STATE OF OHIO v. RUSSELL L. HANNAH
Case No. 15-CA-1
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
October 19, 2015
[Cite as State v. Hannah, 2015-Ohio-4438.]
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2008-CR-0128. JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
For Plaintiff-Appellee
MATTHEW C. DEROSA
38 South Park Street
Mansfield, OH 44902
For Defendant-Appellant
JAMES L. BLUNT, II
3954 Industrial Parkway Drive
Shelby, OH 44875
{¶1} On April 1, 2008, Appellant, Russell Hannah, pled guilty to two counts of domestic violence, in violation of
{¶2} Appellant was arrested on the outstanding warrant and appeared before the trial court on December 29, 2014. By sentencing entry filed same date, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eighteen months in prison on each count, to be served concurrently.
{¶3} Appellant assigns as error:
I
{¶4} “WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING A SENTENCE OF 18 MONTHS.”
II
{¶5} “WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED ALL OF THE SENTENCING FACTORS AND THE PURPOSE OF FELONY SENTENCING WHEN IMPOSING 18 MONTHS OF INCARCERTION.”
I, II
{¶6} Appellant claims the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum term of eighteen months in prison as the default sentence was community control. Appellant also claims the trial court failed to consider the purposes and factors under
{¶8} Under
{¶9} Appellant pled guilty to two counts of domestic violence, in violation of
A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.
{¶11}
{¶12} In State v. McKinney, 5th Dist. Richland No. 14-CA-53, 2015-Ohio-372, ¶ 16, this Court noted:
However, the failure to indicate at the sentencing hearing that the court has considered the factors in
R.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 does not automatically require reversal. State v. Reed, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-1163, 2010-Ohio-5819, 2010 WL 4884904, ¶ 8 (Emphasis added). Any findings of the trial court in regard toR.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 need not be in the sentencing transcript if the findings are contained in the journal entry. See State v. Boyd, 5th Dist. Richland No. 13 CA 62, 2014-Ohio-2019, ¶ 12, citing State v. O‘Donnell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23525, 2007-Ohio-1943, ¶ 7 (Additional citations omitted).
{¶13} In this case, the sentencing hearing is silent as to whether the trial court considered the factors in
{¶14} During the sentencing hearing held on December 29, 2014, the trial court noted Appellant had assaulted a woman and her twelve year old son, and had been arrested on the outstanding warrant after having fled the jurisdiction over six years prior to his scheduled sentencing in May, 2008. T. at 2, 5, 6-7. The prosecutor informed the trial court that back in 2008, the file indicated “some discussions then about an intensive
{¶15} As this Court explained in State v. Robinson, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2012-0005, 2013-Ohio-2893, ¶ 19-20:
Where the record lacks sufficient data to justify the sentence, the court may well abuse its discretion by imposing that sentence without a suitable explanation. Where the record adequately justifies the sentence imposed, the court need not recite its reasons. In other words, an appellate court may review the record to determine whether the trial court failed to consider the appropriate sentencing factors. State v. Firouzmandi, 5th Dist. No. 2006-CA41, 2006-Ohio-5823 at ¶ 52. Accordingly, appellate courts can find an “abuse of discretion” where the record establishes that a trial judge refused or failed to consider statutory sentencing factors. Cincinnati v. Clardy, 57 Ohio App.2d 153, 385 N.E.2d 1342 (1st Dist.1978). An “abuse of discretion” has also been found where
a sentence is greatly excessive under traditional concepts of justice or is manifestly disproportionate to the crime or the defendant. Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 147 (8th Cir.1973). The imposition by a trial judge of a sentence on a mechanical, predetermined or policy basis is subject to review. Woosley, supra at 143-145. Where the severity of the sentence shocks the judicial conscience or greatly exceeds penalties usually exacted for similar offenses or defendants, and the record fails to justify and the trial court fails to explain the imposition of the sentence, the appellate court‘s can reverse the sentence. Woosley, supra at 147. This by no means is an exhaustive or exclusive list of the circumstances under which an appellate court may find that the trial court abused its discretion in the imposition of sentence in a particular case. State v. Firouzmandi, supra.
{¶16} Upon review, given the state of the record and the sentencing entry, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant.
By: Hoffman, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Farmer, J. dissents
{¶18} I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s finding of no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s failure to adequately address the factors of