State v. HillState v. Hill
O P I N I O N
PIPER, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Nikki J. Hill, appeals from her conviction in the Eaton Municipal Court after she pled guilty to one count of misdemeanor operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI“), her third such conviction within the preceding six years
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On February 5, 2013, Hill was arrested and charged with misdemeanor OVI in violation of
{¶ 3} Nearly 13 years later, on February 4, 2026, Hill appeared before the trial court and entered a guilty plea to the charged misdemeanor OVI offense.2 The trial court accepted Hill‘s plea after finding it was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The matter then proceeded to sentencing. Because this was Hill‘s third OVI conviction within the preceding six years of the offense, Hill was subject to the sentencing enhancements provided in the now former
{¶ 4} At sentencing, the trial court imposed a 365-day jail term, with 210 days suspended, less five days of jail-time credit. This resulted in Hill being sentenced to serve 150 consecutive, nonsuspended, noncredited days in jail. The trial court also ordered Hill to pay a $900 fine, approximately $1,500 in court costs, and suspended Hill‘s driver‘s license for 10 years. Hill was further placed on reporting probation for five years. In so doing, the trial court advised Hill that if she violated her probation by being convicted of any additional criminal conduct, it would give “serious consideration” to reimposing her 210-day suspended jail term, stating: “This either stops now or you will suffer the consequences.”
{¶ 5} Prior to sentencing Hill, the trial court noted what it had considered in fashioning Hill‘s sentence. Initially, the trial court noted that it had reviewed Hill‘s criminal history, stating:
I have taken a look at your criminal history ma‘am... [a]nd you have criminal history in Indiana, Kentucky, Georgia, the State of Washington and the State of Ohio and it is, from my perspective, significant and I am stating that from the experience of being a Judge for 26 years. . . So when I tell you [that] you have a significant criminal history, I am basing that on all my years of experience.
{¶ 6} Continuing, the trial court stated:
Additionally, I note that you have a number of DUI convictions in the State of Kentucky, this particular matter, and you also had 3 physical control convictions in the State of Washington. I could not tell if they were reductions or amended charges, but physical control is a[n] offense [in which] a person is impaired by alcohol or drugs and is operating a motor vehicle. It‘s akin to an OVI but not the same because there are different elements required for an OVI that are not for physical control.
{¶ 7} Concluding, the trial court stated:
Lastly, the Court has taken into consideration Section 2929.21 of the Ohio Revised Code which is the purposes of sentencing in misdemeanor cases. This is a misdemeanor. Specifically that statute provides for two overriding purposes for sentencing that a Judge must consider when imposing sentence. One, protect the public from future crimes by the offender, secondly, punish the offender. Those are the only two purposes for a Judge to consider, that‘s why I looked at your past history, etcetera.
Hill‘s Appeal and Single Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} On February 23, 2026, Hill filed a notice of appeal. After briefing, Hill‘s appeal was submitted to this court for consideration on July 8, 2026, and is now properly before the court for decision. Hill raised one assignment of error in support of her appeal. In her single assignment of error, Hill argues that the trial court‘s decision to impose a sentence that exceeded the mandatory minimum term of 30 consecutive days in jail constituted an abuse of discretion that must be reversed. This is because, according to Hill, the trial court did not fully consider and properly apply the statutory guidance provided to it in
Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review
{¶ 9} “This court reviews a trial court‘s sentence on a misdemeanor violation under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Henson, 2021-Ohio-38, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). “An abuse of discretion suggests the trial court‘s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. Sanchez-Garza, 2017-Ohio-1234, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.). “A decision is unreasonable where a sound reasoning process does not support it.” State v. Miller, 2016-Ohio-7360, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.). “And an ‘arbitrary’ decision is one made ‘without consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.‘” (Bracketed text in original.) State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 125 (10th Ed.2014). “An unconscionable decision may be defined as one that affronts the sense of justice,
Principles of Misdemeanor Sentencing
{¶ 10} Pursuant to
{¶ 11}
Hill‘s Argument and Analysis
{¶ 12} Hill argues that the trial court‘s sentence in this case was erroneous because the court made no express findings at her sentencing hearing to show that it considered the “guidance and direction” provided by
{¶ 13} However, while Hill would prefer it be different, “the trial court was not required to discuss any of the misdemeanor sentencing factors on the record” at sentencing, nor was it required to “make any explicit findings” to support her sentence. State v. McClurg, 2020-Ohio-1144, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.). This is because, “in misdemeanor sentencing, there is no requirement that a trial court specifically state its reasons for imposing the sentence that it does on the record.” State v. Moreno, 2024-Ohio-2055, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.); see State v. O‘Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, ¶ 75 (noting that “[t]here are multiple aggravating and mitigating factors that must be considered by trial courts at sentencing,” including those set forth in
{¶ 14} There is instead “a presumption that the trial court considered the necessary statutory criteria absent an affirmative showing by the defendant that it did not.” State v. Henson, 2021-Ohio-38, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). Even “[a] silent record creates a rebuttable presumption that the sentencing court considered the statutory misdemeanor sentencing criteria.” State v. Burley, 2017-Ohio-378, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.). Therefore, “unless the record contains an affirmative indication that the trial court failed to consider the statutory criteria, the trial judge‘s sentence will not be reversed.” State v. Ward, 2004-Ohio-4156, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.).
{¶ 15} The record in this case is devoid of any such affirmative indication. The record, in fact, establishes the exact opposite. This is evidenced by the trial court expressly stating at Hill‘s sentencing hearing that it had considered
{¶ 16} In so holding, we find it necessary to address Hill‘s assertion set forth in her appellate brief that “more should be required of trial courts if they are going to vary from the minimum mandatory sentences which are prescribed by the legislature.” But what should be required of trial courts engaged in misdemeanor sentencing is well beyond the scope of our review as an intermediate appellate court. “Our duty, after all, is to apply the law, not to make it.” State v. Jamison, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 572, *23 (1st Dist. Feb. 17, 1988).
{¶ 17} It is instead the responsibility of the General Assembly “to weigh policy
Conclusion
{¶ 18} For the reasons outlined above, and having now overruled Hill‘s single assignment of error, Hill‘s appeal of her conviction for misdemeanor OVI, her third such conviction within the preceding six years of the offense, is denied.
{¶ 19} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL and SIEBERT, JJ., concur.
J U D G M E N T E N T R Y
The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Eaton Municipal Court for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Presiding Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge