State v. Guder
267 P.3d 751
| Kan. | 2012Background
- Guder pleaded guilty to manufacturing a controlled substance, marijuana cultivation, multiple weapons counts, and paraphernalia possession.
- District court sentenced on May 9, 2001 to composite terms culminating in 177 months’ imprisonment.
- Appellant timely appealed, but docketing was delayed; post-remand, Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing.
- District court resentenced August 19, 2008, modifying the manufacturing sentence and altering paraphernalia to consecutive terms, yielding a 58-month control term.
- Guder challenged the resentencing, asserting limits on district court authority post-KSGA and the effect of prior convictions on sentencing.
- Court of Appeals affirmed; Kansas Supreme Court granted review to address remand authority and statutory interpretation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May district court modify sentences after remand for a different conviction? | Guder relies on Woodbury lineage of remand authority. | McKnight and KSGA limit remand-modifications to specified circumstances. | No authority to resentence on non-vacated counts; modify only per statute. |
| Does K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5) govern remands after reversal of the primary conviction? | Remand requires following KSGA sentencing provisions in multi-count cases. | Authority does not extend to resentence other convictions when only primary is vacated. | Remandable authority limited to statutory remand language; not to other counts. |
| May a sentence vacated on appeal still allow modification of unvacated counts? | Statutory and common-law remand principles permit broader resentence. | Statutory language limits resentence to vacated primary issues only. | Vacating one conviction's sentence does not authorize altering others; reverse the modification accordingly. |
| Can prior convictions be used to enhance or factor into sentencing after remand? | Use of prior convictions as sentencing factors remains appropriate. | Ivory line of reasoning resists departure from prior rulings on trial rights. | Court adheres to Ivory and related decisions; no jury-trial-right violation in using priors. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Woodbury, 133 Kan. 1 (1931) (prior law allowed broad remand modification before KSGA)
- State v. Snow, 282 Kan. 323 (2006) (remand on one count can affect other counts before KSGA)
- State v. Anthony, 274 Kan. 998 (2002) (limits on modification of legal sentences absent statutory support)
- State v. McKnight, 292 Kan. 776 (2011) (statutory interpretation of remand authority under KSGA)
- State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44 (2002) (jury-trial rights and use of prior convictions clarified)