State of Ohio v. Ernie E. Haynes
Court of Appeals No. WD-19-035
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY
December 30, 2020
2020-Ohio-6977
Trial Court No. 2018CR0070
Michael H. Stahl, for appellant.
* * * * *
OSOWIK, J.
Introduction
{¶ 1} The defendant-appellant, Ernie Haynes, was convicted of abduction in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas for the illegal removal of his three grandsons and
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Ernie Haynes (hereinafter “the defendant“) is grandfather to J.H.-H. (then aged 5), J.H.-H. (also aged 5 but 11 months younger), and J.H.-H. (aged 2), all boys. The defendant is alleged to have abducted his grandsons by removing them from the place where thеy were found, on December 19, 2017. The record established that the defendant personally removed the two younger boys from a friend‘s home and drove them away in his truck. He instructed his wife, Marcella Spence Haynes (hereinafter “Marcella“), to pick the oldest boy up from school, which she did, and she removed him from the school by car.
{¶ 3} At trial, the state presented the following evidence: The mother of the boys, Jennifer Haynes, died suddenly on December 12, 2017. The evidence strongly suggests that Jennifer Haynes (hereinafter “Jennifer“) died of a drug overdose. Jennifer lived in Fostoria, Ohio, in Seneca County, with James Hill-Hernandez. The unmarried couple had been in a relationship for seven years and were parents to the three boys. When she died, Jennifer was еxpecting their fourth child, and her death caused the infant to be born two months prematurely and with underdeveloped lungs. The infant was “life-flighted” to Toledo Children‘s Hospital in Lucas County and remained there until May of
{¶ 4} Much of the testimony at trial focused on the week in between Jennifer‘s death and the abductions. During that time, the three boys were cared for mostly by the defendant and by family friends, John and Amanda Decker. Even before Jennifer‘s death, the Deckers “had the kids the majority of the time [including] during the week.”
{¶ 5} The funeral was held on December 18, 2017 in Fostoria, after which the defendant “took the boys to [his] house” to changе clothes. The plan was for Hill-Hernandez to “pick the boys up and take them to the hospital [in Toledo] so they could visit with their [newborn baby] brother.” When Hill-Hernandez arrived, Marcella told him that “she wanted them back by [8 p.m.]” because the oldest son had school the next day. When Hill-Hernandez told Marcella that “there [was] no way” he could meet that time-table—given the distance to Toledo and back—Marcella “blew up.” The defendant “changed” too and said, “no” and “that‘s it. Go get your other two boys and bring them in[side].” The defendant told Hill-Hernandez that “he may not have done right by his children but he‘s going to do right by [your] children, and nobody is going to have anything to say about it.” The defendant “gave [Hill-Hernandez] the understanding that [he] had no rights over [his own] children.” Hill-Hernandez “didn‘t want any cоnflict, altercations or anything,” and he left, without the boys, and drove to the Toledo Hospital where he “stayed the night.”
{¶ 7} Hill-Hernandez began calling the defendant and Marcella to tell them that he had “obtained [his] parental rights as a father” and “I want my children.” He also sent a picture of the magistrate‘s order to the defendant‘s phone. Neither the defendant nor Marcella answered their phones or responded to messages. So, Hill-Hernandez called John Decker to ask Decker to tell the defendant that he‘d “like to receive [his] children.” John Decker testified that he called the defendant and “said, ‘look, James [Hill-Hernandez] just left [the courthouse], he‘s got custody papers for the kids.’ And that was it. [The defendant] hung up on me.”
{¶ 8} Also testifying on behalf of the state was the defendant‘s ex-wife (and mother of Jennifer), Shawna Haynes (“Shawna“). Shawna accompanied the defendant to the Fostoria Police Department on December 19, 2017, so that they could talk to the police “about [Jennifer‘s] death.” When the defendant left the station, he announced that he “had to leave [and] go get the kids from John and Mandy [Decker], [because] James [Hill-Hernandez] was on his way with a court order to get the boys.”
{¶ 10} At 3:14 p.m., Marcella Haynes picked up the oldest child from Longfellow Elementary School in Fostoria, according to the school‘s “sign-out sheet.” The assistant secretary for the school testified that it was “very normal” for Marcella and the defendant to pick up and drop off J.H.-H. from school, and both were authorized to do so.
{¶ 11} Later that day, still December 19, 2017, a Rising Sun Police Officer escorted Hill-Hernandez to the defendant‘s home. Although no one аnswered the door, lights were on inside, and it appeared to Hill-Hernandez that someone was there.
- December 20, 2019: Hill-Hernandez texted the defendant twice, and again, the defendant did not respond.
- December 21, 2019: Hill-Hernandez contacted the Wood County Sheriff‘s Department. Sheriff‘s deputies and Rising Sun police officers went to the defendant‘s home. Again, the lights were one, but no one answered the door.
- December 22, 2017: The police and Hill-Hernandez went to the defendant‘s home, to no avail. Also, Hill-Hernandez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Seneca County Juvenile Court, alleging that his children were being held in contrаvention of the temporary custody order.
- December 23, 2017: The police returned to the defendant‘s home a fourth time “to make contact with [the defendant] and secure the safe return of the children [and] [y]et again no one answered the officer‘s knocks.” (State‘s memorandum at 11).
- December 26, 2017: The police obtained and executed a search warrant of the defendant‘s home. No one was home at the time of search, and the officers gained entry by force. Using subpoenas to track the
defendant‘s whereabouts, the police determined that the defendant was in McComb, Ohio in Hancock County. - December 27, 2017: The juvenile court granted Hill-Hernandez‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered that the children “shall be immediately returned to the Temporary Custody of James Hill-Hernandez.” (Seneca Co. Court of Common Pleas case Nos. 21270037 et al). Also that day, Detective-Sergeant Joe Miller of the Wood County Sheriff‘s Department went to the home of Connie and Leonard Spence in McComb. Connie Spence told the detective that the defendant, Marcella and four children had been at their home for the Christmas holiday since December 22, 2017, but that they had “just left.” Detective Miller left the premises but returned later that day. While talking to the Spences, Detective Miller observed a man exit the Spence‘s garage and get into a truck. The detective blocked the truck with his own vehicle, and, after each had identified himself, the defendant claimed that the children were not there. Ultimately, he admitted that they were inside the Spence‘s home, specifically in a “mother-in-law suite” attached to the garage. Detective Miller contacted the Hancock County Sherriff‘s Department which processed the defendant‘s arrest. After the defendant was taken into custody, the McComb Police Department and Detective Miller were granted entry into the Spence‘s home where the children were located.
{¶ 14} The defendant testified in his own defense, as did his wife, Marcella. Prior to his daughter‘s death, the defendant cared for his grandsons (and granddaughter, “M“) in his home “every other weekend.” After Jennifer died, there were “discussions” that he and Marcella would be “the main caretakers” of the children. According to the defendant, their house in Rising Sun would be the “home base,” but they would “share the responsibility of watching the * * * three boys” with Hill-Hernandez.
{¶ 15} The defendant also testified about the disagreement between himself and Hill-Hernandez on December 18, 2017. According to the defendant, Hill-Hernandez arrived at his house with “drunken breath” and was acting “loud.” The defendant thought Hill-Hernandez was going to “punch” him, and the defendant told him “you got to go, man.” Hill-Hernandez told the defendant and Marcella, “‘I don‘t think it‘s right. I don‘t have no right to my kids. * * * I found out I don‘t have no rights to them.‘” Hill-Hеrnandez announced his intention to go “to the courts,” and the defendant responded that he intended to do the same.
{¶ 16} By all accounts, Hill-Hernandez left the defendant‘s home that night, December 18, 2017, and his children remained in the care of the defendant.
{¶ 18} The defendant agreed that John Decker called him, but he maintained that the call was made after he left the Decker‘s home and after he had dropped off the boys with his ex-wife. During their conversation, Decker told him that Hill-Hernandez had been granted temporary custody and that he, the defendant, should “bring the boys back.” The defendant asked, rhetorically, why should he “believe anything” Decker had to say, and he demanded “an apology” for “desecrate[ing]” his daughter‘s name and “hung up.”
{¶ 19} The next day, on December 20, 2017, the defendant filed for temporary custody of his grand-daughter and 4 grandsons in Seneca County. On December 21, 2017, he learned—in persоn from court personnel—that the juvenile court granted the motion, with respect to his granddaughter “M,” but denied it as to his grandsons. That same day, the defendant hired a lawyer and paid him a $2,000 retainer fee.
{¶ 20} According to the defendant, the children remained with his ex-wife Shawna from December 19 until 22, 2017, when he and Marcella took them (and “M“) to the Spences’ home in McComb for a “vacation.” On December 27, 2017, the defendant learned in an email from this attorney of the “bad news” that “[t]he court want[ed] the children returned [to Hill-Hernandez] immediately.” The defendant claimed that they were preparing to leave McComb to return the boys to their father when he was arrested in the Spence‘s driveway.
{¶ 21} The defendant was indicted in Wood County on February 8, 2018, on charges of аbduction—two counts as to each grandson—for a total of six counts, all third degree felonies. Thus, as to each child, the defendant was indicted under
{¶ 23} On April 9, 2019, the trial court sentenced the defendant to one year of community control, as to each count. The defendant appealed and raises five assignments of error for review:
- The prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of Abduction under
O.R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) contrary to the United States and Ohio Constitutions. - Ernie Haynes’ right to a fair trial and Due Process under the Constitutions of the United States and Ohio were violated when the trial court overruled Haynes’ objection to the prosecution misrepresenting the State‘s burden of proof in closing as to the element of privilege and permitted the prosecution to proceed to claim that the State needed only to prove that Mr. Haynes did not have any one type of рrivilege, rather than the plain language of the instruction that requires the defendant to be without privilege of any type.
The trial court erred and Mr. Haynes’ right to a fair trial and due process were violated when it failed to order the prosecution to furnish a meaningful Bill of Particulars upon Haynes’ motion to compel which allowed the prosecution to finally reveal the alleged time and place of the accused behavior in the prosecution‘s closing argument. - The trial court should have dismissed the indictments based upon Haynes’ post-conviction motion to dismiss because Interference with Custody was the more specific charge, and the state was required to pursue that charge.
- Ernie Haynes’ convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The state presented legally sufficient evidence of force.
{¶ 24} In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the state failed to present legally sufficient evidence to support his abduction convictions.
{¶ 25} Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). In making that determination, the appellate court will not weigh the evidence or
{¶ 26} The abduction statute,
(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly do any of the following:
(1) By forсe or threat, remove another from the place where the other person is found;
(2) By force or threat, restrain the liberty of another person under circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the victim or place the other person in fear; * * *
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of abduction. A violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of this section * * * is a felony of the third degree. * * *.
{¶ 27} As discussed, Haynes was convicted of three counts under subsection (A)(1); the charges under subjection (A)(2) were voluntarily dismissed.
{¶ 28} On appeal, the defendant claims that the state failed to present legally sufficient evidence that he abducted the children by “force or threat.” The term “force” is expressly defined by statute. It “means any violence, compulsion, оr constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.”
“Any,” as used in
R.C. 2901.01(A)(1) , is an adjective. “‘As an adjective, ‘any’ is defined as: ‘[o]ne or some, regardless of kind, quantity, or number; an indeterminate number or amount.‘” State v. Euton, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-06-35, 2007-Ohio-6704, 2007 WL 4374293, ¶ 60, quoting The American Heritage Dictionary (2nd College Ed.1985) 117. “[T]he insertion of the word ‘any’ into the definition of ‘force,’ recognizes that different degrees and manners of force are used in various crimes with various victims.” State v. Lillard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 69242, 1996 WL 273781, *6, (May 23, 1996).“Violence” is defined, in part, as “[t]he use of physical force” or “[p]hysical force exerted for the purpose of violating, damaging, or abusing.” State v. Stevens, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-14-58, 2016-Ohio-446, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 1801 (14th Ed.2014) and The American Heritage Dictionary at 1350.
“Compulsion” means “[t]he act of compelling; the quality, state, or condition of being compelled.” Stevens at ¶ 19, quoting Black‘s at 348. “Cоmpulsion can take other forms than physical force; but in whatever form it appears* * * [i]t can best be considered under the heads of obedience to orders, material coercion, duress per minas, and necessity.” Id., quoting Turner, Kenny‘s Outlines of Criminal Law 54 (16th Ed.1952).
“Constraint” means “state of being checked, restricted, or compelled to avoid or perform some action.” Merriam Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary 248 (10th Ed.1996).
Heiney at ¶ 98-101. Also, although the synonyms that the legislature chose to define the term force—violence, compulsion and constaint—are “ordinarily applicable to persons rather than things,” the definition applies “both to persons and things.” State v. Lane, 50 Ohio App.2d 41, 46, 361 N.E.2d 535 (10th Dist.1976).
{¶ 29} At trial, the state presented its case of “force” as follows:
In this particular case the force that was used was physically removing the children and driving away. Those children were put in child restraint seats. * * * But reason and common sense says but for what Marcella and the defendant did, those children would have remained where they were at. [The oldest child] would have remained at the elementary school until somebody else came to pick him up, and [the younger two] would have remained at the Deckers.
{¶ 30} In his brief, the defendant challenges the prosecution‘s “theory” that it “need only show that ‘any’ amount of force was used.” Without citing any authority, he claims there is “no question” that the state must present “more than” the “ordinary force involved in picking up children from school or a baby-sitter.”
