STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. MOLLY J. HUFFMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 5-19-37
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HANCOCK COUNTY
March 23, 2020
2020-Ohio-1062
Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2018 CR 000452
OPINION
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Howard A. Elliott for Appellant
Lora L. Manon for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Molly J. Huffman (“Huffman“), brings this appeal from the September 11, 2019, judgment of the Hancock County Common Pleas Court sentencing her to a mandatory thirty months in prison after Huffman pled no contest to, and was found guilty of, Aggravated Vehicular Assault in violation of
{¶2} On November 20, 2018, Huffman was indicted for Aggravated Vehicular Assault in violation of
{¶3} Subsequently, Huffman entered into a written negotiated plea agreement wherein she agreed to plead no contest to Aggravated Vehicular Assault as indicted. The written plea agreement also indicated that Huffman would consent
{¶4} A change-of-plea hearing was held on July 3, 2019. At the hearing, the plea agreement was presented to the trial court. The trial court conducted a thorough
{¶5} On September 5, 2019, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The defense argued for the minimum mandatory prison term—twelve months—while the State argued for a mandatory prison term of thirty months out of the maximum possible sixty. After hearing statements from the victim, her daughter, and Huffman, the trial court ultimately sentenced Huffman to serve a mandatory thirty
Assignment of Error No. 1
The Trial Court [erred] in making a finding of guilty for a no contest plea for the offense of Aggravated Vehicular Assault when the statement of facts presented by the State did not demonstrate the vehicle in question was operated under the influence of alcohol.
{¶6} In her assignment of error, Huffman argues that the trial court erred by finding her guilty of Aggravated Vehicular Assault because she claims the statement of facts presented by the State at the plea hearing was insufficient to find that she was intoxicated.
{¶7} While a plea of guilty is a complete admission of a defendant‘s guilt, a plea of no contest “is not an admission of defendant‘s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or complaint, and the plea or admission [cannot] be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.”
{¶8} Importantly, the requirements regarding no contest pleas in felony cases are different from those in misdemeanor cases. State v. Wilson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-039, 2018-Ohio-902, ¶ 46, appeal not allowed, 153 Ohio St.3d 1433, 2018-Ohio-2639. Pursuant to
{¶9} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, “where the indictment * * * contains sufficient allegations to state a felony offense and the defendant pleads no contest, the court must find the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” (Emphasis added). State v. Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d 582, 584 (1998). Nevertheless, although an explanation of circumstances is not required in felony cases, the trial court can ask for an explanation of circumstances before accepting a no contest plea to a felony.2 Wilson at ¶ 46. In the event that the trial court asks for an explanation of circumstances and that explanation absolutely negates the existence of an element of the offense, the trial court errs in finding the defendant guilty pursuant to the no contest plea. Williams, supra; see also State v. Mullen, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-10-08, 2011-Ohio-37, ¶ 19.
{¶10} In this case, Huffman was convicted of Aggravated Vehicular Assault in violation of
(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle * * *, shall cause serious physical harm to another person * * * in any of the following ways:
(1)(a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of
section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance[.]
{¶11} The indictment charging Huffman with Aggravated Vehicular Assault reads:
[O]n or about the 22nd day of September, 2018, at Eagle Township, Hancock County, Ohio Molly J. Huffman did Unlawfully, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, did [sic] cause serious physical harm to B.J.M., as the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of
§4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance in violation of§2903.08(A)(1)(a) , (B)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code.
(Doc. No. 1).
{¶12} The Aggravated Vehicular Assault charge was recited by the trial court at the change-of-plea hearing just as it was indicted. (July 3, 2019, Tr. at 3-4). A review of the indictment, which was considered by the trial court in finding Huffman guilty at the change-of-plea hearing, clearly shows that all of the elements of Aggravated Vehicular Assault were present. On this basis, without anything
{¶13} Nevertheless, although the trial court could have relied solely on the indictment to find Huffman guilty here, the trial court was presented with additional information through the State‘s narrative of facts. In that narrative, the State indicated that Huffman drove through a stop sign at approximately 47 miles per hour and that she ran into the vehicle of an 81-year old woman. The elderly woman was seriously injured and had to be removed from her vehicle with the “jaws of life.” The elderly woman suffered, inter alia, a lower back fracture that kept her in a back brace, she suffered bruising to her bowel and bladder that required her to wear a catheter for eight months, a sternal fracture, a hemorrhage of the spleen, and a brain bleed that became a life-threatening situation. The victim nearly died multiple times while in the hospital.
{¶14} At the scene of the accident, a responding trooper indicated that he spoke with Huffman‘s husband, who was a passenger in the vehicle. The husband stated that Huffman was driving and that alcohol was a factor in the crash.
{¶16} At the scene of the accident, Huffman admitted that she had consumed two beers and one mixed drink. Huffman told an officer that she consumed the mixed drink approximately twenty minutes prior to the crash. An HGN test was performed on Huffman and six of six clues of impairment were detected. Huffman attempted to perform other field sobriety tests but she had trouble staying in starting position and keeping her balance so the tests were not completed. Huffman refused to submit a urine sample.
{¶17} Following the State‘s factual recitation, the trial court found Huffman guilty of Aggravated Vehicular Assault, noting that it had considered both the recitation and the indictment. Though, again, the indictment itself was sufficient unless the recitation absolutely negated an element of the offense, Huffman contends that the recitation of facts was not sufficient to find that she was intoxicated and thus a guilty finding for Aggravated Vehicular Assault was unwarranted.
{¶18} However, the narrative established that there was a collision caused by Huffman resulting in serious physical harm. The narrative established that Huffman admitted to having multiple drinks, that an officer noticed six of six clues on the
{¶19} Furthermore, notwithstanding the facts presented in the narrative and the sufficiency of the indictment, Huffman actually consented to a finding of guilt in her written plea agreement. The agreement, which was signed by Huffman, her attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial court read, in pertinent part.
By pleading No Contest, I am consenting to a finding of guilt to the offense contained in Count One of the Indictment, and I understand that I am admitting to the facts of the offense contained in the Indictment as to Count One, and such admission shall not be [used] against me in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, and that I understand the Judge, after accepting my Plea of No Contest, can find me to be guilty of the offense[.]
(Doc. No. 35). This portion of the agreement was mentioned at the change-of-plea hearing.5
{¶21} For all of the foregoing reasons, Huffman‘s assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Hancock County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
/jlr