State v. FisherState v. Fisher
Michael J. Short for Appellant.
Destiny R. Hudson for Appellee.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Daniel Lewis Fisher, appeals the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas’ judgment entry of conviction. We affirm.
{¶2} On March 1, 2012, the Hardin County Grand Jury indicted Fisher on Count One of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of
{¶3} On May 21, 2012, Fisher was arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty to all counts in the indictment. (Doc. No. 5).
{¶4} On June 4, 2013, the matter proceeded to а jury trial, and the jury found Fisher guilty on all counts. (Doc. Nos. 37-41).
{¶5} On July 29, 2013, the trial court held a sentencing hearing wherein it found that Count Two was an allied offense to Count One. (JE, Doc. No. 50); (July 29, 2013 Tr. at 16). The State elected to sentence on Count One. (Id.); (Id.). The trial court sentenced Fisher to two years community control on eaсh of Counts One, Three, and Four and further ordered Fisher serve his community control concurrently. (Id.); (Id. at 16-23). The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on August 1, 2013. (Doc. No. 50).
Assignment of Error
The conviction was against the manifest weight оf the evidence.
{¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Fisher argues that his aggravated trafficking and aggravated possession convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. With respect to the aggravated trafficking conviction, Fisher argues that the State‘s sole witness, a confidentiаl informant (“CI“), was not a credible witness because of his admitted lack of memory concerning the details of the transaction. With respect to the aggravated possession charge, Fisher argues that he did not knowingly possess a controlled substance, because he believed the substance was jewelry cleaner.1
{¶8} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘[weigh] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, [consider] the credibility of witnesses and [determine] whether in resolving confliсts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.‘” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the wеight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967).
{¶10} Fisher argues that the CI‘s testimony wаs not credible because the CI could not remember certain details concerning the drug transaction, and, at trial, the CI could not remember Fishеr‘s name. While the CI did testify that he did not know the defendant‘s name—or at least the defendant‘s last name—at the time he entered the store, he identified the drug dealer as “Danny Fisher” in a statement he made a few minutes after the controlled buy. (Tr. at 131, 135-136, 145). At trial, the CI identified Fisher as the person that sold him the bath salts оn December 1,
{¶11} Next, Fisher argues that his trafficking conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidencе because the only evidence demonstrating he sold the bath salts was the CI‘s less-than-credible testimony. In particular, Fisher argues that the audio recording from the CI‘s concealed wire was of very poor quality and not played for the jury. (See id. at 153-155). While it is true that the audio recording was of very poor quality, there was circumstantial evidence of the drug transaction offered through the testimony of Detective Beach, who conductеd the controlled buy. Prior to conducting the controlled buy, Detective Beach searched the CI for money and contraband and found none; thereafter, Detective Beach gave the CI $100 to make the controlled purchase, and he watched the CI
{¶12} Finally, in a singular sentence in his brief, Fisher argues that his aggravated possession conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence bеcause he thought the substance was jewelry cleaner, and therefore, he did not knowingly possess the illegal bath salts. We disagree.
{¶13} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certаin nature.”
{¶14} Fisher‘s assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶15} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herеin in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS, and SHAW, J.J., concur.
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