State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Leon Glenn Helland, Defendant and Appellee
No. 20240224
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2025 ND 63, Filed 03-28-2025
Bahr, Justice.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Bahr, Justice.
Isaac O. Lees (argued) and Gabrielle J. Goter (on brief), Assistant State‘s Attorneys, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.
Alexander R. Grosz, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellee.
Bahr, Justice.
[¶1] The State appeals from a district court judgment dismissing four counts of
I
[¶2] In March 2024, the State charged Helland with four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, a class C felony, in violation of
A person who . . . has been convicted of a class A misdemeanor offense involving violence or intimidation in violation of chapters 12.1-16 through 12.1-25 . . . and the offense was committed while using or possessing a firearm . . . is prohibited from owning a firearm or having one in possession from the date of conviction and continuing for five years after the date of conviction or the date of release from incarceration, parole, or probation, whichever is latеst.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶3] At the preliminary hearing, the State called the arresting officer who testified to the events leading up to the charges. The officer testified that on March 22, 2024, Helland was at a gas station and had a handgun in his waistband and two handguns and a shotgun in his vehicle. The officer further testified her records search revealed Helland was convicted of menacing in 2021, and the affidavit of probable cause in that case indicated Helland used or was in possession of a firearm during the events that formed the basis of the menacing charge. She further testified Helland‘s sentence in the menacing case included supervised probation, and that Helland was prohibited from possessing firearms for five years after his release from probation.
[¶4] On cross-examination, the officer admitted she did not review the charging document (amended information) in the menacing case; that she believed Helland was placed on supervised probation, not unsupervised probation; that she did not know Helland received a deferred imposition of sentence; and that she did not know Helland successfully completed the deferred imposition of sentence.
[¶5] The State did not offer any evidence other than the officer‘s testimony. Helland did not offer any evidencе.
[¶6] During the preliminary hearing, Helland argued he successfully completed the deferred imposition of sentence for menacing, that the guilty plea was withdrawn, the case dismissed, and the record sealed. Thus, he argued, there was no conviction on his record that prevented him from possessing firearms. During the State‘s argument, the district court referenced and questioned the State about the amended information and the written plea agreement in the menacing case. Ultimately, the court reserved judgment and instructed the parties to submit briefs addressing whether the menacing case prohibited Helland from possessing a firearm “givеn the factual basis and the Amended Information [and] all of the things that were filed in that prior case.”
[¶7] Both parties submitted post-hearing briefs. In its brief, the State asserted it is error for the district court “to consider extraneous information not presented to the court through testimony or notice and merely contained in defense counsel‘s argument in favor of dismissal, and to do so at the time of the preliminary hearing without proper notice, motion, or briefing.” Helland provided three exhibits from the menacing case with his brief: the plea agreement, the amended information, and a transcript of the preliminary hearing. As part of the plea agreement, Helland admitted
[¶8] The district court dismissed the unlawful possession of a firearm charges for lack of probable cause. After noting Helland‘s charges, the court stated, “The question before the Court is whether the State is able to provide supplemental testimony regarding the element of ‘the offense was committed while using or possessing a firearm’ rather than have such fact рroven or admitted to in a previous criminal action.” The court explained the State offered testimony Helland “had a prior conviction for menacing in 2020 and the facts contained in the case‘s affidavit stated [Helland] used a firearm.” But Helland “provided the Court a copy of the plea agreement in the case which shows he never admitted or was convicted of possessing a firearm when he committed the menacing.” The court explained, “Nowhere else in the plea agreement or admissions by [Helland] does the allegation of a firearm appear. An affidavit is not a factual finding made by thе Court. Therefore, the Court finds the record is clear, [Helland] was convicted of menacing, but not while using or possessing a firearm.” The court stated “that providing supplemental testimony pertaining to whether [Helland] committed the menacing while using a firearm is insufficient—that the State was required to prove the conviction involved the use of a firearm.” The court concluded “the State has failed to meet its burden of showing by probable cause that the Defendant had been convicted of an A misdemeanor offense involving the use of a firearm, as required under
II
[¶9] The State argues the district court erred in considering evidencе not introduced at the probable cause hearing. The State‘s argument relates to court documents filed in Helland‘s menacing case. The State does not cite a single authority, rule, or case in support of its position. The State does not even identify the standard of review for this issue. See
[¶10] Helland asserts the district court properly took judicial notice under
[¶11] Some courts have stated appellate and trial courts have inherent power to take judicial notice. See, e.g., Eagan Econ. Dev. Auth. v. U-Haul Co. of Minn., 787 N.W.2d 523, 530 (Minn. 2010) (stating the court has inherent power to take judicial notice of public records where the orderly administration of justice commends it); Gnecchi v. State, 58 Wash.2d 467, 472, 364 P.2d 225 (1961) (“It is the function and inherent power of the court (whether it be trial or appellate) to take judicial notice of facts outside the record, provided they meet certain standards.“). According to one commentator, “The taking of judicial
[¶12] We hold a district court has inherеnt power to take judicial notice in a preliminary proceeding where the rules of evidence do not apply, provided certain standards are met. “We review a district court‘s decision to take judicial notice under an abuse of discretion standard.” Koon v. State, 2023 ND 247, ¶ 11, 1 N.W.3d 593. “A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination.” Id. (quoting Orwig v. Orwig, 2021 ND 33, ¶ 6, 955 N.W.2d 34). Our review of a district court‘s decision to take judicial notice in a preliminary hearing is informed by
[¶13] Under
[¶14] Under
[¶15] Here, the information charging Helland with four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm specifically identified the menacing case by case number and identified it as the predicate offense to the charges. During the State‘s argument in the preliminary hearing, the district court referenced and questioned the State about the amended information and the written plea agreement in the menacing case. The court also instructed the parties to file post-hearing briefs addressing the issue “given the factual basis and the Amended Information [and] all of the things that were filed in that prior case.” The court‘s questions and instruction evidenced it was considering the court records in the menacing case. The State did not object to the court doing so at that time. The State did object to the court considering “extraneous information not presented to the court through testimony or notice” in its post-hearing brief. The State did not request to be heard on the propriety of the court taking judicial notice after the court issued its order holding the State failed to show probable cause.
[¶16] We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial
III
[¶17] The State argues the district court erred in not finding probable cause to support the four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. The State requests this Court reverse the judgment and remand the case for trial.
A
[¶18] We review the dismissal of a criminal complaint under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Carrillo, 2021 ND 239, ¶ 13, 968 N.W.2d 134. “A trial court abuses its discretion only when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious manner, or misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id. (quoting State v. Cain, 2011 ND 213, ¶ 16, 806 N.W.2d 597).
[¶19] Preliminary hearings are governed by
[¶20] The State has the burden of proof in a preliminary hearing. State v. Blunt, 2008 ND 135, ¶ 15, 751 N.W.2d 692. “The State is not required to prove with absolute certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime occurred, but rather need only produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty.” Carrillo, 2021 ND 239, ¶ 15 (quoting Blunt, ¶ 15). “The probable cause showing required at a preliminary hearing under
[¶21] The North Dakota Rules of Evidence do not apply to preliminary hearings on criminal matters.
B
[¶22] The district court concluded “that providing supplemental testimony pertaining to whether [Helland] committed the menacing while using a firearm is insufficient—that [under
[¶23] The district court‘s interpretation of
[¶24] For a conviction under
[¶25] United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 129 S.Ct. 1079 (2009), supports this conclusion. In Hayes, law enforcement charged the defendant with possessing firearms under
[¶26] A person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is prohibited from pоssessing a firearm.
The question here is whether the language of
§ 921(a)(33)(A) calls for a further limitation: Must the statute describing the predicate offense include, as a discrete element, the existence of a domestic relationship between offender and victim? In line with the large majority of the Courts of Appeals, we conclude that§ 921(a)(33)(A) does not require a predicate-offense statutе of that specificity. Instead, in a§ 922(g)(9) prosecution, it suffices for the Government to charge and prove a prior conviction that was, in fact, for “an offense . . . committed by” the defendant against a spouse or other domestic victim.
Id. Similarly,
[¶27] When interpreting a statute, we construe the statute “in a practical manner, giving consideration to the context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were enaсted.” Henry Hill Oil Servs., 2023 ND 41, ¶ 10.
statute‘s reference to offenses “involving violence or intimidation in violation of chapters 12.1-16 through 12.1-25” to only apply to one offense. If the legislature only intended the language to apply to one offense, there would be no reason to refer to multiple chapters of the Century Code. Moreover, limiting application of the language to a single offense would not serve the purpose for which the statute was enacted.
