[¶ 1] Dаrlene George appeals from a judgment of conviction of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2011),
[¶ 2] George argues on appeal that (1) the court erred when it denied her motion to suppress her grand jury testimony; (2) the court erred in denying Jeffrey L.
[¶ 3] George also argues, similarly to Williams’s arguments on appeal, that the court erroneously prohibited cross-examination of the cooperating witness regarding his prior arrests and the prosecutor improperly vouched for the cooperating witness’s credibility. Because we addressed these issues in detail in the companion opinion, State v. Williams,
[¶ 4] We affirm the judgment.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶ 5] The history of this case is described in greater detail in State v. Williams,
[¶ 6] During the course of the investigation, George testified, pursuant to subpoenas, before the York County grand jury on July 7, 2008, and on September 2, 2008. At each proceeding, George was not advised of her right to decline to answer questions because of a risk of self-incrimination, and she was not informed that she was a potential suspect in the case. By the time of her grand jury appearance on September 2, George was a focus of the State’s investigation as a potential suspect in the homicide.
[¶ 7] Following the grand jury proceedings, Williams and Cassimy were indicted for the intentional or knоwing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), or depraved indifference murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(B), of the victim on September 5, 2008. In a superseding indictment on March 4, 2009, they were charged with an additional count of conspiracy to commit murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 151(1)(A). George was also indicted on March 4, 2009, for the intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), or depraved indifference murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(B), of the victim and conspiraсy to commit murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 151(1)(A). George, Williams, and Cassimy pleaded not guilty to both counts.
[¶ 8] After George’s indictment, pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 8(b), the State filed a notice of joinder to join George, Williams, and Cassimy as codefendants in one trial. Williams filed a motion to sever his trial from George and Cassimy’s trial, which the motion court denied.
[¶ 9] On August 5, 2009, George filed a motion to suppress her grand jury testimony on the grounds that (1) she was not advised of her right to decline to answer questions; (2) she was not informed that she was a “target” in the case; (3) her testimony was compelled; (4) she did not have the benefit of counsel; and (5) as a result, her testimony was involuntary. After a hearing, the court denied George’s motion to suppress her grand jury testimony. The court reasoned that “[t]here is no constitutional requirement that a subpoenaed witness, including a potential target witness of grand jury action, be given the equivalent of a Miranda warning before testifying ... [and] Ms. George had access
[¶ 10] George and Williams’s trial began in June 2010. Cassimy, who had entered an agreement to plead guilty to conspiracy and cooperate with the State, testified in detail to the codefendants’ conspiracy and their role in the murder of the victim. George exercised her right not to testify; Williams did testify. Williams testified that he traveled to Maine to visit George on June 19, 2008; however, on the night the victim was murdered, he was in a motel sleeping. He also testified that he had no knowledge regarding who murdered the victim.
[¶ 11] In addition to the charges of murder and conspiracy for which George was indicted, the court instructed the jury on the elements of accomplice liability, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3) (2011).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Denial of Motion to Suppress
[¶ 12] Geоrge argues that the court erred in denying her motion to suppress her grand jury testimony because her statements were involuntary. In support of this, George asserts that she was not advised of her privilege against self-incrimination, she was not informed that she was a suspect, she testified under compulsion, and the grand jury proceeding is an inherently coercive setting.
[¶ 13] “We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to factual findings and de novo as to issues of law.” State v. Dodge,
1. Grand Jury Witnesses and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
[¶ 14] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be а witness against himself.” U.S. Const, amend. V. In the Maine Constitution, Article I, section 6 guarantees that “[t]he accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself or herself.” Me. Const. art. I, § 6.
[¶ 15] The privilege against self-incrimination extends to grand jury proceedings. United States v. Washington,
[¶ 16] The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the Fifth Amendment does not require that a grand jury witness be given the full panoply of warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona,
[¶ 17] Whether the Constitution requires that a witness who is, in fact, a target of a grand jury investigation, but has not yet been chаrged with a crime, be issued a warning informing her of her Fifth Amendment right not to answer incriminating questions during the investigation has not been decided. See Washington,
[¶ 18] Although not compelled by precedent, the U.S. Department of Justice has instituted an internal policy that requires that a “target” of an investigation be notified of her status as a “target” and be advised of her privilege against self-incrimination prior to testifying before a grand jury. See 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 8.10(d) at 261, 263. At least twenty-three states, either by statute or pursuant to case law, require that grand jury witnesses be given admonishments that include reference to the witness’s right against self-incrimination. See John F. Decker, Legislating New Federalism: The Call for Grand Jury Reform in the States, 58 Okla. L.Rev. 341, 377-78 (2005) (collecting statutes and cases).
[¶ 19] We have not adopted a similar standard.
2. Voluntariness of George’s Testimony
[¶ 20] The State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s statement was voluntary. See State v. Lavoie,
[¶ 21] In making a determination on voluntariness, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Dodge,
the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of offiсers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; threats, promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant’s age, physical and mental health, emotional stability, and conduct.
Id. ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Sawyer,
[¶ 22] Here, the totality of the circumstances establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Georgе’s July grand jury testimony was voluntary. First, George was not in custody. A grand jury witness’s interrogation is not analogous to a custodial interrogation. See Mandujano, 4
[¶ 23] Second, there is no evidence in the record indicating that George was mentally impaired, incapable of comprehending the grand jury proceeding, or coerced in any manner. Third, George had access to counsel prior to the grand jury proceeding. Fourth, the fact that George was compelled, pursuant to a subpoena, to testify at the grand jury proceeding does not remove her ability to invoke her рrivilege against self-incrimination. Finally, as discussed above, there was no constitutional requirement that the prosecutor advise George of her status as a “target” or her privilege against self-incrimination at the July 2008 grand jury proceeding.
[¶ 24] Accordingly, the court did not err in denying George’s motion to suppress her grand jury testimony.
B. Denial of Motion to Sever
[¶ 25] George argues that her trial should have been severed from
[¶ 26] We are not persuaded by George’s assertion that Williams’s and George’s antagonistic defenses were prejudicial and, thus, warranted severance of the joint trial. Williams testified that he was in a motel all night without any knowledge of the planned home invasion or murder. In turn, George, who did not testify, put the State to its proof. Thе court did not err in joining the trials of George and Williams.
C.Sufficiency of the Indictment
[¶ 27] George contends that the indictment is insufficient because she was charged with murder, as a principal actor, when the evidence at trial failed to prove every element of murder as a principal actor. George further contends that the indictment is insufficient bеcause it did not state the elements of accomplice liability for murder.
[¶ 28] An indictment must state all “the essential facts constituting the crime charged.” M.R.Crim. P. 7(c); see State v. Gauthier,
[¶ 29] Contrary to George’s contention, “[a] person may be guilty of a crime if [s]he personally does the acts that constitute the crimе or if [s]he is an accomplice of another person who actually commits the crime.” State v. Hurd,
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶ 30] George contends that Cassimy’s testimony was so self-contradictory and improbable that no rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she committed murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
[¶ 31] Contrary to George’s contention, viewing the facts and inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the State, see State v. Severy,
E. Fundamental Fairness of the Conviction
[¶ 32] George argues that Cassimy’s testimony, the product of a plea agreement, renders her conviction funda
[¶ 33] “The Due Process Clause of the Constitution prohibits deprivatiоns of life, liberty, or property without fundamental fairness through governmental conduct that offends the community’s sense of justice, decency and fair play.” State v. Stade,
[¶ 34] The testimony of a cooperating witness who “may have had motives to lie” is not “constitutionally inadmissible.” Hoffa v. United States,
[¶ 35] The record in this case shows that these safeguards were in place. We find no error.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Title 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2011) provides:
1. A person is guilty of murder if the person:
A. Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being.
. Title 17-A M.R.S. § 151(1)(A) (2011) provides:
1. A person is guilty of criminal conspiracy if, with the intent that conduct be performed that in fact would constitute a crime or crimes, the actor agrees with one or more others to engage in or cause the performance of the conduct and the most serious crime that is the object of the conspiracy is:
A. Murder. Violation of this paragraph is a Class A crime.
.George was tried jointly with her brother, Jeffrey L. Williams, who also was convicted of intentional or knowing murder and conspiracy to commit murder. See State v. Williams,
. Title 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3) (2011) provides:
A persоn is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if [w]ith the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime, the person solicits such other person to commit the crime, or aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the crime. A рerson is an accomplice under this subsection to any crime the commission of which was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the person's conduct.
. "[T]he States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake.” Lego v. Twomey,