State of Ohio v. Hassen Habibi I‘Juju
No. 15AP-692 (C.P.C. No. 12CR-5591)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
May 19, 2016
2016-Ohio-3078
BROWN, J.
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on May 19, 2016
On briеf: Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, for appellee.
On brief: Hassen Habibi I‘juju, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BROWN, J.
{¶ 1} Hassen Habibi I‘Juju, defendant-appellant, appeals the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, in which the court denied his motion to correct judgment entry pursuant to
{¶ 2} In 1985, the trial court found appellant guilty of two counts of aggravated murder with death penalty specifications and one count of kidnapping with a firearm specification. The trial court mergеd the two aggravated murder counts and sentenced appellant to a single term of 30 years to life, to be served consecutively to a 10-to-25 year term on the kidnapping count and 3 years on the firearm spеcification. This court affirmed on appeal in State v. I‘Juju, 10th Dist. No. 85AP-803 (Sept. 2, 1986).
{¶ 3} On May 15, 2015, appellant filed a motion to correct judgment entry pursuant to
[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT ENTRY PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL RULE 36.
[II.] SENTENCING ENTRY IS ERRED BECAUSE IT SENTENCED THE APPELLANT/DEFENDANT AS THE “PRINCIPAL OFFENDER” RATHER THAN THE “COMPLICITOR.”
{¶ 4} Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to correct its 1985 judgment entry. Appellant filed his motion pursuant to
{¶ 5} In his motion, appellant asserted his sentencing entry was deficient in the following ways: (1) it failed to state which count of aggravated murder defendant was convicted of for the purpose of sentencing; (2) it failed to state the aggravated element, statute, and division of aggravated murder for the purpose of sentencing; (3) it failed to state the jury‘s verdict in regard to the guilty verdict for the death penalty specification in Count 1 and Count 2; (4) it failed to state the degree of kidnapping for sentencing purposes; (5) it failed to state the verdict for the gun specification; (6) it failed to state the
{¶ 6} The trial court denied appellant‘s motion, finding there was no clerical error that it needed to correct. The court concluded that the sentencing entry complied with
{¶ 7}
Judgment. A judgment of conviction shall set forth the fact of conviction and the sentence. * * * The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by the clerk.
{¶ 8} After reviewing the arguments appellant raised in his motion to correct judgement entry, wе find they are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. Under the doctrine of law of the case, “the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved fоr all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.” Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984). This doctrine ensures the consistency of results in a case and avoids endless litigation by settling the issues. Id. Pursuant to the doctrine, a litigant may not raisе arguments “which were fully pursued, or available to be pursued, in a first appeal.” Hubbard ex rel. Creed v. Sauline, 74 Ohio St.3d 402, 404-05 (1996).
{¶ 9} In State v. Monroe, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-598, 2015-Ohio-844, this court applied the law-of-the-case doctrine to preclude a defendant‘s argument that thе sentencing entry did not comply with
{¶ 10} We find Monroe instructive and applicable to the present case. Initially, as we found in Monroe, the purpose of
{¶ 11} Although we indicated in Monroe that an аppellate court may choose to re-examine the law of the case it has itself previously created if that is the only means to avoid injustice, appellant has failed to demonstrate that any injustice would be prevented by granting his motion. Appellant filed his motion to correct judgment entry 30 years after the trial court filed the original judgment, and appellant has failed to convince us that the trial court‘s issuing a new entry at this very late juncture would alleviate any prejudice or prevent an injustice.
{¶ 12} We note that, with regard to the seventh deficiency appellant listed in his motion-that the 1985 sentencing entry failed to state his jail-time credit-appellant cannot avail himself of the provisions under
{¶ 13} Although appellant is correct that his 1985 judgment entry did not include any provision for jail-time credit, the requirements in
{¶ 14} Furthermore, we also note that in State v. Crane, 10th Dist. No. 85AP-780 (Apr. 1, 1986), which was decided only eight months after the 1985 judgment entry was issued in this case, this court held that the trial court was not required to include jail-time credit in the sentencing entry as jail-time credit was not a part of sentencing. We found that nоne of the statutes or rules regulating the trial court‘s imposing sentence referred to jail-time credit, and
{¶ 15} Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons, we find thе trial court did not err when it denied appellant‘s motion to correct judgment entry, and we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error.
{¶ 16} Appellant argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court‘s sentenсing entry was erroneous because it sentenced him as the principal offender rather than the complicitor. Appellant contends that nowhere in the sentencing entry does it indicate that he was convicted as a complicitor under
{¶ 17} Accordingly, appellant‘s two assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
DORRIAN, P.J., concurs in judgment only.
LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concurs.
Judgment affirmed.