STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AARON LEE GORDON
No. COA17-1077-2
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
Filed: 17 March 2020
Forsyth County, Nos. 15 CRS 58663-4
Appeal by defendant from order entered 13 February 2017 by Judge Susan E. Bray in Forsyth County Superior Court. Originally heard in the Court of Appeals 22 March 2018, with opinion issued 4 September 2018. On 4 September 2019, the Supreme Court allowed the State‘s petition for discretionary review for the limited purpose of remanding to this Court for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Grady, 372 N.C. 509, 831 S.E.2d 542 (2019).
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Joseph Finarelli, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Michele A. Goldman, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant Aaron Lee Gordon timely appealed from the trial court‘s order requiring him to enroll in lifetime satellite-based monitoring following his eventual release from prison. On 4 September 2018, this Court filed a published opinion vacating the trial court‘s civil order mandating satellite-based monitoring. See State v. Gordon, ___ N.C. App. ___, 820 S.E.2d 339 (2018). The State subsequently filed a petition for discretionary review with the North Carolina Supreme Court. On 4 September 2019, the Supreme Court allowed the State‘s petition for discretionary review for the limited purpose of remanding
Background
I. Satellite-Based Monitoring
Our General Assembly enacted “a sex offender monitoring program that uses a continuous satellite-based monitoring system . . . designed to monitor” the locations of individuals who have been convicted of certain sex offenses.
After determining that an individual meets the criteria for one of three categories of offenders subject to the satellite-based monitoring program, see
II. Defendant‘s Enrollment
In February 2017, Defendant pleaded guilty to statutory rape, second-degree rape, taking indecent liberties with a child, assault by strangulation, and first-degree kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to 190-288 months’ imprisonment and ordered to submit to lifetime sex-offender registration. After determining that Defendant was convicted of an “aggravated offense” under
The State‘s only witness at Defendant‘s satellite-based monitoring hearing was Donald Lambert, a probation and parole officer in the Forsyth County sex-offender unit. Lambert explained that the device currently used to monitor offenders enrolled in satellite-based monitoring is “just basically like having a cell phone on your leg.” The battery requires two hours of charging each day, which requires that Defendant plug the charging cord into an electric outlet while the device remains attached to his leg. The charging cord is approximately eight to ten feet long. Every 90 days, Defendant must also allow a monitoring officer to enter his home in order to inspect and service the device.
Lambert testified that the device currently in use monitors an offender‘s location “at all times[.]” Once Defendant is released from prison and enrolled in satellite-based monitoring, “we [will] monitor [him] weekly. . . . [W]e just basically check the system to see his movement to see where he is, where he is going weekly. . . [W]e review all the particular places daily where he‘s been.” “[T]he report that can be generated from that tracking . . . gives that movement on a minute-by-minute position,” as well as “the speed of movement at the time[.]” Under the current statutory regime, a monitoring officer may access an offender‘s location data at any time without obtaining a search warrant. If Defendant enters a restricted area—for example, if
When asked what would happen if Defendant “had a traveling sales job that covered” a regional territory and required travel to multiple states, Lambert explained that the sheriff‘s office “would have to approve it.” “He would also be monitored through the Raleigh office where the satellite-based monitoring is. He would have to clear that with them as well. And then he would have to notify the state that he‘s going to if he was going to—and have to decide whether or not he‘d have to stay on satellite-based monitoring in another state.”
The State introduced Defendant‘s Static-99 score at his satellite-based monitoring hearing. Lambert explained that Static-99 is “an assessment tool that they‘ve been doing for years on male defendants [convicted of reportable sex offenses] over 18. It‘s just a way to assess whether or not they‘ll commit a crime again of this [sexual] sort.” Lambert testified that offenders are assigned “points” based on
whether or not they‘ve committed a violent crime, whether or not there was an unrelated victim, whether or not there was—there‘s male victims. . . . Other than just the sexual violence, was there another particular part of violence in the crime—in the index crime? Also, [Static-99 assessment] does take their prior sentencing dates into factor too.
Defendant received a “moderate/low” score on his Static-99, which Lambert explained meant there was “a moderate to low [risk] that he would ever commit a crime like this again.” Defendant did not have any prior convictions for sex offenses, but he was assessed one point for having prior convictions for violent offenses.
