State v. Findley, 07 Ma 53 (3-11-2008)State v. Findley, 07 Ma 53 (3-11-2008)
{¶ 1} This timely appeal comes for consideration upon the record in the trial court, the parties’ briefs, and their oral argument to this Court. Appellant, Ricky Bryant, appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas overruling his motion to dismiss based upon an alleged speedy trial violation. As we conclude that Bryant was brought to trial within the statutory time limit, we affirm the decision of the trial court and uphold Bryant‘s conviction.
{¶ 2} On June 1, 2006, Bryant was indicted for one count of aggravated robbery in violation of
{¶ 3} As his sole assignment of error, Bryant claims: “The trial court erred in overruling Appellant Bryant‘s motion to dismiss as his trial date was set after his statutory speedy trial time had elapsed thus violating Appellant Bryant‘s statutory rights per
{¶ 4} Our review of a trial court‘s decision regarding a motion to dismiss based upon a violation of the speedy trial provisions involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Brown (1998), 131 Ohio App.3d 387, 391, 722 N.E.2d 594. We accord due deference to the trial court‘s findings of fact if supported by competent, credible evidence. However, we independently determine whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts of the case. Id. Furthermore, when reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state. Brecksville v. Cook (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57, 661 N.E.2d 706.
{¶ 5}
{¶ 6} Because he was incarcerated from the date of his arrest, the State was required to bring him to trial within 90 days pursuant to the triple count provision of
{¶ 7} In this case, it appears that the trial court was diligent in providing counsel to Bryant. Nevertheless, it does not appear that any time is tolled since there was no actual delay necessitated by Bryant‘s lack of counsel. The State took several meaningful steps in Bryant‘s prosecution before counsel was appointed. For example, he was arraigned and both a pre-trial hearing and trial were scheduled. Thus, Bryant‘s speedy trial time should not be extended during the period of time preceding the initial appointment of counsel. See State v. Henry (Aug. 10, 1994), 7th Dist. No. 93-C-26.
{¶ 8} The clock ran until Bryant filed a motion for discovery on June 16, 2006. In State v. Brown, 98 Ohio St.3d 121, 781 N.E.2d 159, 2002-Ohio-7040, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a defendant‘s demand for discovery or a bill of particulars is a tolling event per
{¶ 9} The clock ran again for 24 days (35 days total) before Bryant filed a motion for reduction of bond on July 14, 2006. The clock was tolled by the filing of this motion and ordinarily the time would have remained tolled until the trial court addressed the motion. State v. Brown (June 10, 2005), 11th Dist. No. 2003-A-0092; State v. Caudill (Dec. 2, 1998), 3d Dist. No. 5-97-35, at *8, citing State v. Walters (Jan. 18, 1996), 8th Dist. No. 68279. However, in its January 10, 2007 journal entry, the trial court stated that, because on July 18, 2006 Bryant‘s counsel moved to withdraw, “the matter of a bond reduction was not entertained by the Court. Rather, a hearing was scheduled on Attorney Yavorcik‘s Motion to Withdraw.” In State v. Santini, (2001) 144 Ohio App.3d 396, 760 N.E.2d 442, this court opined:
{¶ 10} “Looking first to the language of the statute itself, we note that it does not state merely that all motions filed by the accused extend the try-by date for the accused. Rather,
{¶ 11} Here, the trial court stated on the record that it did not rule upon the motion
{¶ 12} However, the withdrawal of Bryant‘s counsel on that same day constituted another tolling event. State v. Kemper (Nov. 12, 2004), 2d Dist No. 2002-CA-101.
{¶ 13} The clock began to run again on September 7, 2006 as there were no motions or continuances noted on the docket which would toll the running of the speedy trial clock. See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 441 N.E.2d 571. The clock continued to run for 18 days until Bryant made a second discovery request on September 25, 2006. (66 days total) Although the document is time stamped on September 27, 2006, this request was complied with by the State on September 25, 2006 as noted in the document. Notably, this document also contains a reciprocal request for discovery from the State similar to the one filed on June 29, 2006.
{¶ 14} The clock ran from September 25, 2006 until the next tolling event which occurred on October 16, 2006, when Bryant filed a second motion for bail modification. (87 days) Bryant then moved to dismiss his case based on an alleged speedy trial violation on October 25, 2006. The trial court, however, did not rule upon Bryant‘s motion for bail modification until after Bryant filed his motion to dismiss. Thus, the clock did not
{¶ 15} Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vukovich, J., concurs.
Waite, J., concurs.