State v. . Lassiter, 191 N.C. 210

Brogden, J.

Hearsay evidence is defined in King v. Bynum, 137 N. C., 495, as follows: “Evidence, oral or written, is called hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part upon the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.” In the case of Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch, 290, Chief Justice Marshall held the principle to be that hearsay evidence is incompetent to establish any specific fact in its nature susceptible of being proved by witnesses who speak from their own knowledge. It is a rule of evidence that hearsay is in its own nature inadmissible, that this species of testimony supposes some better testimony which might be adduced in the particular case, is not the sole ground of its exclusion. Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetence to satisfy the mind of the existence of the fact, and the fraud that might be practiced under its cover, combine to support the rule that “hearsay evidence” is totally inadmissible. Barker v. Pope, 91 N. C., 165; Redman v. Roberts, 23 N. C., 479; Daniel v. Dixon, 161 N. C., 377; S. v. Reid, 178 N. C., 745; Merrill v. Whitmire, 110 N. C., 367. The inherent vice of hearsay testimony consists in the fact that it derives its value not from the credibility of the witness himself, but depends upon the veracity and credibility of some other person from whom the witness got his information.

It is appafent therefore that the testimony of Blanchard and Eason as to declarations of Lassiter, not in the presence of the defendant, is incompetent and constitutes prejudicial error.

However, it is urged that this testimony was admitted by the court not as substantive but as corroborative testimony. What, therefore, is corroborating testimony ? Black’s Law Dictionary defines corroborate as follows: “To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and confirming facts or evidence.” Corroborating evidence is sup plementary to that already given and tending to strengthen or confirm it. S. v. Mongeon, 108 N. W., 554; Radcliffe v. Chavez, 110 Pac., 701.

If the testimony of Blanchard and Eason is not competent as substantive evidence, it is not rendered competent because it tends to corroborate some other witness. Holt v. Johnson, 129 N. C., 138; S. v. Springs, 184 N. C., 768. Indeed, the evidence of Blanchard and Eason in nowise tends to strengthen or confirm the testimony of Lassiter or add to its weight or credibility, but on the contrary the testimony given by them tends to destroy the credibility of Lassiter and to greatly reduce the weight of his testimony by reason of the fact that both Blanchard and Eason unequivocally contradict Lassiter. In no aspect of the law of evidence can contradictory evidence be used as corroborating, strengthening or' confirming evidence.

It is further urged that Lassiter was the agent of the defendant, Ballard. There was no proof of agency disclosed in the record except the mere declaration of the alleged agent. It is a rule of universal application in this jurisdiction that agency cannot be proved by the mere declaration of the agent. Lockhart Handbook of Evidence, sec. 154; Summerrow v. Baruch, 128 N. C., 202; Daniel v. R. R., 136 N. C., 517; Hunsucker v. Corbitt, 187 N. C., 503. Of course, the agent may testify under oath as to the agency. Sutton v. Lyons, 156 N. C., 3.

However, Lassiter, the alleged agent, denied the agency under oath, and there was no other proof thereof except his declarations to third parties in the absence of defendant.

Upon the whole record, therefore, for the errors indicated, there must be a

New trial.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. . Lassiter

Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina

Date Published: Feb 17, 1926

Citations: 191 N.C. 210; 131 S.E. 577; 1926 N.C. LEXIS 38

Court Abbreviation: N.C.