Lambert agreed that Defendant‘s Static-99 score indicated that “it‘s not likely he‘s going to [commit a sex offense] again[.]” However, the State failed to present any evidence “as to what the rate of recidivism is during—even during [a] five-year period[.]”
The general purpose of the satellite-based monitoring program is “to monitor subject offenders and correlate their movements to reported crime incidents.”
After reviewing the evidence presented during the hearing, the trial court announced:
Let the record reflect we‘ve had this hearing, and the Court is going to find by the preponderance of the evidence that the factors that the State has set forth—his previous assaults, the Static-99 history, the fact that this occurred in an apartment with other children present as well and the relatively minor physical intrusion on [D]efendant to wear the device—it‘s small. It has to be charged two hours a day. But other than that, it can be used in water and other daily activities—so I am going to find . . . that he should enroll in satellite-based monitoring for his natural life unless terminated.
Defendant timely appealed the trial court‘s satellite-based monitoring order to this Court. On appeal, Defendant only challenged the constitutionality of the satellite-based monitoring order as applied to him as one convicted of an aggravated offense. He argued that the trial court erred in ordering that he be subjected to lifetime satellite-based monitoring because “[t]he [S]tate failed to meet its burden of proving that imposing [satellite-based monitoring] on [Defendant] is reasonable under the
In a published opinion filed on 4 September 2018, we vacated the trial court‘s civil
State v. Grady I
In Grady I, the United States Supreme Court made clear that its determination that satellite-based monitoring effects a search was only the first step in analyzing the program‘s constitutionality. Grady I, 575 U.S. at 310, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 462. As the Supreme Court reiterated, “[t]he
On remand from Grady I, the trial court held satellite-based monitoring constitutional, both facially and as applied. Upon the defendant‘s appeal, however, this Court concluded that because “the State failed to present any evidence of its need to monitor [the] defendant, or the procedures actually used to conduct such monitoring[,]” Grady II, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 817 S.E.2d at 28, the State had failed to meet its burden of proving that satellite-based monitoring would constitute a reasonable
In Grady III, our Supreme Court modified and affirmed this Court‘s decision in Grady II, holding satellite-based monitoring unconstitutional as applied to the defendant and all similarly situated individuals. The Court, in “offer[ing] guidance as to what factors to consider in determining whether [satellite-based monitoring] is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances[,]” determined that the defendant‘s “privacy interests and the nature of [the] . . . intrusion” must be weighed against the State‘s interests and the effectiveness of satellite-based monitoring. State v. Griffin, No. COA 17-386-2, slip op. at 13-14 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2020). The Court concluded that although recidivists have greatly diminished privacy interests, satellite-based monitoring is nevertheless a substantial intrusion; and that by failing to make “any showing . . . that the [satellite-based monitoring] program furthers [the State‘s] interest in solving crimes that have been committed, preventing the commission of sex crimes, or protecting the public,” the State did not meet “its burden of establishing the reasonableness of the [satellite-based monitoring] program under the
Notably, the Supreme Court specifically limited its holding to those unsupervised offenders who are subject to satellite-based monitoring because of their classification as recidivists: “[O]ur decision today does not address whether an individual who is classified as a sexually violent predator, or convicted of an aggravated offense, or is an adult convicted of statutory rape or statutory sex offense with a victim under the age of thirteen” may be subject to mandatory lifetime satellite-based monitoring. Id. at 550, 831 S.E.2d at 572. In addition, the holding in Grady III applies only to unsupervised individuals; thus, supervised offenders—all persons currently subject to a period of State supervision, such as probationers, parolees, and individuals who remain under post-release supervision—remain subject to satellite-based monitoring following Grady III. Id. at 548, 831 S.E.2d at 572.
Reconsideration of State v. Gordon
Upon reconsideration of our original opinion, we again conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that lifetime satellite-based monitoring is a reasonable search of this Defendant. Here, Defendant was ordered to submit to satellite-based monitoring solely due to his conviction of an aggravated offense; however, he will not actually enroll in the program for approximately 15 to 20 years, after he has completed his active prison sentence.
