Stаte of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jacob M. Heyder, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 13AP-298 (C.P.C. No. 12CR-4115)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
March 20, 2014
[Cite as State v. Heyder, 2014-Ohio-1066.]
KLATT, J.
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on March 20, 2014
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, for appellee.
Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and John W. Keeling, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
KLATT, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jacob M. Heyder, appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence, we reverse that judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On August 16, 2012, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant with one count of aggravated robbery in violation of
{¶ 3} Before trial, appellant filed a motion to prohibit the state from, in part, presenting evidence of a knife that police found in a bathroom where they arrested appellant a few days after the robbery. Appellant argued that the state could not prove that the knife was the one used during the robbery. At a hearing on the day of trial, appellant requested the trial court to ask the victim whether the knife found was the one used during the robbery. If the victim could not identify the knife, then appellant wanted evidence of the knife excluded. The trial court denied appellant‘s rеquest and allowed the state to proceed with the knife evidence.
{¶ 4} At trial, the victim of the robbery identified appellant as the person who robbed her store with a knife. However, when the state presented the victim with the knife that the pоlice had connected with appellant, she said that she had never seen the knife before and that it was not the knife used during the robbery. The victim described the knife used during the robbery as a small, Swiss-Army type knife. While not ever clearly described by any witness, the trial court described the knife found near appellant at the time of his arrest as a “buck knife,” a folding knife with a three and one-half inch blade, a knife that is “very much larger than a key chain size Swiss army knife.” (Tr. 93-94.)
{¶ 5} After the victim could not identify the knife as the one used during the robbery, appellant renewed his motion to exclude any further evidence or reference to the “irrelevant and unduly prejudicial knife.” (Tr. 90.) Appellant did not seek to have the victim‘s testimony about the knife stricken but sought the exclusion of any further testimony about the knife. The state argued that the witness could be mistaken about the knife and that it had a good-faith basis to present the knife to the witness. The trial court initially wondered if the knife evidence was helpful to apрellant, because if his knife was not the one used during the robbery, it would arguably support his argument that the victim wrongly identified him as the robber. The trial court also wondered why the knife would be relevant after the victim admitted that it was not the knife used during the robbery.
{¶ 6} Thе trial court, however, then focused on the possible jury confusion that could occur if there was no explanation of why the knife was presented to the victim. Ultimately, the trial court allowed the state to present additional knife evidence regarding how and why the knife appeared at trial, concluding that the state should be able to explain where the knife came from. (Tr. 99.) The trial court also opined that it saw no prejudice at this point in the trial and actually perceived a benefit to appellant, because the victim said that the knife was not the one used during the robbery.
{¶ 7} Subsequent witnesses testified regarding appellant‘s arrest five days after the robbery. After the arrest, which occurred in the bathroоm of a bar, a bar employee brought to the police a knife he found in the bathroom. DNA found on the knife was consistent with appellant‘s DNA. That knife was the one presented to the victim of the robbery. After the presentation of testimony, and over appellant‘s objection, the trial court admitted the knife into evidence and allowed it to go back to the jury.
{¶ 8} The jury found appellant guilty of all the charges and the trial court sentenced him accordingly.
II. The Appeal
{¶ 9} Appellant appeals and assigns the following error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO PRESENT TESTIMONY, OVER OBJECTION, THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A KNIFE WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED FIVE DAYS AFTER THE ROBBERY. THE COURT FURTHER ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE THIS KNIFE INTO EVIDENCE WHEN THE STATE KNEW, AND THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED, THAT THE KNIFE WAS NOT THE ONE USED TO COMMIT THE ROBBERY, WAS OF NO RELEVANCE TO THE CASE, AND WAS USED AS NOTHING MORE THAN OTHER BAD ACT EVIDENCE USED TO IMPROPERLY PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS A DANGEROUS PERSON OR A PERSON MORE LIKELY TO BE GUILTY OF A ROBBERY.
{¶ 10} Appellant argues in his lone assignment of error that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant testimony about a knife appellant had days after the robbery which was not the one used in the robbery.1 We agree.
{¶ 11} The admission or exclusion of evidence is a decision within the trial court‘s sound discretion. Columbus v. Bishop, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-300, 2008-Ohio-6964, ¶ 18, citing State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, the trial court‘s decision to admit the knife testimony will only be reversed if the court abused its discretion. State v. Cunningham, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-145, 2006-Ohio-6373, ¶ 33; State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, ¶ 130. Although an abuse of discretion is typically defined as an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable decision, State v. Beavers, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1064, 2012-Ohio-3654, ¶ 8, we note that no court has the authority, within its discretion, to commit an error of law. State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 70.
{¶ 12} Appellant argues that the knife evidence admitted by the trial court was irrelevant pursuant to
{¶ 13} We agree that the knife evidence was irrelevant after the viсtim testified that it was not the knife used during the robbery. Walker v. United States, 490 F.2d 683, 684-85 (8th Cir.1974) (gun found in possession of defendant days after armed bank robbery was irrelevant for defendant‘s trial on bank robbery after two witnesses to the robbery testified that the gun was not used in the robbery).
{¶ 14} The state‘s argument in support of admissibility of the knife evidence ignores appellant‘s evidentiary concerns. Instead, the state argues that once the victim could not identify the knife as the one used during the robbery, the trial court had discretion to decide how bеst to explain the presentation of the knife evidence at the trial. The trial court could have prohibited further reference to the knife or, as it chose to do, it could have allowed the state to present additional evidence to explain why the knife was presented to the victim so that the jury was not left wondering. The state argues that the trial court‘s choice to allow the additional evidence was the better choice, especially considering thе trial court‘s belief that the knife evidence actually benefited the appellant.
{¶ 15} To support its argument, the state relies on language from Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). A review of that case, however, reveals that the state‘s reliance on that languagе is misplaced. In Old Chief, the defendant had been charged with possession of a firearm by someone with a prior felony conviction. Before trial, the defendant attempted to stipulate to the fact of the prior conviction without revеaling the name and nature of the conviction, arguing that the name and nature of the prior conviction2 would unfairly prejudice him. The prosecutor refused to enter into a stipulation because it interfered with the right “to prove his casе his own way.” Id. at 177. The district court rejected the stipulation and allowed the prosecution to present evidence to prove the prior conviction, specifically, a judgment of conviction that included the name and nature of the offense. After a conviction, the appellate court affirmed that decision, noting that the prosecution is entitled to prove the prior conviction element of an offense through introduction of probative evidence.
{¶ 16} The Supreme Court identified the issue of the case as “whether a district court abuses its discretion if it spurns [an offer to concede the fact of the prior conviction] and admits the full record of a prior judgment, when the name or nature of the prior
{¶ 17} As the state points out, the court in Old Chief went on to discuss jurors’ expectations and the concern that jurоrs may feel like they are not being told the whole story because they had heard a stipulation or admission instead of “robust evidence” that would be used to prove some fact. Id. at 189. In light of the precise issue facing the Court in Old Chief, that of choosing one permissible method to prove a relevant fact over another permissible alternative, the discussion regarding jurors’ expectations and the quality of evidence the prosecution may present in support of its case has some resonance. However, in a case such as this, where the question is not how the prosecution may prove a relevant issue but whether the prosecution may prove an irrelevant issue, that concern has much less or even no significance. Thus, the language in Old Chief relied on by the state is not persuasive in this appeal.
{¶ 18} Ultimatеly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the knife evidence. Once the victim testified that the knife presented to her was not the one used during the robbery, that knife became irrelevant to the determination of the action. The fact that the state wanted to explain to the jury why the knife was presented to the victim does not change the irrelevant nature of the evidence.
B. The Trial Court‘s Error Materially Prejudiced Appellant
{¶ 19} Our analysis does not end with a holding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the irrelevаnt knife evidence. Appellant must also have suffered material prejudice from the introduction of the irrelevant knife evidence.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 20} We sustain appellant‘s assignment of error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and remand the matter for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded.
CONNOR and O‘GRADY, JJ., concur.