State v. GaskinsState v. Gaskins
OPINION
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Keith A. Gaskins, appeals a judgment of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of escape and sentencing him to one year of incarceration. Gaskins maintains that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for acquittal made pursuant to
{¶ 2} After reviewing the entire record before us, we find that the State had presented sufficient evidence during its case-in-chief to overcome Gaskins’ initial
{¶ 3} On August 12, 2002, Gaskins was sentenced to eleven months of incarceration after pleading guilty to theft in violation of
{¶ 4} On February 22, 2003, Gaskins signed out of CROSSWAEH to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting at the First Lutheran Church in Tiffin, Ohio. Around 8:30 p.m. Gaskins’ supervisor went to pick him up from the meeting and discovered that Gaskins had left the meeting without permission and had taken a cab to his girlfriend‘s house.
{¶ 5} Subsequently, Gaskins was re-apprehended and charged with escape in violation of
{¶ 6} After the presentation of all of the evidence, Gaskins again moved for an acquittal pursuant to
{¶ 7} After the State had presented additional evidence, Gaskins renewed his motion for acquittal under
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in overruling Appellant Keith Gaskins’ motion for acquittal pursuant to Criminal Rule 29 at the close of the State of Ohio‘s case in chief.
{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, Gaskins contends that the trial court erred in overruling his initial motion for acquittal. He claims that the evidence the State had presented in its case-in-chief prior to his first motion for acquittal was insufficient to prove all of the necessary elements of escape under
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{¶ 10} A trial court‘s decision to deny a motion of acquittal made pursuant to
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(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of escape. (1) If the offender, at the time of the commission of the offense, was under detention as an alleged or adjudicated delinquent child or unruly child and if the act for which the offender was under detention would not be a felony if committed by an adult, escape is a misdemeanor of the first degree. (2) If the offender, at the time of the commission of the offense, was under detention in any other manner or was a sexually violent predator for whom the requirement that the entire prison term imposed pursuant to division (A)(3) of section
2971.03 of the Revised Code be served in a state correctional institution has been modified pursuant to section2971.05 of the Revised Code, escape is one of the following: (a) A felony of the second degree, when the most serious offense for which the person was under detention or adjudicated a sexually violent predator is aggravated murder, murder, or a felony of the first or second degree or, if the person was under detention as an alleged or adjudicated delinquent child, when the most serious act for which the person was under detention would be aggravated murder, murder, or a felony of the first or second degree if committed by an adult; (b) A felony of the third degree, when the most serious offense for which the person was under detention or adjudicated a sexually violent predator is a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree or an unclassified felony or, if the person was under detention as an alleged or adjudicated delinquent child, when the most serious act for which the person was under detention would be a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree or an unclassified felony if committed by an adult; (c) A felony of the fifth degree, when any of the following applies: (i) The most serious offense for which the person was under detention is a misdemeanor. (ii) The person was found not guilty by reason of insanity, and the person‘s detention consisted of hospitalization, institutionalization, or confinement in a facility under an order made pursuant to or under authority of section2945.40 ,2945.401 [2945.40.1], or2945.402 [2945.40.2] of the Revised Code. (d) A misdemeanor of the first degree, when the most serious offense for which the person was under detention is a misdemeanor and when the person fails to return to detention at a specified time following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period or at the time required when serving a sentence in intermittent confinement.
{¶ 13} While
{¶ 14} Gaskins asserts that the State failed to provide evidence during its case-in-chief regarding the degree of the felony for which he was under detention at the time he escaped. Thus, he claims that there was insufficient evidence before the trial court at the time he made his first motion for acquittal to convince reasonable minds that he had committed a third degree felony under
{¶ 15} In fact, the State had presented evidence on each “element” of the offense. Unfortunately, the State had failed to present specific evidence on an additional finding, to wit, the nature of the detention, or degree of offense for which the defendant was under detention at the time of his escape. Had no evidence been presented as to the degree of the offense for which Gaskins was under the detention, he could have been sentenced only for a misdemeanor of the first degree pursuant to
{¶ 16} However, during the State‘s case-in-chief, testimony was presented that CROSSWAEH was a divisionary program for convicted felons. There was also evidence that Gaskins had been under confinement in CROSSWAEH at the time of his escape. While this testimony did not specify the degree of felony for which he was under confinement, it was sufficient to defeat Gaskins’ motion for acquittal and would have been sufficient to permit the trial court to sentence the defendant for a violation of a felony of the third degree pursuant to
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{¶ 18} Additionally, “the question of opening up a case for the presentation of further testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court‘s action in that regard will not be disturbed on appeal unless under the circumstances it amounted to an abuse of discretion.” Columbus v. Grant (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 96, syllabus; see, also, State v. Walker (March 8, 2001), 3rd Dist. No. 13-2000-26, 2001-Ohio-2119; State v. Cutlip (June 28, 1993), 3rd Dist. No. 13-93-1. An abuse of discretion will only be found where the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219.
{¶ 19} In the case sub judice, the trial court allowed the prosecution to reopen its case and recall an earlier witness in order to establish the fact that the felony Gaskins was incarcerated for at the time of his escape was a felony of the fifth degree. There is no claim of surprise or prejudice on the part of Gaskins due to nature or content of this additional testimony. Moreover, Gaskins did not specifically address this issue until he made his second motion for acquittal. He chose not to support his initial motion for acquittal with an oral argument. Nothing in the record before us suggests that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in reaching its decision to allow the State to reopen its case. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to reopen its case and present additional evidence.
{¶ 20} Because the State was properly allowed to reopen its case, the trial court eventually had before it evidence that Gaskins was under confinement for a fifth degree felony at the time of his escape. Thus, even if the trial court had erred in denying Gaskins’ initial motion for acquittal, the trial court eventually had before it all of the required evidence. Therefore, the alleged insufficiency in the State‘s evidence was remedied, and any error on the part of the trial court for failing to grant Gaskins’
{¶ 21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed. Shaw, P.J., and Cupp,