The State filed its satellite-based monitoring application at the time of Defendant‘s sentencing, in accordance with
In considering the reasonableness of subjecting a defendant to satellite-based monitoring, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine “whether the warrantless, suspicionless search here is reasonable when ‘its intrusion on the individual‘s
In the instant case, however, the State‘s ability to demonstrate reasonableness is hampered by a lack of knowledge concerning the unknown future circumstances relevant to that analysis. For instance, we are unable to consider “the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations” because the search will not occur until Defendant has served his active sentence. Grady III, 372 N.C. at 527, 831 S.E.2d at 557 (citation omitted). The State makes no
Rather than addressing these concerns, the State focuses primarily on the “limited impact” of the monitoring device itself. The State, however, provides no indication that the monitoring device currently in use will be the same as—or even similar to—the device that will be employed approximately two decades from now. See State v. Spinks, 256 N.C. App. 596, 613, 808 S.E.2d 350, 361 (2017) (Stroud, J., concurring) (“The United States Supreme Court has recognized in recent cases the need to consider how modern technology works as part of analysis of the reasonableness of searches.” (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 392, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430, 446-47 (2014))), disc. review denied, 370 N.C. 696, 811 S.E.2d 589 (2018).
Nor does the record before this Court reveal whether Defendant will be on supervised or unsupervised release at the time his monitoring is set to begin, affecting Defendant‘s privacy expectations in the wealth of information currently exposed. Samson, 547 U.S. at 850-52, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 258-59; Grady II, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 817 S.E.2d at 24 (“[The] [d]efendant is an unsupervised offender. He is not on probation or supervised release. . . . Solely by virtue of his legal status, then, it would seem that [the] defendant has a greater expectation of privacy than a supervised offender.“); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 654, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 575 (“[T]he legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-à-vis the State may depend upon the individual‘s legal relationship with the State.“).
The State has also failed, at this time, to present evidence adequately estimating the government‘s need to search—i.e., the other side of the balancing test. See Grady III, 372 N.C. at 527, 831 S.E.2d at 557. The State merely asserts that “[i]f, as Defendant acknowledges, the State has a ‘substantial interest in preventing sexual assaults,’ then the State‘s evidence amply demonstrated that Defendant warranted such concern in the future despite his Static-99 risk assessment score.” However, the State makes no attempt to distinguish this undeniably important interest from the State‘s “normal need for law enforcement[.]” State v. Elder, 368 N.C. 70, 74, 773 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2015) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 717 (1987)); see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 481, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1, 41 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protection of our people from suspicionless law-enforcement searches. The
In addition, to the extent that the current satellite-based monitoring program is justified by the State‘s interest in deterring future sexual assaults, the State‘s evidence falls short of demonstrating what Defendant‘s threat of reoffending will be after having been incarcerated for roughly fifteen years.3 See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1230 (4th Cir. 1971) (“One of the principal purposes of incarceration is rehabilitation . . . .“). The only individualized measure of Defendant‘s threat of reoffending was the
It is manifest that the State has not met its burden of establishing that it would otherwise be reasonable to grant authorities unlimited discretion to continuously and perpetually monitor Defendant‘s location information upon his release from prison. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404, 181 L. Ed. 2d at 918. Authorizing the State to conduct a search of this magnitude approximately fifteen to twenty years in the future based solely upon scant references to present circumstances would obviate the need to evaluate reasonableness under the “totality of the circumstances” altogether. “We therefore hold, consistent with the balancing test employed in Grady III, that the imposition of [satellite-based monitoring] . . . as required by the trial court‘s order is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant and must be reversed.” Griffin, slip op. at 20.
Accordingly, we necessarily conclude that the State has failed to meet its burden of establishing that lifetime satellite-based monitoring following Defendant‘s eventual release from prison is a reasonable search in Defendant‘s case. We therefore reverse the trial court‘s order.
REVERSED.
Judge BROOK concurs.
Judge DIETZ concurs by separate opinion.
No. COA17-1077-2 – State v. Gordon
DIETZ, Judge, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the outcome of this case because we are bound by this Court‘s recently re-issued decision in State v. Griffin, No. COA17-386-2, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2020). I do not join the majority opinion for the reasons discussed in my concurring opinion in State v. Gordon, ___ N.C. App. ___, 820 S.E.2d 339, 349-50 (2018), remanded, 372 N.C. 722, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2019).
DIETZ, Judge