THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. FISK, APPELLEE.
No. 2021-1047
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
December 13, 2022
2022-Ohio-4435
O‘CONNOR, C.J.
Submitted July 12, 2022
[Until this оpinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Fisk, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4435.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohiо 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4435
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. FISK, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Fisk, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4435.]
Criminal law—Marsy‘s Law,
(Nо. 2021-1047—Submitted July 12, 2022—Decided December 13, 2022.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 28798, 2021-Ohio-1973.
O‘CONNOR, C.J.
{¶ 1} Appellee, Zacary L. Fisk, was sentenced to an indefinite prison term of two to three years for the felonious assault of Steven Patton. At sentencing, the trial court denied Patton‘s request for
Background
{¶ 2} A jury found Fisk guilty of one count of felonious assault in violation of
{¶ 3} The trial court merged the felonious-assault counts for sentencing and sentenced Fisk to an indefinite prison term of two to three years. The trial court denied Patton‘s restitution request, however, stating that the court needed documentation from the Department of Veterans Affairs regarding the “noncoverage, [and] the reason that coverage of any kind was declined.” The state objected, arguing that Patton had provided medical bills that reflected the cost of his medical treatment and that it was unnecessary for Patton “to have to provide to the Court a reason why [the Department of Veterans Affairs was] declining сoverage.”
{¶ 4} Fisk appealed his conviction and the state cross-appealed, challenging the trial court‘s decision to deny restitution. The state argued that the trial court should have ordered restitution to cover Patton‘s medical bills that the Department of Veterans Affairs declined to cover, or at least, should have granted Patton the opportunity to acquire additional documentation regarding the declined coverage. The state asserted that the trial court‘s denial of restitution to Patton clearly violated his constitutional right under Marsy‘s Law to “full and timely restitution from the person who committed the criminal offense,” see
{¶ 5} We accepted the state‘s discretionary appeal. See 165 Ohio St.3d 1490, 2021-Ohio-4409, 178 N.E.3d 513. In its sole proposition of law, the state argues that Marsy‘s Law “gives standing to the State
Analysis
{¶ 6} When interpreting the language of a constitutional provision ratified by direct vote, like Marsy‘s Law, we consider how the language would have been understood by the voters who adopted the amendment. Centerville v. Knab, 162 Ohio St.3d 623, 2020-Ohio-5219, 166 N.E.3d 1167, ¶ 22, citing Castleberry v. Evatt, 147 Ohio St. 30, 33, 67 N.E.2d 861 (1946). We generally apply the same rules of construction that govern the interpretation of statutes, starting with the plain language of the provision, State v. Jackson, 102 Ohio St.3d 380, 2004-Ohio-3206, 811 N.E.2d 68, ¶ 14, and “considering how the words and phrases would be understood by the voters in their normal and ordinary usage,” Knab at ¶ 22, citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-577, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008).
Marsy‘s Law
{¶ 7} In 2017, Ohio voters adopted an initiative known as Marsy‘s Law, which amended
{¶ 8} As adopted, Marsy‘s Law expressly notes that its purpose is “[t]o secure for victims justice and due process throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems.”
Marsy‘s Law also provides victims with the ability to vindicate their enumerated rights or any other right afforded to them by law in the courts:
The victim, the attorney for the government upon request of the victim, or the victim‘s other lawful representative, in any proceeding involving the criminal offense * * * or in which the victim‘s rights are implicated, may assert the rights enumerated in this section and any other right afforded to the victim by law. If the relief sought is denied, the victim or the victim‘s lawful representative may petition the court of appeals for the applicable district, which shall promptly consider and decide the petition.
The court of appeals misinterpreted Marsy‘s Law
{¶ 9} The court of appeals construed Marsy‘s Law to “leave[] the State without standing to appeal” on behalf of the victim a trial court‘s decision to deny restitution. 2021-Ohio-1973 at ¶ 44. In doing so, it examined the two sentences that make up
the government language” in the second sentence, but “[t]hey specifically did not, instead only mentioning the victim or the victim‘s lawful representative.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 43. The court of appeals concluded that this omission left the state without standing to appeal the restitution issue because it “suffered no injury“; Patton, not the state, was the aggrieved party, id. at ¶ 44-45. The Second District accordingly declined to reach thе merits of the state‘s challenge to the trial court‘s decision to deny restitution to Patton. Id. at ¶ 46.