{¶ 31} Force is expressly defined as ”
{¶ 32} For example, in Lane—an aggravated burglary case requiring the state to show a trespass “by, force, stealth, or deception“— the issue was whether the trial court erred by using the word “effort” rather than “violence, compulsion, or constraint” in its charge to the jury. The court found no “substantial difference between the statutory definition [of force] and that given by the trial court,” and it reasoned that “the statute clearly indicates that ‘compulsion * * * physically exerted’ against a thing to gain entrance constitutes force. The same is true of constraint. The ‘thing’ in this case is a closed but locked door.” Id. at 46.
{¶ 33} In a similar case, also involving burglary, the Second Appellate District added that the definition of force “does not provide for any measure of the physical exertion that might constitute force, but instead looks to the purpose for which the physical exertion, however slight, has been employed. If the purpose is to overcome a barrier against the actor‘s conduct, whether that barrier is the will of the victim or the closed but unlocked door of a home, the physical exertion employed to overcome the barrier may constitute force.” State v. Gregg, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 91-CA-15, 1992 WL 302438 (Oct. 26, 1992) (Finding sufficient evidence that defendant used force when he “turned the knob and opened the closed door to enter [the home]; A greater degree of
{¶ 34} Just as the trespass-by-force element was met in the burglary cases by demonstrating compulsion physically exerted against a thing (i.e. a door), we find that the removal-by-force element in this case was shown by demonstrating compulsion physically exerted against things. Those “things” were the controls of the defendant‘s truck and Marcella‘s car. We agree with the state that the physical act of driving the children away from the place where they were found satisfies the force element in this case. The law is clear that any amount of force or threat of force, however slight, against a thing, here the motor vehicles, is sufficient tо support an abduction conviction.
{¶ 35} Next, the defendant argues that the state failed to show that he removed the children under “circumstances which pose[d] a risk of harm to [them] or place[d] [them] in fear.” (Brief at 8 quoting Legislative Service Commission, 1973). He argues that the only evidence at trial established that the children left with their grandparents “willingly” and in the presence of other adults, who were “not alarmed.” But, under Section (A)(1), the state was not required to present evidence that the removal occurred under circumstances that created a risk of physical harm to the victims or that the victims were placed in fear. Such a showing is required under Section (A)(2), and those counts were dismissed before trial. Moreover, to the extent that the childrеn‘s willingness to leave with their grandparents raises the issue of whether the defendant was “privileged” to
{¶ 36} Finally, the defendant argues that the act of “buckling” the children into child safety seats cannot establish “the sole basis” of the force element because he was required by law to use child safety seats when transporting the children. See
{¶ 37} As we have found, the act of driving the children from the place where they were found established force in this case, and that finding is without regard to whether the children were first fastened into child safety seats. But, it is also true that the stаte created confusion by stressing the fact that the children were buckled into car seats before the defendant and Marcella drove away.
{¶ 38} First, it bears repeating that the state abandoned its abduction cases under Section (A)(2) which would have required it to show the defendant “restrain[ed] the liberty” of the children. Second, to the extent that the defendant was prevented from asserting
{¶ 39} In examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jenks at paragraph two the syllabus. The testimony presented at trial, if believed, established that the defendant, personally and in cоmplicity with Marcella, removed the children by force from the place where they were found. We find that the state presented legally sufficient evidence of “force” in this case. Accordingly, the defendant‘s first assignment of error is found not well-taken.
The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant‘s objection during the state‘s closing argument as to the element of “privilege.”
{¶ 40} The test for prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments “is whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the defendant.” State v. Ndiaye, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-964, 2014-Ohio-3206, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.883 (1984). “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” (Internal quotation omitted.) Id., quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.E.2d 78 (1982). Thus, prоsecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal unless the defendant has been denied a fair trial. Id., citing State v. Mauer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 266, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984).
{¶ 42} To convict the defendant of abduction, “the finder of fact must [have] determine[d] that the defendant removed * * * the victim[s] by force or threat ‘without privilege to do so.‘” State v. Steele, 138 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013-Ohio-2470, 3 N.E.3d 135, ¶ 26, quoting
{¶ 43} During closing arguments, the prosecutor said,
Now, with respect to privilege, I‘m going to visit or revisit eighth grade grammar class. I‘ve put the definition of privilege up on the screen. * * * It says privilege means an immunity, license or right conferred by law, or bestowed by express or implied grant, or arising out of status, position, office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity. The only thing that matters here is the State has to prove [the defendant] didn‘t have one of those. It‘s written in the disjunctive. (Emphasis added.) Tr. at 839-840.
{¶ 44} The defendant objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. On appeal, the defendant argues that the prosecutor led the jury to believe, incorrectly, that the state only had to prove that the defendant did not have one of those—an immunity, license or right—to satisfy its burden of proof as to privilege. And, he maintains that,
{¶ 45} Terms that are undefined in a statute are accorded their common, everyday meaning. Satterfield v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 155 Ohio St.3d 463, 2018-Ohio-5023, 122 N.E.3d 144. Because the state was required to show that the defendant acted “without privilege,” it was required to show that he acted without an “immunity, license, or right.” In other words, it had to show that none of those applied. Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1991) (“In some usages, the word ‘or’ creates a multiple rather than an alternative obligation; where necessary * * * ‘or’ may be construed to mean ‘and.‘“). While we agree that the state‘s comment was erroneous, we also find that it not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. First, the prosecutor cured its misstatement when he asserted, correctly, that it was the state‘s burden to show “beyond a reasonable doubt that thе defendant did not have a privilege to do what he did,” and the prosecutor then quoted the statutory definition of privilege, verbatim. Second, the trial court also provided accurate instructions on all of the elements of the offense, including privilege, and it further instructed the jury that closing arguments are not to be considered evidence. Accord, State v. Freeman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91842, 2009-Ohio-5218, ¶ 16-21. Finally, the fact that the defendant is not challenging that the state presented legally sufficient that he acted without privilege militates against a finding that the misstatement prejudiced the outcome of this case. For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not
The trial court did not err in failing to compel the state to produce a bill of particulars.
{¶ 46} In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues that his right to a fair trial was violated when the trial court failed to order the state to furnish a meaningful bill of particulars, in contravention of
{¶ 47} When the defendant makes a written request, “the prosecuting attorney shall furnish the defendant with a bill of particulars setting up specifically the nature of the offense charged and of the conduct of the defendant alleged to constitute the offense.”
{¶ 48} The defendant complains that, in response to his motion, the state provided a “copy of the indictment and referred to the discovery in this case.” In denying the defendant‘s subsequent motion to compel, the trial court found that, “[t]he State of Ohio has a practice of providing open-file discovery” and “‘[n]o bill of particulars is required when the state allows open-file discovery.‘” See Aug. 15, 2018 Order, quoting State v. Coffey, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1047, 2013-Ohio-3555, ¶ 35. The defendant argues that Coffey is inapplicable because it involved an amendment to a bill of particulars, unlike this case which involves the absence of any bill. However, Coffey was not restricted to its facts. And, in any event, this precise issue was recently addressed in State v. Franklin,
{¶ 49} Likewise, the defendant in this case sought “the exact time that the offense(s) allegedly took place.” It is undisputed that the state provided open file discovery, which according to it, included “a written statement by John Decker indicating [that the defendant] had come over to his home [and] had picked up two of the three children.” The discovery file alsо included police reports, medical reports, and witness statements in the case. Thus, as in Coffey and Franklin, a bill of particulars would not have provided the defense with any additional information. Accordingly, under the facts of this case, we find that the purpose of the bill of particulars was fulfilled. Accordingly, the defendant‘s third assignment of error is found not well-taken.
The trial court did not err in denying the defendant‘s post-trial motion to dismiss.
{¶ 50} In his fourth assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his post-trial motion to dismiss the indictment under
{¶ 52} In his brief, the defendant baldly asserts that the state was “required to pursue” interference with custody charges agаinst the defendant—rather than abduction—“because” the former is the “more specific charge.” The defendant‘s claim is wholly unsupported with any legal arguments. Indeed, the defendant failed even to identify the interference statute by number or set forth its elements, much less analyze those elements so as to establish that it is an allied offense of abduction. As noted by the state, the defendant also failed to cite any case law in support of his proposition.
{¶ 53} This court is “not obligated to search the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the parties, because ‘appellate courts do not sit as self-directed
The conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 54} In his fifth and final assignment of error, the defendant argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 55} Under a manifest weight standard, an appellate court must sit as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree with the fact-finder‘s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. The appellate court, “‘reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against conviction.‘” Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 57} Finally, the defendant complains that his civil attorney “pick[ed] fights with the police detectives * * * for no apparent reason.” Defendant‘s complaint, even if true, does not cast doubt on the weight of the evidence. Further, he bears at least some of the responsibility for his lawyer‘s bravado, given that the defendant failed to tell him a critical fact at the time he was retained, namely that the juvenile court had already granted Hill-Herndandez temporary custody.
Conclusion
{¶ 59} As set forth herein, the defendant‘s assignments of error are found not well-taken. Accordingly, the April 9, 2019 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed, with costs ordered to be paid by the defendant pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
Christine E. Mayle, J.
Gene A. Zmuda, P.J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
JUDGE
JUDGE