State v. . GreenState v. . Green
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Stacy
Thеre is evidence - on behalf of the State tending to show that about ten o’clock on the night of 15 May, 1926, Moses Green and Leroy Wingatе, two colored men, went to the store of one David Peele, a merchant at Aycock’s Crossing, in Wilson County, and entered his plaсe of business ostensibly for the purpose of making a purchase of a shirt and a pair of pants. Wingate stood at the door while Green went into the store, though the State’s witness was somewhat equivocal as to which one entered the store and which one stоod at the door. A shirt was selected and a pair of pants examined, but the latter did not prove satisfactory. As the merchant-turned to wrap up the shirt, the prisoner, Moses Green, whipped out his pistol, shot Peele just above the heart and killed him almost instantly. No wаrning was given by the prisoner of his purpose prior to the shooting, аnd both colored men left the store immediately.
During the time Green and Wingate were in jail awaiting trial, both made statements to the sheriff, in thе absence of each other, as to how the homicide оccurred, each contending that the other did the shooting. All the еvidence was to the effect that the one who entered the store, *303 whether Green or Wingate, and not the one who remained at the door, shot the deceased.
At the close of the evidence, a verdict of “Not guilty” was directed in favor of the defеndant Leroy Wingate.
With respect to the following statement made by Wingate to the sheriff and his deputy, while in jail, the prisoner, Moses Greеn, duly objected, and asked that it be excluded as evidence against him.
The officer testified: “He (Wingate) said that Green went into the stоre and called for a shirt, a blue shirt with a collar, and also a рair of pants; that he couldn’t find any pants to suit him, but said he would take thе shirt, and asked the man to wrap it up; that he (Wingate) called Greеn and said ‘Let’s go,’ and when he looked, Green pulled his pistol out and fired; that he (Wingate) ran, and never saw Green any more until they brought him up to the jail.”
This evidence was incompetent as against the рrisoner, Moses Green, and should have been excluded as to him. It wаs highly prejudicial, we think, in view of the uncertainty of the State’s witness as tо which one of the defendants entered the store and did the shoоting. Also, it would seem, that the prejudicial effect of the statement was accentuated by the court’s action in directing a verdict of not guilty as to Leroy Wingate.
It is a rule, too firmly established to admit of debate, that the declaration of a third person, not an аgent, of the party sought to be affected, made in the absence of such party, is inadmissible as hearsay. Daniel v. Dixon, 161 N. C., 377; Redman v. Roberts, 23 N. C., 479. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. “Things done between strangеrs ought not to injure those who are not parties to them.” Co. Litt., 132; McKelvey on Evidence, pp. 129 and 203.
Speaking to the question in S. v. Lassiter, 191 N. C., 210, Brogden, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, sаid: “The inherent vice of hearsay testimony consists in the fact that it derives its value, not from the credibility of the witness himself, but depends upon the veracity and credibility of some other person from whom the witnеss got his information.” This is the general rule, supported by all the authoritiеs on the subject. There are, of course, exceptions tо the rule, not now necessary to be considered, as the evidence here complained of falls under none of them.
Eor the error, as indicated, there must be a new trial; and it is so ordered.
New trial.