[¶28] We conclude the requirement in
[¶29] Here, at the preliminary hearing, the officer testified that in 2021
of conviction was within five years, meeting the first and sixth elements under
[¶30] Menacing is a class A misdemeanor offense involving intimidation.
[¶31] At the preliminary hearing, the officer testified the affidavit of probable cause in the menacing case indicated the offense was committed while using a firearm. The officer‘s testimony was sufficient to indicate Helland likely used or possessed a firearm during the commission of his menacing conviction, meeting the fifth element under
[¶32] We conclude the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case because it misinterpreted
IV
[¶33] Helland argues he no longer has a menacing conviction because he successfully completed his probation, withdrew his guilty plea, and the district court dismissed the case and sealed the record. Thus, he argues, there is no predicate conviction to support the unlawful possession of a firearm charges. He asserts the court erred by not addressing whether he had a conviction and requests this Court address the issue. The State responds that a dismissed deferred imposition of sentence constitutes a conviction under
[¶34] Helland did not provide evidence to the district court whether or when the court dismissed the menacing case. The pleа agreement shows Helland agreed to plead guilty on the condition he receive a deferred imposition of sentence; the plea agreement does not show whether the court accepted the plea agreement, whether Helland successfully completed any imposed probation, or whether the court eventually dismissed the menacing conviction. To confirm there is an actual case or controversy, we take judicial notice
A
[¶35] The district court did not address the deferred imposition of sentence issue because it dismissed the case on the ground the State did not show probable cause. The court did not err by not opining on this issue when it dismissed the case on another ground.
[¶36] That the district court did not address whether Helland still has a menacing conviction does not render the issue moot. As we stated in Powell v. Statoil Oil & Gas LP, 2023 ND 235, ¶ 9, 999 N.W.2d 203, “The court‘s refraining from ruling on the issue does not render the issue moot. Otherwise, the court could unilaterally moot any issue by not ruling on the issue.” “Nor is the issue academic or raising an abstract legal question.” Id. “By raising this issue in the district court, [Helland] is permitted, as the appellee, to argue it again on appeal.” Kalvoda v. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. #1, 2011 ND 32, ¶ 14, 794 N.W.2d 454. “An appellee is entitled to attempt to save a judgment by urging any ground asserted in the district court, regardless of whether a cross-appeal is filed.” Powell, ¶ 9.
[¶37] Helland requests affirmance of the judgment on grounds he asserted at the district court. Because he is not requesting a more favorable result on appeal, he was not required to cross-appeal. Powell, 2023 ND 235, ¶ 9; see also Kalvoda, 2011 ND 32, ¶ 14 (“A cross-appeal is necessary only if the appellee seeks a more favorable result on appeal than it received in the district court.“); Tkach v. Am. Sportsman, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 785, 788 (N.D. 1982) (“In the absence of a cross-appeal, the appellee may only seek affirmance of the judgment, and may not seek a more favorable result on appeal than he received in the trial court.“). The issue he raises is also a purely legal issue. Great Plains Royalty Corp. v. Earl Schwartz Co., 2021 ND 62, ¶ 16, 958 N.W.2d 128 (declining to address alternative ground for affirmance because it is not clear it is a purely legal issue). We therefore consider Helland‘s argument and decide whether his completion of the deferred imposition of sentence means there is no conviction prohibiting him from possessing a firearm.
B
[¶38] Resolution of whether Helland hаs a qualifying predicate conviction under
[¶39] “Under
[¶40] “Rule 32.1, N.D.R.Crim.P., sets out the requirements for orders deferring the imposition of a sentence for an infraction or a misdemeanor[.]” Ebertz, 2010 ND 79, ¶ 7. “Under the requirements of
[¶41] Under
2. For the purposes of this section, “conviction” means a determination that the person committed one of the above-mentioned crimes upon a verdict of guilt, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere even though:
. . .
b. The court deferred imposition of sentence in accordance with subsection 4 of
section 12.1-32-02[.]
[¶42] In State v. Nelson, 2019 ND 204, ¶ 6, 932 N.W.2d 101, we considered “whether the mandatory minimum sentence under
[¶43] In State v. Johns, 2019 ND 227, ¶ 1, 932 N.W.2d 893, we addressed whether a deferred imposition of sentence that has been dismissed can be used for sentеnce enhancement purposes under
[¶44] Under
[¶45] We acknowledge this interpretation of
[¶46] Under
V
[¶47] We affirm the district court‘s judgment dismissing the four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm against Helland.
[¶48] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr