domestic violence. (Id. at
{42} Jackson testified in his defense. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. II, at 201). Jackson stated that on the morning of September 26, 2017, he woke up at Fearing‘s house, where he was living at the time, and left for work. (Id. at 202). Jackson testified that on the evening of September 26, 2017, while at work, he received a text message from Fearing ending their relationship, asking him not to contact her, and telling him he was no longer welcome in her house. (Id. at 203). Jackson understood the text message from Fearing to indicate that she was kicking him out of the house he had lived in since March 2017. (Id. at 203-204).
{43} Upon receiving the text message from Fearing, Jackson left work and went to the police station to report the text message to law enforcement. (Id. at 204-205). Jackson stated that he then stayed the night at a friend‘s house. (Id. at 205).
{44} Jackson testified that on the morning of September 27, 2017, he rode his bicycle to Fearing‘s house to retrieve his belongings and “possibly gain entrance into the house to make sure that all [his] belongings [were] there.” (Id.). Jackson stated that he “banged on the door,” dislodging the doorknob. (Id. at 206). Jackson testified that when Fearing did not answer the door, he continued to knock. (Id.). Jackson stated he then went to the side door and tapped on the glass, but Fearing still did not answer the door. (Id. at 207). Jackson testified that he then walked
Case No. 13-18-18
around to the back of the house and “bang[ed] on the door pretty hard” with his back to the door because he was “upset.” (Id.). Jackson stated that when Fearing again failed to answer the door, he came around to the front porch, where his belongings were located, and went through his belongings. (Id. at 207-208).
{45} Jackson admitted that, while he was on the front porch with his belongings, he interacted with Gene and apologized to Gene for the noise he was making. (Id.). Jackson testified that after speaking to Gene, he returned to Fearing‘s house, slammed the screen door, went around to the back of the house a second time, and left when Fearing did not answer the door because he was “in a time crunch.” (Id. at 208). Jackson testified that after leaving Fearing‘s house, he took his belongings to his friend‘s house and slept the rest of the day. (Id. at 209).
{46} Jackson stated on September 28, 2017, he rode his bicycle back to Fearing‘s house in the early morning to retrieve his belongings. (Id. at 209-210). Jackson specifically denied having been inside Fearing‘s residence on September 27 or 28, 2017. (Id. at 211).
{47} On cross-examination, Jackson admitted that he lived at Fearing‘s house for approximately six months, that he and Fearing were involved in a romantic relationship, and that the two shared household expenses. (Id. at 212). When shown State‘s Exhibit 4, a photo of Fearing‘s back door following the alleged incident on September 27, 2017, Jackson could not confirm or deny if he caused the
{48} Jackson denied being angry when he was at Fearing‘s house the morning of September 27, 2017, instead insisting he was “firm,” “a little disappointed in certain areas,” and “trying to hurry and get [his] stuff done so [he] [could] make it to work.” (Id. at 213). Jackson then confirmed that he testified that he was hurrying while he was at Fearing‘s house because he needed to go to work and that he also testified that he went to his friend‘s house and slept all day after leaving Fearing‘s house. (Id.). Jackson stated that the last time he saw Fearing before his arrest was on the morning of September 26, 2017 before he left for work. (Id.).
{49} Jackson was shown State‘s Exhibits 2 and 3, which purport to show injuries to Fearing‘s arm. (Id.). (See State‘s Exs. 2, 3). Jackson admitted that he saw bruising on Fearing‘s arm as depicted in State‘s Exhibits 2 and 3, but stated that he noticed the bruising prior to September 26, 2017 when Fearing had some blood work done at the doctor‘s office. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. II, at 213-214).
{50} Jackson testified that he wanted to enter Fearing‘s house to confirm that all of his belongings, especially a prescription, were out of the house. (Id. at 214-215). Jackson denied entering Fearing‘s home on September 27, 2017 and
{51} Jackson admitted that he had a prior felony conviction for domestic violence in 2012, a felony conviction for trafficking in cocaine in 2008, and a theft conviction in 2012. (Id. at 216). With regard to Gene‘s, Angela‘s, and Suzanne‘s testimony, Jackson stated that he did not know if they were lying. (Id. at 217-218).
