State v. HandcockState v. Handcock
Rendered on the 21st day of August, 2009.
. . . . . . . . . .
AMY M. SMITH, Atty. Reg. No. 0081712, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 50 E. Columbia Street, 4th Floor, P. O. Box 1608, Springfield, Ohio 45501
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
WILLIAM N. MERRELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0015957, P. O. Box 2901, Springfield, Ohio 45501
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . . .
HARSHA, J. (by assignment)
{¶ 1} After being found guilty of felonious assault with a firearm specification, James Handcock, Jr. appeals, contending the verdict was contrary to law and against the manifest wеight of the evidence. The State introduced evidence that Handcock shot a 9 millimeter pistol at a car occupied by three
I. Facts
{¶ 2} Thomas Benner, Robert Camp and Robert Dawes stopped at a Speedway gas station for gasoline and coffee while on the way to work. Benner went inside where he saw Handcock, who raised his shirt and showed Benner a handgun that was apparently in a holster. Benner left the store and returned to the car where he waited for the driver Robert Camp to pay for the gas.
{¶ 3} Handcock also left the store and sat down next to his car, which had broken down near the gas pumps. Just before Camp‘s car left the gas station, Benner and Handcock exchanged stares and perhaps some words. Then Handcock ran toward the car and started firing the gun.
{¶ 4} At trial, Thomas Benner testified the three men stopped at the gas station for coffee and gas. Benner went into thе store, where he saw Handcock standing near the ATM. Benner stated Handcock lifted his shirt and showed
{¶ 5} Robert Camp, the driver of the car testified he saw Handcock in the rearview mirror as they were attempting to get away from him. In response to an inquiry аbout whether he saw Handcock point the gun at the car, Camp responded, “Yeah(.).”
{¶ 6} The third passenger, Robert Dawes, did not see any of the shooting because he was lying down in the front seat after the incident started.
{¶ 7} In the defense case, Handcock testified he had stopрed at the gas station because his car‘s transmission broke down. He went into the store to use the ATM but could not get it to work properly. He admitted he had mental health problems and indicated he had not been taking his medication. Handcock denied taking the gun into the store, but admitted firing it. Hоwever, he indicated he was not trying to shoot anyone, but rather was firing in the air because of frustration over the car, his inability to get cash from the ATM and the resulting “nervous breakdown.” He asserted that if he intended to shoot anyone, he could not have
{¶ 8} The State offered the rebuttal testimony of a police weapons training expert who noted shooting a gun “sideways” was not an accurate technique. He also indicated that even trainеd police officers frequently missed human sized targets from twenty feet or less. In fact, he had observed officers under stress miss from less than five feet.
{¶ 9} After the jury acquitted Handcock of two counts of felonious assault on Camp and Dawes, respectively, but found him guilty of the crime involving Benner, Hаndcock filed this appeal.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 10} Handcock presents one assignment of error for our review:
{¶ 11} “THAT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY IN COUNT II (FELONIOUS ASSAULT) IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
III. Standard of Review
{¶ 12} An appellate court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to detеrmine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, paragraph two of the syllabus. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
{¶ 13} A sufficiency of the evidence challenge tests whether the state‘s case is legally adequate to satisfy the requirement that it contain prima facie evidence of all the elemеnts of the charged offense. See State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, and Carter v. Estell (CA 5, 1982), 691 F.2d 777, 778. It is a test of legal adequacy, rather than a test of rational persuasiveness.
{¶ 14} In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidеnce and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, citing State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175. A reviewing сourt will not reverse a conviction where there is substantial evidence upon which the court could reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 40, 41; State v. Eskridge (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 56, paragraph two of the syllabus.
IV. Felonious Assault
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} “(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
{¶ 17} * *
{¶ 18} “(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another * * * by
{¶ 19} Handcock asserts that the State failed to prove he knowingly attempted to cause physical harm to Benner by firing the gun. He submits he had no intention to harm anyone because he fired the gun “into the air, not in the direction of the three men.” As proof of that assertion he points to several pieces of evidence.
{¶ 20} First, he relies on his own testimony that he fired into the air rather than at the car. He notes no bullets struck the car even though he fired at a short distance from the car. He also emphasizes that all the occupants either ducked down behind their seats and could not see him fire, or in the case of the driver, he was hastily driving the car out of the gas station and couldn‘t see what was happening behind him.
{¶ 21} Although there is a limited amount of logic behind these arguments, they ovеrlook several very important legal rules and the State‘s competing evidence. First, because the State successfully presented a prima facie case, the court properly allowed the jury to decide Handcock‘s case. Both Benner and Camp testifiеd Handcock pointed the gun at them and/or the car. Thus, a reasonable juror could infer that Handcock intended to cause physical harm to Benner. And, the jury was free to believe all, part or none of Handcock‘s testimony. As long as the State presented substantial competing evidence, it was the jury‘s role to choose which version of the events to believe. So, in spite of some of the inconsistencies and weaknesses in the State‘s case, we conclude there is no manifest miscarriage of justice here.
{¶ 23} Moreover, to the extent an inconsistency may exist, a reviewing court will not overturn a verdict that convicts a defendant of one crime and acquits him of another merely because the two findings are irreconcilable. State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-2787, at ¶81; see, also, State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548; State v. Adams (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 7 O.O.3d 393. Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an
V. Mental Health Issues
{¶ 24} Handcock originally entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity under
{¶ 25} Despite Handcock‘s history of mental illness, Dr. DeMarchis expressly concluded in his competency evaluation that Handcock was competent to stand trial. While acknowledging that Handcock could become destabilized upon “medical noncompliance”, i.e., his voluntary failure to take his medications, Dr. DеMarchis also noted Handcock “rapidly stabilized” once he resumed those medications. By his observations and testing, Dr. DeMarchis concluded Handcock was able to understand the nature of the court process, the role of its various participants, the nature of the сharges he faced and thus, was able to assist in his defense.
{¶ 26} On the issue of lack of criminal responsibility under
{¶ 27} Just as in State v. Bock (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 108, we conclude the court‘s failure to hold the mandatory competency hearing after the issue was raised prior to trial is harmless error. It is possible that defense counsel orally withdrew
{¶ 28} Like the situation in Bock, trial counsel never mentioned the issue of competency again on the record. And Handcock‘s appellate counsel has not raised any factual concern with Handcock‘s competency tо stand trial or his sanity. Although Handcock‘s conduct during the incident was unquestionably strange, his behavior during the trial did not present the indicia of incompetency. Just like the defendant in Bock, Handcock testified and was subject to cross-examination “with no apparent behavior which would lead this cоurt to believe he was not competent to stand trial.” Bock, supra, at 111. “Nor is there any expert or lay opinion in the record that the defendant was actually incompetent.” Id.
{¶ 29} Therefore, we conclude Handcock suffered no prejudice as the result of the failure of the recоrd to reflect either a written withdrawal of the plea and motion, or in the alternative, the absence of a hearing. See State v. Bock (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 108, at syllabus one. See, also, State v. Furlow (1998), Montgomery App. No. 16403, 1998 WL 257877.
VI. Conclusion
{¶ 30} Accordingly, we reject Handcock‘s assignment of error and affirm his conviction.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
. . . . . . . . . .
(Hon. William H. Harsha, Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).
Copies mailed to:
Amy M. Smith
William N. Merrell
Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter