State v. MorganState v. Morgan
O P I N I O N.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Tyrone Morgan advances on appeal a single assignment of error challenging the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court‘s judgment overruling his “Motion for Jail Time Credit.” Because the trial court miscalculated Morgan‘s days of confinement prior to his convictions, we reverse in part the judgment overruling his motion.
{¶2} On September 2010, in the case numbered B-1004025, Morgan was convicted upon guilty pleas to six counts of drug trafficking, sentenced to concurrent prison terms of four and one-half years, and credited with two days for his confinement prior to his convictions. Three days later, in the case numbered B-1004092, Morgan was convicted upon guilty pleas to trafficking and having weapons under a disability, sentenced to concurrent prison terms of four years to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed in the case numbered B-1004025, and credited with 65 days for his preconviction confinement.
{¶3} Morgan voluntarily dismissed his direct appeals from those convictions, but thereafter filed in each case a series of motions seeking correction of his jail-time credit. In February 2014, in each case, Morgan filed, and the common pleas court overruled, a “Motion for Jail Time Credit.” But he here appeals from only the judgment overruling his motion in the case numbered B-1004092.
{¶4} In seeking correction of his jail-time credit, Morgan argued that the trial court had miscalculated the credit and had misapplied it against his sentences, and that he was, instead, entitled to jail-time credit of 76 days against each prison sentence imposed in the cases. He asserted that the trial court should have credited him with 67 days, rather than 65 days, for his preconviction confinement in the case numbered B-1004092, credited against each sentence the total days of confinement preceding his convictions in both cases, and included in his jail-time credit the days of confinement following his convictions awaiting his conveyance to prison.
{¶6} In 2012, the General Assembly amended
Determine, notify the offender of, and include in the sentencing entry the number of days that the offender has been confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the offender is being sentenced and by which the department of rehabilitation and correction must reduce the stated prison term under
section 2967.191 of the Revised Code .
Under the amended statute, an “inaccurate”
The sentencing court retains continuing jurisdiction to correct any error not previously raised at sentencing in making a determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this section. The offender may, at any time after sentencing, file a motion in the sentencing court to correct any error made in making a determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this section, and the court may in its discretion grant or deny that motion. If the court changes the number of days in its determination or redetermination, the court shall cause the entry granting that change to be delivered to the department of rehabilitation and correction without delay.
{¶7}
{¶8} No jurisdiction to correct jail-time credit under
{¶9} Jail-time-credit calculation subject to correction under
{¶10} On July 22, 2014, in the case numbered B-1004092, and thus after the common pleas court had overruled Morgan‘s February 2012 motion and Morgan had perfected this appeal, the common pleas court placed of record an entry purporting to “grant[]” his motion, at least to the extent of crediting him with “a total of 66 days credit (as of the date of sentencing), plus conveyance time to the institution.” By its entry, the court essentially conceded, as the record confirms, that Morgan‘s preconviction-confinement credit had been miscalculated, and that he was instead
{¶11} But in 2010, when Morgan was convicted,
{¶12} Moreover, the July 2014 entry was recorded while this appeal was pending. A trial court loses jurisdiction to act in a case after an appeal has been taken, except to take action in aid of the appeal or in a manner not inconsistent with the appeals court‘s jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify, or reverse the appealed judgment. State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97, 378 N.E.2d 162 (1978). Accord In re S.J., 106 Ohio St.3d 11, 2005-Ohio-3215, 829 N.E.2d 1207, ¶ 9. When, by its July 2014 entry, the common
{¶13} We affirm in part and reverse in part. We, therefore, hold that Morgan‘s claims in his motion that the trial court had erred as a matter of law in determining his jail-time credit motion were subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, we overrule his assignment of error in part, and upon the authority of
{¶14} But the judgment of conviction in the case numbered B-1004092 was subject to correction pursuant to
Judgment affirmed in part as modified, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
HILDEBRANDT, P.J., HENDON and DINKELACKER, JJ.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.