STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellant, v. DARRYL HIGNITE, Defendant-Appellee.
CASE NO. CA2015-07-063
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY
12/14/2015
[Cite as State v. Hignite, 2015-Ohio-5204.]
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 15CR30825
Helbling Law Firm, LLC, John J. Helbling, 6539 Harrison Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio 45247, for defendant-appellee
O P I N I O N
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the state оf Ohio, appeals from the decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas granting two motions in limine in favor of defendant-appellee, Darryl Hignite. For the reasons outlined below, we reverse the trial court‘s decision and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On March 23, 2015, the Warren Cоunty Grand Jury returned an indictment
{¶ 3} On May 29, 2015, the state filed a notice of its intent to introduce so-called “other acts” evidence at trial pursuant to
{¶ 4} On June 25, 2015, Hignite filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the photographic and video evidence at trial by claiming it was inadmissible under both
{¶ 5} Specifiсally, as the trial court stated in regards to the photographic and video evidence from LCNB National Bank and Chase Bank:
With respect to the pictures and videos from September 13th, specifically from LCNB and from the Chase Bank, the Court finds that there are similarities in the way the defеndant presents himself the way he acts and the way he – his gait, his appearance, that there are similarities that would be probative as to the issue of identification. That being said, the evidence is so unfairly prejudicial, that I find that even a limiting instruction will not be sufficient to prevent the jury from drawing an inference as to the defendant‘s character and that he acted in conformity with that character on August [5], 2014, so I am going to exclude the videos and the still photos from the incidents of September 13, 2014.
{¶ 6} In addition, as it relates to the summary of the interview containing Hignite‘s allegеd statement he made to police implicating himself in the US Bank robbery, the trial court stated:
But, having reviewed the statement, itself, I find that the statement, the context of the statement, if provided to the jury in a limited fashion that I would have to do to carve it up so as not to bring in his prior conviсtions or his other bad acts, to carve that up in such a way would have to be done to the point where the evidence that would remain would not be in proper context, it would not be reliable, and there is a high probability again that the jury would seize upon this evidence as chаracter evidence, and invite them to really to lose their way. So, I‘m going to exclude the interviews of the defendant, statements made by the defendant, again in the State‘s case in chief, for those reasons.
{¶ 7} On June 30, 2015, the trial court issued a written decision incorporating its ruling granting Hignite‘s motiоns in limine. After issuing its written decision, the state filed a timely certification pursuant to
Denial of a Motion in Limine as a Final Appealable Order
{¶ 9} “The purpose and effect of a motion to suppress and a motion in limine are distinct.” State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 (1995). A motion to suppress is the proper vehicle for raising constitutional challenges. State v. Miller, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2012-P-0032, 2012-Ohio-5585, ¶ 14. In contrast, “[a] motion in liminе is tentative and precautionary in nature, reflecting the court‘s anticipatory treatment of an evidentiary issue at trial.” City of Defiance v. Kretz, 60 Ohio St.3d 1, 4 (1991). In turn, a trial court‘s decision ruling on motion in limine is generally not a final appealable order. State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 201-202 (1986). However, in cases involving appeals under
{¶ 10} For instance, in State v. Davidson, 17 Ohio St.3d 132 (1985), the defendant argued that a trial court order granting a motion in limine was not appealable under
Any motion, however labeled, which, if granted, restricts the state in the presentation of certain evidence and, thereby, renders the state‘s proof with respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable probability of effective prosecution has been destroyed, is, in effect, a motion to suppress. The granting of such a motion is a final order and may be appealed pursuant to
R.C. 2945.67 andCrim.R. 12[K] .
Id. at syllabus.
{¶ 11} Therefore, inasmuch as the trial court effectively suppressed the disputed evidence by granting Hignite‘s two motions in limine, thereby excluding such evidence from trial, it is proper for this court to review the trial court‘s decision. “[W]here an evidentiary ruling destroys the state‘s case, the ruling is in essence a final order from which the state may appeal.” State v. Bassham, 94 Ohio St.3d 269, 271 (2002). In so holding, we note that Hignite did not dispute the state‘s claim that this matter was immediately appealable in his appellate brief or during oral argument before this court.
Standard of Review
{¶ 12} It is well-established that this court generally reviews a trial court‘s ruling on a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion. State v. Durbin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-249, 2014-Ohio-5759, ¶ 14. However, as this court recently stated, this is an improper standard of appellate review to use where a motion in limine is the functional equivalent of motion to suppress. State v. Shalash, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-12-146, 2015-Ohio-3836, ¶ 42, citing State v. Johnston, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26016, 2015-Ohio-450, ¶ 27. Rather, this court uses the standard of review applicable to a motion to suppress. Id. In
{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 14} THE WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED [HIGNITE‘S] MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF [HIGNITE‘S] OTHER BANK ROBBERIES.
{¶ 15} In its first assignment of error, the state argues the trial court erred by granting Hignite‘s motion in limine to exclude the photographic and video evidence from LCNB National Bank and Chase Bank. We agree.
{¶ 16}
{¶ 18} Here, just as the trial court found, the photographic and video evidence from LCNB National Bank and Chase Bank was properly admissible under
{¶ 19} After a thorough review of the record, we find the trial court erred by finding the probative value of the photographic and video evidence depicting Hignite attempting to rob LCNB National Bank before successfully robbing Chase Bank in the same manner he is
{¶ 20} We also find the trial court erred by finding a limiting instruction would not be sufficient to minimize any pоtential prejudice to Hignite. It is well-established that a jury is presumed to follow and comply with instructions given by the trial court. State v. Carpenter, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-11-494, 2007-Ohio-5790, ¶ 20, citing Pang v. Minch, 53 Ohio St.3d 186 (1990). Therefore, the trial court‘s decision finding a limiting instruction would be insufficient to overcome any potential prejudice to Hignite was improper and contrary to “the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow [the trial court‘s] instructions.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987), citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325, fn. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985).
{¶ 21} We find it important to note that “[l]ogically, all evidence presented by a prosecutor is prejudicial, but not all evidence unfairly prejudices a defendant. It is only the latter that
{¶ 22} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 23} THE WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED [HIGNITE‘S] MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE [HIGNITE‘S] STATEMENT TO POLICE.
{¶ 24} In its second assignment of error, the state argues the trial court erred by granting Hignite‘s motion in limine to exclude a summary of an interview Hignite had with police, wherein he is alleged to have made a statement to police implicating himself in the US Bank robbery now at issue. Yet, while we agree that the summary itself is not admissible, based on the record before this court, we see no reason why the officers who conducted the interview of Hignite should be precluded from testifying about Hignite‘s alleged statement to them. As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, “[a] defendant‘s own out-of-court statements, offered against him at trial, are not hearsay.” State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 112. In addition, similar to the disputed evidence discussed above, we agаin find nothing about this evidence indicates it has the potential to arouse the jury‘s emotional sympathies, evoke a sense of horror, or appeal to an instinct to punish so as to be deemed unfairly prejudicial. Therefore, the state‘s second assignment of error is also sustained.
{¶ 25} Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
PIPER, P.J., and RINGLAND, J., concur.