{52} Jackson stated that he took multiple trips to retrieve his belongings from Fearing‘s house and that, to the best of his knowledge, all of his belongings were accounted for although he stated that he did not have the opportunity to fully inventory his belongings. (Id. at 218).
{53} On redirect examination, Jackson denied striking or taking any money from Fearing. (Id. at 219).
{54} Thereafter, Jackson moved to admit his exhibits, all of which were admitted without objection, and rested. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 188); (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. II, at 220, 223). The State did not present any rebuttal evidence. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. II, at 220).
{55} We first review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Jackson‘s domestic-violence and disrupting-public-services convictions. State v. Velez, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-10, 2014-Ohio-1788, ¶ 68, citing State v. Wimmer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-98-46, 1999 WL 3551590, *1 (Mar. 26, 1999). With regard to his conviction for domestic violence, Jackson concedes that Fearing was a family or household member and that he has prior convictions for domestic violence. (Appellant‘s Amended Brief at 5). However, Jackson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting whether he: (1) knowingly caused or attempted to cause (2) physical harm to Fearing. (Id. at 5-6). Jackson argues that “the only evidence adduced at trial that [he] caused physical harm to [Fearing] came from [Fearing herself].” (Id. at 6). Moreover, Jackson argues that “[n]o other individuals witnessed [the] alleged altercation,” that the purported injuries only “consisted of ‘redness’ and a ‘knotting,‘” and that Fearing did not seek medical treatment for the alleged injuries. (Id.).
{56} We disagree. There is sufficient evidence that Jackson knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to Fearing.
{57} Jackson‘s argument that the evidence is insufficient because Fearing‘s testimony was the only evidence offered at trial to show that Jackson caused physical harm to Fearing is without merit. First, “Ohio courts have held that the testimony of one witness, if believed by the jury, is enough to support a conviction.”
{58} Moreover, although Fearing and Jackson were the only individuals present in Fearing‘s house during the alleged incident, the State provided additional witnesses and evidence corroborating Fearing‘s testimony. For instance, State‘s Exhibits 2 and 3 depict bruising on Fearing‘s arm. (See State‘s Exs. 2, 3). Furthermore, Sgt. Bour testified that he observed bruising and swelling on Fearing‘s arm and that in his personal and professional experience, the injuries he observed on the morning of September 27, 2017 “appeared * * * to have just happened.” (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 177-179, 182-183). He also described Fearing‘s mental state in the aftermath of the incident as “distraught“. (Id. at 177). Additionally, Gene, Angela, and Suzanne all testified that they heard a commotion and saw Jackson at Fearing‘s home on the morning of the incident. (Id. at 144-146, 153-156, 163-166). Angela testified that she heard screams coming from Fearing‘s
{59} Jackson‘s argument that the State failed to demonstrate the requisite degree of physical harm because Fearing‘s injuries “consisted of ‘redness and knotting‘” and because Fearing did not seek medical treatment for her injuries also fails. First, it has been noted that ”
{60} Accordingly, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Jackson knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to Fearing.
{61} We next review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Jackson‘s disrupting-public-services conviction. Velez, 2014-Ohio-1788, at ¶ 68, citing Wimmer, 1999 WL 3551590, at *1. With regard to his conviction for disrupting public services, Jackson argues “there was no evidence submitted during trial that he acted with purpose to impair any emergency service or law enforcement officer from responding to any emergency.” (Appellant‘s Amended Brief at 6). Jackson asserts that insufficient evidence was presented at trial for a conviction because “nothing was put forth at trial concerning [Jackson‘s] purpose toward a cellular telephone,” “[t]he only evidence concerning [Jackson‘s] involvement with [Fearing‘s] cellular phone was that he ‘threw it against the wall,‘” and any damage to Fearing‘s cell phone did not render it inoperable. (Id. at 7). Jackson also asserts
{62} We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find Jackson guilty of disrupting public services. First, “[i]n State v. Robinson, the Supreme Court noted that the reference to ‘damaging or tampering with any property’ in
Once it is determined that a defendant damaged or tampered with a victim‘s telephone, the next consideration is whether that act “substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm” in order to constitute a violation of
Walters at ¶ 23, quoting Robinson at ¶ 32. ”
{63} Fearing testified that she was in the process of unlocking her phone to call law enforcement when Jackson took it and threw it against the wall. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 113). Ohio courts have held that “under certain circumstances, the act of throwing a telephone can constitute ‘damaging or tampering with any property’ as a matter of law.” State v. Hill, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 09 MO 3, 2010-Ohio-4871, ¶ 24. “[T]he deciding factor in these cases is whether the defendant‘s conduct caused the victim to be unable to use that telephone.” Id. at ¶ 25.
{64} Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Jackson‘s conduct caused Fearing to be unable to use her cell phone. Fearing testified that Jackson broke into her house through the back door, came into her room as she was attempting to unlock her cellular telephone to call the police, and threw her cell phone against the wall. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 113). Fearing further testified that after her telephone was thrown, she was unable to locate the device, and she went to her neighbor‘s house following the incident so that she could call law enforcement. (Id. at 117-118).
{65} Fearing stated that she located her phone between the headboard of her bed and her windowsill when her friend called her phone, causing the phone to
{66} Moreover, despite Jackson‘s argument to the contrary, the telephone does not have to be rendered inoperable to uphold a conviction for disrupting public services. See Hill, 2010-Ohio-4871, at ¶ 23, 25 (concluding that throwing the victim‘s cell phone into a neighboring yard in the dark of night “could support a conviction for disruption of public services in violation of
{67} In addition, we find that the evidence presented is sufficient to establish the element of “substantial impairment.” Here, Fearing testified that she was in the process of unlocking her phone to contact law enforcement when Jackson came into her room and threw her phone against the wall. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 113). As a result of Jackson throwing her phone, Fearing was unable to call law enforcement for assistance. (Id. at 117-118). Therefore, Fearing was unable to give any information to law enforcement, even partial information, before Jackson took her phone and threw it. Fearing stated that she left her house following the incident to call law enforcement from her neighbor‘s house since she was unable to locate her cell phone. (Id.). In fact, law enforcement was contacted by Fearing‘s neighbors who heard a disturbance coming from Fearing‘s residence and not by Fearing herself. (Id. at 146). Moreover, it was not until law enforcement was
{68} Finally, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could have concluded that, by taking Fearing‘s cell phone from her and damaging it, it was Jackson‘s purpose to substantially impair the ability of emergency-services personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve Fearing or her property from serious physical harm. Although
{69} Here, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that Jackson specifically intended to substantially impair emergency-services personnel by damaging or tampering with Fearing‘s cell phone. First, Jackson was on notice that Fearing intended to call law enforcement on Jackson if he attempted to contact Fearing again in any way. (See State‘s Ex. 1). Moreover, per Fearing‘s testimony, Jackson‘s first action upon confronting Fearing
{70} Accordingly, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that Jackson committed the offense of disrupting public services under
{71} Having concluded that Jackson‘s domestic-violence and disrupting-public-services convictions are based on sufficient evidence, we next address Jackson‘s argument that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Velez, 2014-Ohio-1788, at ¶ 76.
{72} With regard to his domestic-violence conviction, Jackson reasserts his arguments made in his first assignment of error. (Appellant‘s Amended Brief at 8). Specifically, he argues that “[Fearing] was the sole witness presented by the state concerning the causation of physical harm to [Fearing]” and that “[e]ven if the jury was able to determine [Fearing] had injuries at the time [Sgt. Bour] conducted his investigation, the causation element was not met.” (Id.).
{73} After weighing the evidence and evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, with appropriate deference to the trier of fact‘s credibility determination,
{74} First, Jackson‘s argument that his domestic-violence conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence because “[Fearing] was the sole witness presented by the state concerning the causation of physical harm to [Fearing]” is without merit. As discussed above, Fearing testified that Jackson struck her on her arm, face, and ribs resulting in red marks on the side of Fearing‘s face, bumps on her arm, and red marks on her ribs. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 113-114, 118-119). In addition, State‘s Exhibits 2 and 3 depict bruising on Fearing‘s arm. (State‘s Exs. 2, 3). Moreover, the State‘s additional witnesses corroborate Fearing‘s testimony. Sgt. Bour indicated that he observed bruising and swelling on Fearing‘s arm the morning of the incident, and Gene testified that when he saw Fearing immediately following the alleged incident, “[s]he looked like she had been beaten up.” (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 146, 178-179). Fearing‘s three next-door neighbors all testified that they observed Jackson at Fearing‘s house the morning of September 27, 2017 and heard a commotion coming from Fearing‘s house coinciding with the time of the alleged physical encounter. (Id. at 144-145, 153-
{75} On the other hand, although Jackson admitted that he was at Fearing‘s residence on the morning of September 27, 2017, he denied entering Fearing‘s residence or causing any physical injury to Fearing. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. II, at 205, 213-216, 219). Furthermore, he opined that the bruising observed in State‘s Exhibits 2 and 3 was the result of blood work Fearing had done prior to the day of the alleged incident. (Id. at 213-214).
{76} In sum, there is undeniably conflict between the State‘s version and Jackson‘s version of the events of September 27, 2017. Consequently, this case hinges on witness credibility. “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 at paragraph one of the syllabus. “When examining witness credibility, ‘the choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact and an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.‘” State v. White, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-21, 2017-Ohio-1488, ¶ 50, quoting In re N.Z., 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2010-L-023, 2010-L-035 and 2010-L-041, 2011-Ohio-6845, ¶ 79, quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1986). “A fact finder is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of
{77} With regard to his disrupting-public-services conviction, Jackson asserts “there was no evidence presented at trial as to [his] purpose” regarding Fearing‘s phone. (Appellant‘s Amended Brief at 9). Specifically, Jackson argues that “[n]othing was presented alleging that [Fearing] communicated what she was attempting to do with her cellular telephone to [Jackson] at the time he allegedly took the cellular telephone.” (Id.). Further, Jackson argues that Fearing‘s cellular
{78} We conclude that Jackson‘s disrupting-public-services conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Jackson‘s argument that “there was no evidence presented at trial as to [his] purpose” with respect to Fearing‘s cell phone is without merit. “‘The determination of a defendant‘s mental state, absent some comment on his or her part, must of necessity be determined by the nature of the act when viewed in conjunction with the surrounding facts and circumstances.‘” State v. Hartman, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26609, 2016-Ohio-2883, ¶ 27, quoting State v. Mundy, 99 Ohio App.3d 275, 288 (2d Dist.1994), citing State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 168 (1990). This includes whether the defendant acted purposely in undertaking a given course of conduct. See, e.g., id. at 27-33. Here, from the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged incident, it can be inferred that by wrenching Fearing‘s cell phone from her hands, damaging it by throwing it against a wall, and rendering it inaccessible, Jackson specifically intended to substantially impair the ability of law enforcement officers to prevent serious physical harm to Fearing‘s person or her property.
{79} First, Fearing testified that she was fearful of Jackson due to “warning signs” she had observed in the previous weeks. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 122). It is undisputed that Fearing terminated her relationship with Jackson on
{80} Fearing‘s testimony presents a scenario in which a person violently breaks into a home and, on first encountering the resident, deprives that person of their means to call for help. When a person breaks into a residence and their first act is to deprive the occupant of their means for contacting the outside world, a natural and probable inference is that they did so with the intention of preventing the occupant from calling the police.
{81} Moreover, even though Fearing did not testify that she verbally communicated to Jackson her intention to call law enforcement with her cell phone when he entered her bedroom, her purpose can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. Fearing had terminated her relationship with Jackson the day before and had explicitly told Jackson that she would contact the police if he attempted to return to her home or contact her. (Apr. 12-13, 2018 Tr., Vol. I, at 111-112); (State‘s Ex. 1). Therefore, Jackson had been put on notice that Fearing intended to call the police if he returned to her residence or made contact with her. Furthermore, as the door to her house had just been broken in and her estranged boyfriend had entered her bedroom despite being told the day before not to come back to the residence, the totality of the circumstances indicate that Fearing‘s purpose in unlocking her cellular telephone was to contact law enforcement.
{82} Finally, Jackson‘s argument that his disrupting-public-services conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence because Fearing‘s cell
{83} For the foregoing reasons, Jackson‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{84} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
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