State v. GunzenhauserState v. Gunzenhauser
For Plaintiff-Appellee: W. DAVID MONTAGUE 0015204, Assistant Director of Law, 1213 E. Main St., Ashland, Ohio 44805
For Defendant-Appellant: JOHN L. GOOD 0056179, 930 Claremont Avenue, Ashland, Ohio 44805
{¶1} Defendаnt-Appellant, Christopher Gunzenhauser, appeals his conviction for one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of
{¶2} On March 22, 2009, Officer Aaron Kline initiated a traffic stop of Appellant‘s car after observing that Appellant‘s car had a faulty brake light. Specifically, Officer Kline obsеrved that Appellant‘s right rear brake light was not working. Officer Kline stated that the left rear brake light was working and that a brake light located in the rear window of the vehicle was also working.
{¶3} As Officer Kline approached Appellant‘s vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of cologne. He testified that in his experience, such an excessive amount of cologne is often used to mask the smell of marijuana in a car. Officer Kline called for the K9 unit and asked Appellant if he had any drugs in the car. Appellant admitted that he had marijuana and also drug paraphernalia in the vehicle. As a result, Appellant was charged with one count of Possession of Marijuаna, in violation of
{¶4} On April 10, 2009, Appellant entered pleas of not guilty to both charges in Ashland Municipal Court. He then filed a Motion To Suppress the physical evidence and statements obtained by the State as a result of the traffic stop, claiming that the stop was illegal and that any evidence obtained as a result of that stop should be
{¶5} “Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, and pole trailer when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with two or more stop lights, except that passenger cars manufactured or assembled prior to January 1, 1967, motorcycles, and motor-driven cycles shall be equipped with at least one stop light. Stop lights shall be mounted on the rear of the vehicle, actuated upon application of the service brake, and may be incorporated with other rear lights. Such stop lights when actuated shall emit a red light visible from a distance of five hundred fеet to the rear, provided that in the case of a train of vehicles only the stop lights on the rear-most vehicle need be visible from the distance specified.”
{¶6} In its ruling denying Appellant‘s motion, the trial court determined that it did not need to make a ruling with respect to whether
{¶7} Appellant now appeals the trial court‘s decisiоn and raises one Assignment of Error:
{¶8} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, WHEN IT EXTENDED THE “GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION” TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO INCLUDE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER‘S MISTAKE REGARDING A MATTER OF LAW, AS OPPOSED TO A MATTER OF FACT.”
{¶9} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a traffic stop. We disagree.
{¶10} Appellate review of a trial court‘s decision to deny a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 713 N.E.2d 1. During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 661 N.E.2d 1030. A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Metcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 675 N.E.2d 1268. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court‘s conclusion, whether the trial court‘s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State v. Williams (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141.
{¶11} There are three methods of challenging a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court‘s finding of fact. In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial court‘s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 1 Ohio B. 57, 437 N.E.2d 583; and State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 597 N.E.2d 1141. Second, an appellant may argue that the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See State v. Williams (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141. Finally, an
{¶12} The issue in this case is whether the application of the exclusionary rule may be avoided with respect to evidence obtained by a рolice officer as a result of a traffic stop based on conduct observed by the officer that the officer mistakenly, but reasonably, believes to constitute a violation of the law.
{¶13} The exclusionary rule for еvidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure is a rule of purely federal construction. State v. Greer (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 299, 303, 683 N.E.2d 82. “Ohio has no independent exclusionary rule for evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search and sеizure.” Id., citing State v. Mapp (1960), 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387, reversed on other grounds sub nom. Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081.
{¶14} The exclusionary rule is subject to exceptions. Among these exceptions is the good-faith exception set forth in United States v. Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. In Leon, the Supreme Court referred to the competing interests of presenting probative, reliablе evidence in criminal cases versus avoiding unreasonable searches and seizures. The court made the following observation:
{¶15} “An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference with the сriminal justice system‘s truth-finding function is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains. Particularly
{¶16} Under limited circumstances, courts have held that the exclusionary rule may be avoided with respect to evidence obtained in a stop based on conduct that a police officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believes is a violation of the law. City of Wilmington v. Conner (2001), 144 Ohio App.3d 735, 740, 761 N.E.2d 663, citing State v. Greer (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 299, 300-301, 683 N.E.2d 82. Such cases necessarily involve a mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact. “Beсause courts must be cautious in overlooking a police officer‘s mistakes of law, the mistake must be objectively reasonable.” Id.; see also People v. Teresinski (1980), 26 Cal.3d 457, 462-464.
{¶17} Where a statute is vague or ambiguous, or requires judicial construction to determine its scope or meaning, exceptional circumstances exist which permit courts to extend the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to not only mistakes of fact, but also mistakes of law. See e.g., Greer, supra, at 303.
{¶18} This exception to the exclusionary rule must be “narrowly tailored in order to avoid giving police officers the incentive to construe statutes and ordinances broadly for the purpose of finding a violation” upon which to рredicate a stop. The police officer must be held to a higher standard of knowledge of the law than would be appropriate for
{¶19} The statute in question before us is not free from ambiguity.
{¶20} Further adding to this multiple interpretation quandary, the trial court in the present case stated to the prosecutor and to defense counsel, when making its ruling, “I see you both wrestling with the construction of
{¶21} The trial court did not, at the suppression hearing, determine whether the officer was actually mistaken in his understanding of the law. Rather, the court solely determined that if the officer was mistaken, then his mistake was a reasonable one.
{¶22} We are satisfied with the trial court‘s ruling and find that Officer Kline‘s belief was a reasonable one. Given that the trial court as well as the attorneys were struggling with the interpretаtion of
{¶23} Appellant‘s assignment of error is overruled.
By: Delaney, J.
Edwards, P.J. and
Hoffman, J. concur.
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
{¶26} I write separately only to note my agreement with the Fourth and Twelfth Districts’ interpretation of
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the judgment of the Ashland Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs assessed to Appellant.
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN