STATE OF OHIO v. MARK HOPPE
Case No. 22CA0032
COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
June 29, 2023
2023-Ohio-2188
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.; Hon. John W. Wise, J.; Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 21CR344. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED.
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
O P I N I O N
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee:
WILLIAM C. HAYES
LICKING CO. PROSECUTOR
ERIC DEPUE
20 S. Second Street
Newark, OH 43055
For Defendant-Appellant:
WILLIAM T. CRAMER
470 Olde Worthington Road, Ste. 200
Westerville, OH 43082
{¶1} Appellant Mark Hoppe appeals from the April 29, 2022 Judgment of Sentence of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} Jane Doe and Mary Roe have been married since 1981. Jane describes herself as transsexual. The couple has lived in their current home on Winter Green Loop for about 8 years. Neighbor A Family lives across the street from Jane and Mary, on Winter Green Loop.
{¶3} Appellant is the backyard neighbor of Jane and Mary; his back yard is immediately adjacent to theirs. Neighbor B Family lives next door to appellant. Appellant and Neighbor B Family live on Hillgail Street, which is around the corner from Winter Green Loop.
{¶4} Jane and Mary’s lot backs up to the rear of appellant’s lot, with a tree in between. During the time they have been neighbors, Jane, Mary, and appellant have not had much contact with each other. Jane recalled they spoke to each other briefly in 2015 when appellant was working on a fence. The neighbors have seen little of each other until the electric company cut down branches between the properties, increasing visibility.
An unusual day of erratic behavior and reckless driving
{¶5} On June 16, 2021, between 6:15 and 6:30 a.m., Neighbor B Wife heard a very loud vehicle speed down Hillgail Road, squealing its tires and “peeling out.” The vehicle passed Neighbor Bs’ house very fast; B Wife looked out the window and saw a dark truck speed past. She commented to her husband that someone must be late for work.
{¶6} Moments later, around 6:30 a.m., Jane Doe took her breakfast and coffee out onto her front porch, as she customarily did. Jane noticed a silver truck parked between her driveway and the neighbor’s driveway to the south that didn’t belong there. Just as Jane noticed the oddly-parked truck, the driver revved the engine loudly and sped away. For the moment, Jane thought nothing more of the truck.
{¶7} Around 7:00 a.m., Neighbor B Wife went outside to water her flowers and heard very loud music playing from appellant’s garage next door and the garage door was open, which was unusual. No vehicles were present at the house. Neighbor B Wife continued to work in her yard and around her house throughout the day. She heard appellant coming and going from his residence, driving very fast and “yelling and screaming” in his house and yard, which was very unusual. The loud music continued. At one point, Neighbor B Wife noticed chairs stacked in appellant’s driveway and wondered whether he was moving out. She could hear items being thrown in the house and garage.
{¶8} As evening approached, Neighbor B Husband mowed the grass, then he and Wife sat out on their deck with a can of beer and a glass of wine. Husband asked Wife whether she saw appellant drive through their yard; appellant drove diagonally across the yard from his driveway and almost struck Neighbor Bs’ vehicles. As the couple watched, appellant pulled out of his driveway again very fast and peeled off down the road. Wife was concerned about appellant’s erratic behavior and reckless driving because people were walking throughout the neighborhood.
{¶9} Appellant and Neighbor B Family did not speak to each other or have any interaction as the day went on.
Night falls: Mary Roe is awakened by a crash
{¶10} Around 10:30 p.m., Mary Roe was already in bed, asleep, when she was awakened by a loud “boom” and felt the house shake on its foundation. She ran to a window at the front of the house and looked outside to see a truck parked diagonally across the end of their driveway.
{¶11} Mary ran downstairs and out of the house; she proceeded down the driveway toward the truck. She thought the driver possibly struck a large tree at the end of the drive. She called out, “What have you done?”
{¶12} Appellant was out of the truck, slightly bent over, looking at the front of the vehicle. It was dark and the truck’s headlights were the only light, making it difficult to see. Appellant responded, “You know what you’ve done. Evil must leave this neighborhood. This is your final warning.” Appellant continued yelling as he got back in the truck and sped away.
{¶13} Mary looked around and realized appellant had crashed his truck into the back of Jane Doe’s car, which had been parked in the driveway. Jane’s vehicle was pushed into the house, causing the “boom” Mary heard and the shaking of the house. The rear of Jane Doe’s car was destroyed and the crash was powerful enough to cause cracks in the foundation of the home.
{¶14} In the meantime, Jane Doe had been brushing her teeth in the rear of the house when she heard a dog barking loudly. She looked out a front window and saw truck headlights coming down her driveway, then heard a loud crash and felt a vibration throughout the house. She realized the truck had pushed her car into the side of the
{¶15} The driveway is about 85 feet long. Jane saw a truck parked across the end of the driveway and heard a man yelling, but she couldn’t understand what he said. Jane called 911 as she walked down the driveway.
{¶16} In response to a question from jurors, Jane testified appellant’s truck was the same truck she saw outside her house that morning.
Father and Daughter hear a crash, investigate, and call 911
{¶17} Neighbor A Father and Daughter were home across the street from Jane and Mary, with their windows open. Daughter A was getting ready for bed when she heard a loud crash and looked out the window. She saw a truck parked “catty-cornered” across the end of the Jane-Mary driveway. She didn’t recognize the vehicle. Daughter A and Father A went outside to investigate. They stood on their stoop and watched the truck, which Daughter A described as “kind of far away.” Father A told her to call 911, which she did, and he narrated what he observed.
{¶18} Daughter A heard appellant yelling “very, very mean things” which she described at trial as “We don’t want your kind in this neighborhood; you’re not welcome here; you’re disgusting.” Daughter A said appellant walked halfway up the drive, yelling, then came back down and got in his truck.
{¶19} Jane Doe and Mary Roe joined Father A and Daughter A on their stoop as appellant got back in his truck and peeled out, speeding away. The group heard the truck speed down the street “then kind of around and behind.” T.I, 116. Jane Doe testified she
{¶20} All four then heard “popping” sounds, and Father A said “those are gunshots, get inside.” All four went inside Neighbor As’ residence and Mary Roe also called 911. They could hear shots coming from behind the Jane-Mary residence. Daughter A testified the shots started approximately thirty to ninety seconds after appellant peeled out of the driveway.
{¶21} About 10 minutes later, a deputy arrived and spoke briefly to Jane Doe. He said he was on his way to appellant’s residence but would return. The deputy left and came back a short time later, reporting that the suspect was cuffed and a gun was confiscated.
{¶22} The next day, Jane and Mary found appellant’s front license plate in their driveway.
{¶23} Contractor Phil Bolon evaluated the damage to the Jane-Mary residence and estimated the total amount to be $3,360.80. Bolon testified for appellee at trial and his estimate was admitted as appellee’s Exhibit 12. Jane testified that her deductible for the damage was $1780.
Neighbor Family B hears crash, speeding truck, and gunshots
{¶24} In the meantime, Neighbor Family B had a closer view of appellant’s actions that evening. As they were getting ready for bed, Wife B heard appellant’s truck start again and told her husband “he’s leaving again.” She could hear the truck quickly back out and speed down the street and around the corner. A few minutes later, Wife B heard a loud crash and glass breaking, and told her husband appellant hit something.
{¶25} Wife B heard appellant come home; she went to a bedroom closest to appellant’s house and sat on the floor to listen. She heard appellant screaming and swearing; she did not hear him get out of the truck and the motor was still running. Suddenly Wife B heard gunshots.
{¶26} She ran to a room at the back of the house and looked out the window. Appellant’s truck was parked in his backyard, with the headlights pointing at the back of Jane and Mary’s house. Wife B heard more gunshots and heard appellant yelling about burning the house down. She looked outside and saw appellant walking around the truck, waving his arms, and heard two more shots fired.
{¶27} At that point her husband pulled her down onto the floor and told her to call 911.
{¶28} Wife B testified she never saw or heard appellant go inside his house; the truck was running the entire time. She heard the truck running, heard gunfire, then saw the truck in the back yard. Wife B testified that it was “moments” after appellant returned that the gunshots started.
Deputies apprehend appellant
{¶29} Deputy Michael Moore was dispatched to Winter Green Loop for a disturbance call; while en route dispatch advised shots were fired and the suspect was on Hillgail, so Moore responded to appellant’s address. Upon arrival, Moore observed two male subjects, one with a beer in his hand, walking up the driveway toward a running Chevy truck.
{¶30} Moore approached the individual holding the beer, whom he identified as appellant. Moore testified appellant showed signs of intoxication because he was holding
{¶31} Moore asked appellant about gunshots and appellant said he fired four rounds into the ground near his fire pit; he said two additional shots “misfired.” Deputies retrieved the firearm and ammunition from inside appellant’s vehicle. Multiple shell casings were found in appellant’s back yard.
{¶32} Appellant admitted he had consumed several beers; Moore asked him, on a scale of one to ten, at what level he assessed his own intoxication. Appellant said a three or a four.
{¶33} Appellant was arrested and transported to the Licking County Jail. During booking he was asked whether he wanted to harm himself and appellant responded no, he only wanted to harm others.
{¶34} Sgt. Scott Schultz also responded to appellant’s residence and located the firearm and ammunition in appellant’s truck console. The firearm, a revolver, was unloaded when found. Appellant said he threw the shell casings into his fire pit in the back yard, and Schultz testified 4 out of 6 shell casings were retrieved from the fire pit, with one round still live.
{¶35} Appellant was charged by (amended) indictment with one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle pursuant to
{¶36} The amended indictment also contains a firearm specification pursuant to
{¶37} The matter proceeded to trial by jury on March 8 and 9, 2022, and appellant was found guilty upon Counts II through V and upon the firearm specification. The trial court ordered preparation of a pre-sentence investigation (P.S.I.) and scheduled sentencing for April 29, 2022. On that date, the trial court imposed a total aggregate prison term of two years. This term includes two terms of 12 months each on the felony counts and two jail terms of 30 days each on the misdemeanor counts, all to be served concurrently, consecutive to a mandatory term of 1 year on the firearm specification. The trial court also granted the forfeiture specification and ordered forfeiture of the firearm.
{¶38} Appellant now appeals from the trial court’s judgment entry of conviction and sentence.
{¶39} Appellant raises seven assignments of error:
{¶40} “I. APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY A CONVICTION FOR IMPROPER HANDLING OF A FIREARM IN A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”
{¶41} “II. THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR IMPROPER HANDLING OF A FIREARM IN A MOTOR VEHICLE.”
{¶42} “III. APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY A CONVICTION ON A FIREARM-POSSESSION SPECIFICATION THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”
{¶43} “IV. THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR THE FIREARM-POSSESSION SPECIFICATION.”
{¶44} “V. APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY MISREPRESENTING THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF ‘LOADED’ DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS.”
{¶45} “VI. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S MISREPRESENTATIONS OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE FIREARM WAS LOADED.”
{¶46} “VII. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY GRANTING THE FORFEITURE OF THE FIREARM BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE FIREARM WAS USED IN THE COMMISSION OF VANDALISM.”
I., II., III., IV.
{¶47} Appellant’s first four assignments of error are related and will be considered together. He argues his convictions upon Count II, improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle, and the firearm specification are not supported by sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶48} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, paragraph two of the syllabus. The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held, “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶49} Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal question dealing with whether the state met its burden of production at trial. State v. Murphy, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00024, 2015-Ohio-5108, ¶ 13, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). “The test for sufficiency of the evidence raises a question of law and does not permit the court to weigh the evidence.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶50} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id.
{¶51} Appellant first challenges his conviction upon one count of improperly handling of firearms in a motor vehicle pursuant to
{¶52} Appellant argues that while there is no dispute appellant’s firearm was in his truck and accessible when police arrived, appellee did not prove that it was loaded. Relevant here is
(i) There is no ammunition in a magazine or speed loader that is in the vehicle in question and that may be used with the firearm in question.
(ii) Any magazine or speed loader that contains ammunition and that may be used with the firearm in question is stored in a compartment within the vehicle in question that cannot be accessed without leaving the vehicle or is stored in a container that provides complete and separate enclosure.
{¶53} If a firearm is not “unloaded” under
{¶54} We note deputies recovered the firearm and ammunition from inside the vehicle, although the firearm was empty when they found it. Appellant argues there is no evidence it was loaded when it was in the vehicle. Appellee responds that multiple witnesses testified they heard appellant’s truck peel out of Jane and Mary’s driveway, speed down the road, and run continuously until he was behind Jane and Mary’s house, when they subsequently heard gunshots. Neighbor B Wife testified appellant pulled into his driveway, idled his car while yelling, and drove into his backyard where she immediately heard shots.
{¶55} Upon our review of the record of Neighbor B Wife’s testimony, we note the following:
* * * *.
[DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL]: * * * *. And then you heard a vehicle go into the back yard—or you seen that?
[NEIGHBOR B WIFE]: I heard the vehicle running and the next thing I heard was gunfire and that’s when I went to the back bedroom and that’s when the vehicle was—I saw it in the backyard.
* * * *.
{¶56} Neighbor B Wife heard the truck running continuously throughout the episode in which appellant pulled into his back yard and fired in the direction of Jane and Mary’s house. T. 170-171.
{¶57} Appellant responds the neighbors didn’t see him in the yard until after the gunshots; they could not have known whether he might have loaded the firearm after exiting the truck.
{¶58} Upon our review of the record, however, we find the most compelling evidence in the case to be the 911 recordings of Mary Roe, Jane Doe, Neighbor A Daughter, and Neighbor B Wife. The callers narrate events as they unfold in real time and it is evident the entire episode happened quickly, from the crash and screaming in Mary and Jane’s driveway to speeding away and driving through the yard to the firing of gunshots toward Mary and Jane’s residence. Neighbor B Wife in particular states “he’s got his truck in the backyard, he’s firing toward neighbors, he drove his truck through my backyard.”
{¶59} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee, we find the jury could reasonably find appellant drove the truck with the loaded revolver immediately prior to the shots being fired toward Jane and Mary’s house.
{¶60} Appellant further argues that the firearm specification accompanying the felony vandalism charge is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence
{¶61} We have held that the testimony of one witness, if believed by the factfinder, is enough to support a conviction. See, State v. Dunn, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008-CA-00137, 2009-Ohio-1688, ¶ 133. The weight to be given the evidence introduced at trial and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact to determine. State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 434 N.E.2d 1356 (1982), syllabus. It is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). In the instant case, the testimony of the bystander witnesses alone was compelling; coupled with the 911 calls, there is immediacy and shock to the unfolding series of events, placing the jury firmly in the shoes of the witnesses on the night in question. Having reviewed the evidence as a whole, the convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶62} Viewing the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to appellee, we conclude any rational trier of fact could have found all of the essential elements of improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle and the firearm specification beyond a reasonable doubt. The record is devoid of any evidence
{¶63} Appellant’s first four assignments of error are overruled.
V.
{¶64} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues his Due Process rights were violated when the prosecutor committed misconduct in allegedly misrepresenting the legal definition of “loaded” during closing arguments. We disagree.
{¶65} Appellant points to the following statement by the prosecutor in closing argument:
* * * *.
* * * [Y]ou will find that a revolver with rounds in your truck is a loaded firearm. And it just makes sense. Again, we’re asking you to re—use reason and common sense. If that’s not the case, then people could drive around with a shotgun with a shell sitting right next to it and it’s not a loaded firearm. You could have rounds up to your chest sitting in them with a revolver, you can put it away at any minute and it’s not a loaded firearm.
* * * *.
T. 281-282.
{¶66} While we agree the above is not an accurate definition of a loaded firearm per our discussion in appellant’s first assignment of error, we do not discern deliberate misrepresentation of the offense so much as imprecise and jumbled language. In the context of the closing argument as a whole, we find no likelihood the jury was misled by
{¶67} For the purpose of our review, defense trial counsel failed to object and bring the alleged error to the attention of the trial court, therefore appellant has waived all but plain error review. Under the plain error rule, “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
{¶68} The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor‘s comments and remarks were improper and if so, whether those comments and remarks prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the accused. Sunbury v. Sullivan, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 11CAC030025, 2012-Ohio-3699, ¶ 30 citing State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990). In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct,
{¶69} We find no plain error in admission of the cited comments, in the context of the entire closing argument, and it is evident beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have found appellant guilty even without the comments. See, State v. Edwards, 5th Dist. Licking No. 21CA0083, 2022-Ohio-3534, ¶ 36.
{¶70} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
VI.
{¶71} In his sixth assignment of error, appellant argues he received ineffective assistance of defense trial counsel because counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct as reviewed in our discussion of his fifth assignment of error. We disagree.
{¶72} A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong analysis. The first inquiry is whether counsel‘s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of any of defense counsel‘s essential duties to appellant. The second prong is whether the appellant was prejudiced by counsel‘s ineffectiveness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373(1989).
{¶73} To warrant a reversal, the appellant must additionally show he was prejudiced by counsel‘s ineffectiveness. “Prejudice from defective representation sufficient to justify reversal of a conviction exists only where the result of the trial was unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair because of the performance of trial counsel. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).
{¶74} The United States Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court have held a reviewing court “* * * need not determine whether counsel‘s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Bradley at 143, 538 N.E.2d 373, quoting Strickland at 697.
{¶75} In light of our conclusion that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct and there was no plain error, we find defense trial counsel did not err in failing to object during closing argument. Appellant was not prejudiced by defense counsel‘s representation of him. The result of the trial was not unreliable nor were the proceedings fundamentally unfair because of the performance of defense counsel. State v. Edwards, 5th Dist. Licking No. 21CA0083, 2022-Ohio-3534, ¶ 42.
{¶76} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.
VII.
{¶77} In his seventh assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should not have granted forfeiture of the firearm because appellee failed to prove the firearm was used in the commission of the vandalism. We disagree.
{¶78} Generally, forfeiture is not favored in the state of Ohio. State v. Haymond, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2009-CA-00078, 2009-Ohio-6817, ¶ 12. “Whenever possible,
{¶79}
{¶80} In determining whether property was used or intended to be used in the commission of an offense, the trier of fact should consider (1) whether the offense could not have been committed or attempted but for the presence of the instrumentality; (2) whether the primary purpose in using the instrumentality was to commit or attempt to commit the offense; and (3) the extent to which the instrumentality furthered the commission of the offense.
{¶81} The state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture.
{¶82} In the instant case, at sentencing appellant did not object to the forfeiture of the firearm. As such, he has waived all but plain error on this issue. In order to have plain
{¶83} On review of the record, during discussion of jury instructions, the trial court asked whether appellant wanted the forfeiture determined by the judge or the jury. Defense trial counsel stated appellant “waived” the issue, and “we’re not concerned about getting the firearm back.” T. 249-250. The trial court thereupon noted it would decide the issue of forfeiture instead of the jury. At sentencing, there was no mention of the forfeiture at all, but the trial court’s sentencing entry notes “the Court grants the forfeiture specification of the H & R 732.32 Revolver to the Licking County Sheriff’s Office.”
{¶84} We read this record as appellant’s concession to the forfeiture of the firearm. Assuming that forfeiture of the firearm could be viewed as error, it was invited error. Invited error is a well-settled principle under which “[a] party will not be permitted to take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced.” State v. Kovac, 150 Ohio App.3d 676, 2002–Ohio–6784, 782 N.E.2d 1185, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.) quoting State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 493, 709 N.E.2d 484 (1999). See, also, State v. Jones, 114 Ohio App.3d 306, 322, 683 N.E.2d 87 (1996) (“A party who invites an error may not demand from the appellate court comfort from its consequences”).
{¶85} Appellant’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶86} Appellant’s seven assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J.,
Hoffman, P.J. and
Wise, John, J., concur.