State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jennifer L. Hughes, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19AP-385
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
June 18, 2020
2020-Ohio-3382
(C.P.C. No. 14CR-5429)
Rendered on June 18, 2020
On Brief: Ron J. O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Barbara A. Farnbacher, for appellee. Argued: Barbara A. Farnbacher.
On Brief: The Koffel Law Firm, and Bradley P. Koffel for appellant. Argued: Paul Giorgianni.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{1} Defendant-appellant, Jennifer L. Hughes, appeals from a decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying her request that she be granted limited driving privileges. Because we conclude the trial court erred in denying appellant‘s motion on the grounds that it lacked the statutory authority to consider the motion on its merits, we reverse and remand the matter to the trial court.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{2} On October 10, 2014, Hughes was indicted on two counts of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of
{3} On January 8, 2019, Hughes filed a “motion to terminate license suspension” in case No. 14CR-5429. On January 15, 2019, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, opposed the motion on grounds there was no legal authority that authorized terminating Hughes’ driver‘s license suspension. Subsequently, on March 6, 2019, Hughes filed a “memorandum of law regarding the court‘s authority to grant limited diving privileges.”
{4} On May 30, 2019, the trial court issued its decision and entry denying Hughes’ motion to terminate license suspension. In denying the motion, the trial court found as follows:
[W]here there are two suspensions imposed by two courts, this Court does not find that [
R.C. 4510.021 ] provides authority to grant Defendant limited driving privileges. Additionally, this Court does not find such authority to grant limited driving privileges in light of the fact that the other suspension was imposed prior to the suspension by this court and the Defendant‘s license will remain suspended pursuant to that suspension. Finally, this Court does not find it appropriate, under the circumstances, to terminate the balance of Defendant‘s 120-month (10 year) suspension imposed by this Court.
(May 30, 2019 Decision and Entry at 3.)1
{5} This timely appeal followed.
II. Assignment of Error
{6} Appellant asserts one assignment of error for our review:
III. Standard of Review
{7} We agree with Hughes that this appeal presents an issue of statutory construction which is subject to a de novo standard of review. Clark v. State Teachers Ret. Sys., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-105, 2018-Ohio-4680, ¶ 16, citing MA Equip. Leasing I, LLC v. Tilton, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-564, 2012-Ohio-4668, ¶ 18.
IV. Law and Analysis
{8} In her sole assignment of error, Hughes contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for limited driving privileges on the basis that it did not have the authority to grant them under
{9}
Unless expressly prohibited by
section 2919.22 ,section 4510.13 , or any other section of the Revised Code, a court may grant limited driving privileges for any purpose described in division (A)(1), (2), or (3) of this section during any suspension imposed by the court. In granting the privileges, the court shall specify the purposes, times, and places of the privileges and may impose any other reasonable conditions on the person‘s driving of a motor vehicle. The privileges shall be for any of the following limited purposes:(1) Occupational, educational, vocational, or medical purposes;
* * *
{10} The court‘s primary goal of statutory construction “is to give effect to the General Assembly‘s intent.” Silver Lining Group EIC Morrow Cty. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn. Autism Scholarship Program, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-398, 2017-Ohio-7834, ¶ 34, citing State v. Banks, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-69, 2011-Ohio-4252, ¶ 13, citing State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, ¶ 11. “To determine legislative intent, we first look to the language of the statute.” Id., citing Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 1997 Ohio 310 (1997). The statutory language must be considered in context, and the court must construe
{11} Where the words in a statute are ” ‘free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.’ ” Silver Lining Group at ¶ 34, quoting Hairston at ¶ 12, quoting Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. ” ‘It is only where the words of a statute are ambiguous, uncertain in meaning, or conflicting that a court has the right to interpret a statute.’ ” Id. at ¶ 35, quoting In re Adoption of Baby Boy Brooks, 136 Ohio App.3d 824, 829 (10th Dist.2000). An ambiguity exists only “if the language of a statue is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id., citing Columbus v. Mitchell, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-322, 2016-Ohio-7873, ¶ 6.
{12} A review of the plain language of
{13} Moreover, none of the foregoing restrictions bars a court from exercising its discretionary authority to grant limited driving privileges merely because an applicant for such privileges has more than one license suspension pending, regardless of whether such multiple suspensions were issued by the same judge and/or court or not, and regardless of the order in which such multiple suspensions were imposed. Nor has any other section of the Ohio Revised Code been identified that would impose such a restriction on the discretionary authority of the court to grant limited driving privileges as permitted by
{14} In short, we find that the words used in
{15} Next, we address Hughes’ two constitutional claims which have been asserted on appeal but were not raised below, to wit: (1) the trial court‘s application of
{16} First, “[p]arties cannot raise any new issues for the first time on appeal, and the failure to raise an issue at the trial level waives it on appeal.” Bell v. Teasley, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-850, 2011-Ohio-2744, ¶ 15, citing Gangale v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1406, 2002-Ohio-2936, ¶ 13. Even a constitutional issue will not be addressed in the first instance by the court of appeals where it was not raised before the trial court. See In re Andy-Jones, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1167, 2004-Ohio-3312, ¶ 20, citing Bouquett v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 123 Ohio App.3d 466, 474 (10th Dist.1997). See also In re Hinkle, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-509, 2004-Ohio-6071, ¶ 32. As noted previously in this case, Hughes did not raise her constitutional claims in the trial court; therefore, they are waived.
{17} Second, we have held that “[t]his court rules on assignments of error, not mere arguments.” Huntington Natl. Bank v. Burda, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-658, 2009-Ohio-1752, ¶ 21, citing
{18} Lastly, the Supreme Court of Ohio has “long held that ‘[c]onstitutional questions will not be decided until the necessity for a decision arises on the record before the court.’ ” In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 156 Ohio St.3d 181, 2018-Ohio-5206, ¶ 29, quoting State ex rel. Herbert v. Ferguson, 142 Ohio St. 496 (1944), paragraph two of the syllabus. In this case, we do not find the record before the court necessitates that the constitutional claims be decided. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we decline to consider the constitutional claims for the first time on appeal.
V. Disposition
{19} In conclusion, the trial court erred in denying Hughes’ request that she be granted limited driving privileges on the grounds that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to consider the request on its merits. Accordingly, we sustain Hughes’ sole assignment of error. The judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with law and this decision.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
BROWN and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.