State v. GibsonState v. Gibson
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 23rd day of July, 2010.
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NICK A. SELVAGGIO, Atty. Reg. No. 0055607, Prosecuting Attorney, 200 N. Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
DENNIS R. GIBSON, JR., #417-518, N.C.C.I., 670 Marion Williamsport Rd. E., P. O. Box 1812, Marion, Ohio 43301
Defendant-Appellant
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FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Dennis R. Gibson, Jr., pro se, appeals from a judgment of the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his motion seeking a declaration that his sexual predator classification was void and asking the court to enjoin enforcement of his sexual predator registration, reporting, and notification
I
{¶ 2} This case is Gibson’s sixth appeal to this Court.
{¶ 3} On September 1, 2001, Gibson entered a negotiated plea of guilty to rape, in violation of
{¶ 4} Gibson did not file a timely direct appeal, and we overruled his motion to file a delayed appeal. State v. Gibson (Dec. 24, 2002), Champaign App. No. 02CA36. The Supreme Court denied review. State v. Gibson, 98 Ohio St.3d 1566, 2003-Ohio-2242.
{¶ 5} Since his conviction, Gibson has filed numerous motions. During 2004, Gibson filed an application for DNA testing, a motion for judicial release, and a motion to vacate his sentence. On January 29, 2005, the court denied each of these requests.
{¶ 6} On May 4, 2005, Gibson moved to withdraw his plea and sought relief from his conviction. Gibson asserted that his counsel had rendered ineffective
{¶ 7} On July 25, 2006, Gibson filed a request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act and Public Records Act. He sought his presentence investigation report, the grand jury minutes, all findings by the trial court pursuant to
{¶ 8} In August 2006, Gibson requested more documents pertaining to the DNA testing that was performed in his case, and the trial court denied the request. We affirmed, determining that Gibson did not demonstrate that he had a justiciable claim or defense to present or that the documents he sought were necessary to support that claim or defense. State v. Gibson, Champaign App. No. 06 CA 37, 2007-Ohio-7161,
{¶ 10} In May 2009, Gibson again moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that his sentence was void because the court failed to comply with
{¶ 11} On November 5, 2009, Gibson filed a “Motion of Complaint for Declaratory Relief Preliminary and Prohibitory Injunction, and Dismissal of Order of Sentencing Court’s Ruling on the Imposition of Predatory Classification, and that the Sentencing Court Dismiss the Sexual Predator Classification.” In his motion, Gibson argued that his sentence was void, because the court “did not properly include the imposition of postrelease control at sentencing for any count of the conviction” and the trial court improperly told him that he could seek judicial release if he were sent to prison for violating post-release control. Gibson claimed that, due to the void sentence, he cannot be required to register as a sexual predator. Gibson sought an injunction prohibiting the Champaign County’s Sheriff’s Department from enforcing his sexual predator registration, reporting, and notification requirements.
{¶ 13} Gibson appeals from the denial of this motion, raising two assignments of error.
II
{¶ 14} Gibson’s assignments of error state:
{¶ 15} “THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY INFORM GIBSON ABOUT POST-RELEASE CONTROL AT SENTENCING AND DID NOT DULY INCORPORATE THE NOTICE INTO THE SENTENCING ENTRY, THEREFORE, VOIDING THE WHOLE SENTENCE ALONG WITH POST-RELEASE CONTROL, SEXUAL PREDATOR REGISTRATION, AND THE SENTENCE ITSELF.
{¶ 16} “APPELLANT’S MOTION OF COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF PRELIMINARY AND PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, OHIO COMMON PLEAS COURT.”
{¶ 17} Gibson claims that the trial court should have granted his motion for declaratory and injunctive relief, because his sentence is void. Gibson asserts that, as a result, any post-release control requirements and his sexual predator
{¶ 18} “The two offenses of rape and gross sexual imposition of which Gibson was convicted are felony sex offenses.
{¶ 19} According to the transcript of the November 9, 2001, sentencing hearing, the trial court informed Gibson regarding post-release control, stating: “The Defendant will be subject to five years post release control in accordance with State law.” The court’s judgment entry stated that, “[a]fter release from prison, Defendant is ordered to be subject to post release control of a maximum of five (5) years, all subject to parole board determination according to law.”
{¶ 20} Gibson claims that the trial court was required to inform him at
{¶ 21} In this case, Gibson claims that the court’s judgment entry also failed to properly include notice of post-release, rendering his judgment and his classification void. We need not address, however, whether the trial court properly included notice of post-release control under
{¶ 22} A defendant’s sex offender classification is not a “final judgment of conviction” and is not a part of the criminal sanctions imposed upon a convicted defendant under the sentencing statutes. State v. Barker, Montgomery App. No. 22963, ¶13. Proceedings under
{¶ 23} The Fifth and Ninth Appellate District have reached similar conclusions. In Williams, the defendant was convicted of complicity to rape, sexual battery, and other offenses; the trial court found her to be a sexually oriented offender and sentenced her to a total of ten years for her underlying convictions.
{¶ 24} On review, the Ninth District concluded that the trial court had correctly held a hearing to resentence Williams to inform her of post-release control. However, the appellate court determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reclassify Williams. It stated:
{¶ 25} “Sex-offender-classification proceedings are civil in nature and legally distinct from the proceedings governing a defendant’s underlying criminal conviction(s) and sentence. State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, syllabus (holding that different standards of review apply to appeals from classification proceedings and criminal convictions). This court has the authority to consider a challenge to a sexual-offender classification even if it lacks the authority to consider an offender’s underlying sentence. See State v. Dobrski, 9th Dist. No. 06CA008925, 2007-Ohio-3121, 2007 WL 1805021. In Dobrski, we held that an appellant’s sentencing entry was not a final, appealable order because it did not comply with
{¶ 26} “Despite the fact that Williams’s sentence was void and had to be vacated pursuant to [State v.] Bezak, [114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250,] the status of her sentence did not affect the status of her classification. That is, the vacation of her sentence did not result in the vacation of her legally distinct sexual-offender classification. See Dobrski, supra. Williams never challenged her sex-offender classification on direct appeal. Thus, Williams had a valid sexual-offender classification when the AWA went into effect on January 1, 2008.” (Footnote omitted.) Williams at ¶10-11. See, also, State v. Culgan, Medina App. No. 08 CA 80-M, 2009-Ohio-2783 (stating, citing Williams, that a classification journal entry is separate and distinct from a sentencing entry, and that a proper classification entry is final and appealable even if the related sentencing entry is not).
{¶ 27} Following Williams, the Fifth District has also found that a defendant’s sex offender classification “was intact” when he “was before the trial court for resentencing based on the court’s failure to advise him of post-release control.” State v. Poissant, Fairfield App. No. 08 CA 7, 2009-Ohio-4235, ¶45. The appellate court thus concluded that it was the province of the Attorney General’s Office, not the court, to reclassify the defendant as a Tier III offender. Id.
{¶ 29} Gibson claims that the trial court made other errors at sentencing, such as “allowing Gibson to believe” that he could seek judicial release during his mandatory nine-year sentence, that the trial court did not comply with
{¶ 30} Because the trial court did not err in concluding that Gibson’s sexual predator designation is not affected by the validity of Gibson’s sentence, the trial court properly denied Gibson’s motion for declaratory and injunctive relief.
{¶ 31} The assignments of error are overruled.
III
{¶ 32} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
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BROGAN, J. and GRADY, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Nick A. Selvaggio
Dennis R. Gibson, Jr.
Hon. Roger B. Wilson