{¶ 10} We first address the problem that arises from the way the parties and the court of appeals have framed the issue. The question was framed as whether the language in Marsy‘s Law provides standing for the state to petition the court of appeals regarding a trial court‘s decision to deny restitution. “Standing” is defined at its most basic as “[a] party‘s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” (Brackets sic.) Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 1442 (8th Ed.2004). “The issue of standing determines ‘whether a litigant is entitled to have a court determine the merits of the issues presented.’ ” State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 132 Ohio St.3d 47, 2012-Ohio-1861, 969 N.E.2d 224, ¶ 10, quoting Ohio Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994).
{¶ 11} Marsy‘s Law is concerned with providing victims with enumerated rights; it is not concerned with providing the state with any legal rights or claims. Indeed, the purpose of Marsy‘s Law was to “expand the rights of victims” (emphasis addеd), Knab, 162 Ohio St.3d 623, 2020-Ohio-5219, 166 N.E.3d 1167, at ¶ 15, and to ensure that victims receive ” ‘due process, respect, fairness, and justice,’ ” id., quoting Marsy‘s Law ballot language.
ability to petition the court of appeals, either on their own or through their “lawful representative” if the relief sought is denied.
{¶ 12} Thus,
{¶ 14} The statе argues that we should read Marsy‘s Law, specifically the second sentence of
{¶ 15} In light of the above considerations, the scope of Marsy‘s Law is inadequate to answer whether the рrosecuting attorney, on behalf of the state of Ohio, is entitled to appeal the denial of restitution to the victim. Marsy‘s Law gives victims the ability to assert their rights on their own or through “the attorney for the government upon request of the victim” or “the victim‘s other lawful representative,” and to “petition the court of appeals,” еither on their own or through their “lawful representative” if the requested relief is denied.
{¶ 16} Marsy‘s Law does not describe, and, to date, the General Assembly has not yet provided by statute “how such a petition might entitle a victim to relief.” Suwalski, 167 Ohio St.3d 38, 2021-Ohio-4061, 188 N.E.3d 1048, at ¶ 38. Yet, other statutes do address the state‘s authority to appeal and the issue of restitution, and it is presumed that the drafters of Marsy‘s Law and the voters who approved it knew of these statutes, see State v. Carswell, 114 Ohio St.3d 210, 2007-Ohio-3723, 871 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 6; State ex rel. Engle v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St. 425, 432,
52 N.E.2d 743 (1944) (explaining that the “general rule as to the interpretation of constitutional amendments” is that “[t]he body enacting the amendment will be presumed to have had in mind existing constitutional or statutory provisions and their judicial construction, touching the subject dealt with“). The parties debate the application of additional
{¶ 17} Whether the state is indeеd entitled to relief under applicable state law is more appropriately considered on remand. At that time, the court of appeals may analyze the merits of the state‘s cross-appeal under applicable statutes regarding the state‘s authority to appeal the issue of restitution. Likewise, the сourt of appeals may consider any alleged forfeiture issues at that time.
Conclusion
{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court to address the merits of the state‘s cross-appeal.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only.
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 19} I concur in the judgment of the majority reversing the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. The prosecuting attorney filed an appeal on behalf of the state challenging the trial court‘s denial of restitution. It is well within the state‘s authority to appeal a decision regarding restitution. See
{¶ 20} The prosecutor‘s arguments on appeal might have been more complete. He discussed the victim‘s сonstitutional rights but did not mention the interests of the state in enforcing the criminal law. It is certainly not unusual, though, for prosecutors to advocate in court for the interests of crime victims.
{¶ 21} Regardless, these issues do not create a standing problem. The state has suffered an injury that is remediable through an appeal. I therefore agrеe with the majority that the court of appeals erred by dismissing the state‘s appeal, and I join in the court‘s judgment remanding the case to that court for it to consider the merits of the state‘s claims.
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
Elizabeth A. Well, urging reversal for amici curiae, National Crime Victim Law Institute and Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center.