State v. HallState v. Hall
John P. Laczko, 3685 Stutz Drive, Suite 100, Canfield, OH 44406 (For Defendant-Appellant).
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Amanda C. Hall, appeals the judgment of conviction, after a bench trial, on one count of endangering children. Appellant argues the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain a finding of guilt such that her motion for directed verdict of acquittal should have been granted. Appellant additionally argues the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶3} Trumbull County Children’s Services initiated an investigation in conjunction with local law enforcement. One of appellant’s children gave an eyewitness statement wherein she detailed that she and one of her siblings observed appellant physically holding T.H.’s arm under running water in the bathtub as a form of punishment. Appellant was also interviewed, but denied holding the toddler’s arm under water. Instead, appellant explained that she had just finished giving T.H. a bath, drained the tub, and left the bathroom for a brief moment. Appellant contended that T.H. turned the water back on to play with a water toy and injured herself.
{¶4} Appellant was indicted on one count of endangering children, a second-degree felony in violation of
{¶5} Appellant now timely appeals and asserts two assignments of error. Appellant’s first assignment of error states:
{¶6} The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant-appellant by denying defendant-appellant’s Criminal Rule 29 motion for directed verdict of acquittal, made at the close of the state’s case and again at the close of all the evidence, when there was insufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crime of child endangering in violation of
{¶7} A motion for directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to
{¶8} In this case, the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did recklessly torture or cruelly abuse the victim, a 19-month old child, resulting in serious physical harm. Appellant does not dispute that the scalding hot liquid, which tested out of her faucet at up to 157 degrees, resulted in serious physical harm. Instead, appellant contends the state failed to establish appellant’s identity as the perpetrator. Appellant points out that, at trial, no eyewitnesses were able to directly implicate her.
{¶9} Initially, it must be recognized that circumstantial evidence possesses the same probative value as direct evidence. State v. Hendrix, 11th Dist. No. 2011-L-043, 2012-Ohio-2832, ¶137, citing State v. Jenks, supra, 272. “Circumstantial evidence has been defined as testimony not grounded on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from which inferences are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be established.” State v. Windle, 11th Dist. No. 2010-L-033, 2011-Ohio-4171, ¶34, citing State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1988). Proof beyond a reasonable doubt may therefore be established by circumstantial evidence. Hendrix, supra, ¶137.
{¶11} Dr. Steiner opined T.H.’s injury was the result of forceful immersion into a hot liquid. In support, Dr. Steiner pointed to the uniformity of the burn; that is, the hot liquid came into contact uniformly with the entire affected area, and there was no area of skin on the hand or forearm that was not burned. The doctor explained this was not a spill, splash, or flow pattern that would otherwise indicate a non-uniform burn pattern to the affected area. There was also no area of transition between the affected area and the unaffected area. Additionally, Dr. Steiner explained the bruising pattern above the burned area indicated that the victim’s upper arm had been grabbed forcefully, with the bruising pattern marking the area between the fingers, where the blood was forced out of the subcutaneous tissue.
{¶12} Appellant herself explained there were no other adults in the home at the time, so there could be no other person who held the toddler’s arm. Appellant’s child, though testifying for the defense, was impeached by her prior statement indicating that appellant held T.H.’s arm under the water because she was misbehaving. Thus, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
{¶13} Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶14} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:
{¶15} The trial court denied appellant due process under the Fourteenth Amendment due to the fact her conviction for child endangering was against the manifest weight of the evidence and the judge’s opinion was inconsistent with the evidence and testimony presented at trial.
{¶16} To determine whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must consider the weight of the evidence, including the credibility of the witnesses and all reasonable inferences, to determine whether the trier-of-fact “lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). In weighing the evidence submitted at a criminal trial, an appellate court must defer to the factual findings of the trier-of-fact regarding the weight to be given the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶17} Appellant argues this case is analogous to State v. Miley, 114 Ohio App.3d 738 (4th Dist.1996), where the Fourth Appellate District reversed a child endangering conviction on manifest weight grounds. The chief distinction is axiomatic: appellant relies on another court’s review of a different case with different facts and different testimony. Indeed, this court has previously noted the limited precedential
{¶18} We cannot say the trial court lost its way in returning a verdict of guilty. Appellant, taking the stand in her own defense, maintained that she did not force T.H.’s hand in any fashion. Instead, appellant stated that she gave T.H. a bath, drained the bathtub, and left the room for a moment. Appellant then heard water running and determined it was coming from the bathroom. Appellant testified that, as she approached the bathroom, she heard T.H. screaming. She walked in to find T.H. alone in the bathtub, hysterically crying. Appellant maintained that T.H. pulled the water faucet on and twisted it upwards to the hottest setting, burning herself. Appellant explained she was so alarmed upon discovering T.H. that she quickly pulled her out of the bathtub, apparently bruising her arm above the burn in the process.
{¶19} However, Dr. Steiner explained that T.H.’s injury was not medically consistent with a child standing in an empty bathtub and turning on the hot water to hold a toy underneath. Such a scenario would not have resulted in a uniform burn pattern, but instead a non-uniform pattern because the water would have flowed across the
{¶20} Based on the foregoing, as well as the complete transcript, this is not a case that warrants reversal based on manifest weight. The trial court, after hearing both sides, elected to believe the state’s account. As the trial court explained, the expert’s opinion was convincing and made common sense; if appellant’s version was true, there is no explanation as to why the child did not have burns elsewhere. The verdict will not be disturbed as a result.
{¶21} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶22} The Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
concur.