State v. HowardState v. Howard
BRESSLER, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the decision of the Preble County Court of Common Pleas granting a motion to suppress evidence.1 We reverse the trial court‘s decision.
{¶2}
{¶3} Four minutes after the stop, Trooper Simms signaled for Legere to exit the vehicle, and she complied. Legere gave her driver‘s license and a rental contract for the vehiclе to Trooper Simms, explaining that she and her passengers had been visiting a friend in Oklahoma and were now on their way to New Jersey. Trooper Simms then spoke with Howard, who provided a birth certificate as his only form of identification. Howard gave a similar account of their recent travels.
{¶4} Eight minutes after the stop, Trooper Simms returned to his vehicle to run a license, registration, wants and warrants check on his mobile computer. While waiting for the information to be returned to the computer, Trooper Simms continued questioning Legere. Trooper Simms then asked Legere to stand on the passenger side of his patrol car, wherе she could clearly see Zeus, a canine used for drug detection. At that time, 10 minutes after the stop, Legere began to complain of menstrual cramps. A few seconds later, Trooper Simms called the dispatcher and requested backup for safety so he could use Zeus to sniff the Taurus for drugs.
{¶5} By 10:55, which was 14 minutes after the stop, Trooper Simms still had not received the information from his license, registration, wants and warrants check on his computer that he had requested six minutes earlier. At that time, he called the dispatcher
{¶6} After securing Howard, Legere, and Legere‘s child, Troopers Simms and Ward searched the vehicle and found several bundles of what they suspected to be marijuana. The troopers conducted a field test, which confirmed that the bundled material was marijuana. The troopers then arrested Howard and Lеgere.
{¶7} Howard and Legere were each indicted on one count of possession of marijuana in violation of
{¶8} Howard and Legere each entered a plea of not guilty, and filed separate motions to suppress all evidence seized at the time of their arrest. After a joint hearing on both motions, the trial court granted both suppression motions. The state appeals the trial court‘s decision, raising a single assignment of error.
{¶9} Appellant‘s assignment of error:
{¶10} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DETENTION OF APPELLEES IN THIS CASE WENT BEYOND THAT WHICH WAS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT THE TRAFFIC STOP IN THIS CASE.”
{¶11} In its assignment of error, the state argues the trial court erred in granting
{¶12} An appellate court‘s review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of lаw and fact. State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Curry (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96. As such, we accept the trial court‘s findings of fact so long as they are supported by competent, crеdible evidence. State v. Guysinger (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 594. However, an appellate court independently reviews the trial court‘s legal conclusions based on those facts and determines, without deference to the trial court‘s decision, “whether as a matter of law, the facts meet the appropriate legal standard.” Curry at 96.
{¶13} “Where a рolice officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a suspicion that the viоlator was engaging in more nefarious criminal activity.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 1996-Ohio-431, syllabus.
{¶14} In conducting a stop of a motor vehicle for a traffic violation, an “officer may detain an automobile for a time sufficient to investigate the reasonable, articulable suspicion for which the vehicle was initially stopped.” State v. Cahill, Shelby App. No. 17-01-19, 2002-Ohio-4459, at ¶21, citing State v. Smith (1996), 117 Ohio App.3d 278, 285. However, an investigativе stop may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Venham (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655; Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319.
{¶15}
{¶16} However, the detention of a stopped driver may continue beyond this time frame when additional facts are encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop. State v. Myers (1990), 63 Ohio App.3d 765, 771; Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d at 655.
{¶17} In addition, a lawfully detained vehicle may be subjected to а canine sniff of the vehicle‘s exterior even without the presence of a reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity. State v. Rusnak (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 24, 28. Both Ohio courts and the United States Supreme Court have determined that “the exterior sniff by a trained narcotics dog to detect the odor of drugs is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.” Id.; United States v. Place (1983), 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637. Thus, a canine sniff of a vehicle may be conducted during the time period necessary to effectuate the original purpose of the stop. Moreover, if a trained narcotics dog “alerts to the odor of drugs from a lawfully detained vehicle, an officer has probable
{¶18} The trial court found, and the parties do not dispute, that Trooper Simms had a valid reason to stop the vehicle after observing the vehicle cross the right edge line of the road. However, the trial court found that Trooper Simms detained appellees beyond that which was required to conduct the stop, and that the detention was not supported by facts giving rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
{¶19} The trial court stated in its opinion, “[t]he Court * * * finds no evidence of the observation of facts that would give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that either [appellee] was involved in the commission of another crime. The accounts of the trip given by each [appellee] were consistent in all material respects. * * * When the mobile computer was not functioning properly, all Trooper Simms needed to do was to call the dispatcher (which he eventually did). Rather than do this, Trooper Simms attempted to kill time until Trooper Ward arrived. * * * The Court believes that this was detention of the [appellees] beyond that which was required to conduct this stop * * * and that the detention was not supported by facts giving rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”
{¶20} Contrary to the trial court‘s сonclusion, we find that Trooper Simms did not detain appellees for an unreasonable amount of time, and that the court erred in granting appellees’ motion to suppress the evidence seized upon their arrest. While this court must defer to the trial court‘s resolution of factual questions and evaluation of witness credibility, the trial court‘s decision does not indicate it disbelieved Trooper Simms testimony. Rather, the trial court‘s decision indicates that it merely disagrees with Trooper Simms‘s conclusions and decision-making conducted in the field during the investigation.
{¶21} As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686-687:
{¶22}
{¶23} In Bolden, 2004-Ohio-184 at ¶19-25, this court affirmed a Preble County Court of Common Pleas decision finding that under similar facts and circumstances, a 23 to 30 minute period of detainment from the time of the initial stop until the time the canine alerted was reasonable. It is important to note that in this case, the total lеngth of the stop was less than 24 minutes in duration. Moreover, only 14 minutes elapsed between the time Trooper Simms ran the license, registration, wants and warrants check on his mobile computer and the time when the information was ultimately available to Trooper Simms from the dispatcher. Trooper Simms testified that during this periоd of time, he encountered additional facts which gave him a reasonable, articulable suspicion that, based on his involvement in several hundred drug interdiction stops, appellees were engaged in additional criminal behavior beyond that for which they had been stopped.
{¶24}
{¶25} In addition, Trooper Simms became suspicious because Legere‘s timeline of events seemed illogical. Lеgere gave Trooper Simms a vehicle rental agreement indicating they had rented the vehicle in New Jersey on October 15. Legere told Trooper Simms that it took them 24 hours of driving time to travel to Oklahoma, and that they spent a couple of days there and were on their way to New Jersey. Trooper Simms testifiеd that her story seemed illogical because it was not possible for them to leave New Jersey on the 15th, spend 24 hours driving to Oklahoma, spend at least two days there, and then be back in southern Ohio on the 18th, when he stopped them.
{¶26} Further, Trooper Simms testified that he became even more suspicious when Legere began complaining of menstrual cramps. Trooper Simms explained that when he first observed Legere, she was calm and laughing. However, when Legere stood on the passenger side of his patrol car, where Zeus, the canine, was in clear view, she started to act very nervous, and then began moaning, grabbing at her stomach, and doubling over at the waist. After checking to see if Legere needed assistance, Trooper Simms called for backup. Trooper Simms continued the investigation by conducting a canine sniff less than 15 minutes later.
{¶27}
{¶28} In finding that Trooper Simms detained appellees for an unreasonable amount of time, the trial court emphasized that Trooper Simms wrote in his police report, which he confirmed in his testimony, that, while waiting for Trooper Ward to arrive, he “tried to kill as much time as [he] could * * *.” We find such emphasis to be misplaced. Trooper Simms explained in his testimony that he tried to kill time by making conversation with Legere in an attеmpt to keep her calm while he was waiting both for backup and for the dispatcher to provide him with the information he needed to complete the traffic stop. At the time when this occurred, Trooper Simms had already encountered the facts which gave him reasonable suspicion that that there werе drugs in the vehicle. Trooper Simms was then permitted to detain appellees for a reasonable length of time necessary to extend the investigation, which he was unable to continue until Trooper Ward arrived. Trooper Ward arrived less than 10 minutes after being called, and Zeus alerted five minutes later. We find Troоper Simms‘s use of the phrase “killing time” to be
{¶29} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the state‘s assignment of error. Accordingly, the trial court‘s judgment granting appellees’ motion to suppress is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings according to law and consistent with this opinion.
{¶30} Judgment reversed and remanded.
POWELL, P.J., and YOUNG, J., concur.