State v. FickertState v. Fickert
Rendered on the 26th day of October, 2018.
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MARC T. ROSS, Atty. Reg. No. 0070446, City of Springfield Prosecutor‘s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Fourth Floor, Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
PATRICK J. CONBOY, Atty. Reg. No. 0070073, 5613 Brandt Pike, Huber Heights, Ohio 45424
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
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WELBAUM, P.J.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} At approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 1, 2017, Sergeant Jason Cadle of the Ohio State Highway Patrol initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Fickert after Fickert flashed her “brights” at him shortly before passing him in the opposite direction. During the stop, Cadle conducted field sobriety tests, which led to a charge of operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol (“OVI“) in violation of
{¶ 3} On November 2, 2017, Fickert filed a motion to suppress. In the motion, Fickert argued that the stop of her vehicle was unlawful, that Sergeant Cadle failed to conduct field sobriety tests in substantial compliance with the proper procedures, that her arrest for OVI was unlawful, and that her statements to Cadle were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. On December 8, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Fickert‘s motion to suppress that was limited to Sergeant Cadle‘s justification for the traffic stop of Fickert‘s vehicle.
{¶ 4} Sergeant Cadle and Fickert both testified at the suppression hearing. Cadle testified that shortly after 1:00 a.m. on July 1, 2017, he was driving eastbound in a marked cruiser on Lower Valley Pike when he observed a pick-up truck traveling westbound toward him on the same road. Cadle described Lower Valley Pike as a dark county road with no street lights. Cadle testified that the road conditions required the use of headlights, but that he was not using his high beams at the time he observed the pick-up truck. He testified that, as the pick-up truck approached, the driver (later identified as Fickert) flashed “a large LED light bar that was mounted on top of [her] truck” as she passed him on the roadway. Trans. (Dec. 8, 2017) p. 6. According to Cadle, the LED light remained on for “just a few seconds tops.” Id. at 10.
{¶ 5} Continuing, Sergeant Cadle testified that because it was an LED light, the light Fickert flashed was different and brighter than when he normally gets “brighted.” Id. at 9. Cadle testified that the LED light projected into his eyes and blinded him. Specifically, Cadle testified that “the light was so blinding * * * I had to go look off to the right a little bit and focus on the edge line to maintain the roadway.” Id. at 6. According to Cadle, he “still had the white spots in [his] eyes” after Fickert flashed the light. Id. at 7. Cadle further testified that he pulled Fickert over due to her blinding him with the LED light. Id.
{¶ 6} In response, Fickert testified that the night in question was very dark and that the pavement was wet from rain earlier in the day. Fickert stated that as she drove her pick-up truck westbound on Lower Valley Pike, a road without streetlights, she saw an oncoming vehicle with its high beams activated. Fickert testified that the oncoming vehicle‘s high beams “blinded [her], so [she] had to watch the lines.” Id. at 14. Upon
{¶ 7} In addition to this testimony, the parties jointly offered Sergeant Cadle‘s cruiser camera video of the traffic stop into evidence. See Joint Exhibit No. 1. The video corroborated both Fickert‘s and Cadle‘s description of the roadway. The video also reflected that Fickert flashed her LED light once and then returned to driving without the LED light illuminated.
{¶ 8} Following the suppression hearing, the parties submitted post-hearing memoranda, both of which discussed the Fourth District Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Woods, 86 Ohio App.3d 423, 621 N.E.2d 523 (4th Dist.1993) and the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ decision in Westlake v. Kaplysh, 118 Ohio App.3d 18, 691 N.E.2d 1074 (8th Dist.1997). After taking the matter under advisement, on January 22, 2018, the trial court granted Fickert‘s motion to suppress. The trial court‘s decision granting the motion stated the following in its entirety:
This matter is before the Court on Defendant‘s motion to suppress.
The issue is narrowed to whether or not the trooper had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a traffic offense, in this case, Failure to Dim Headlights, O.R.C. 4513.15(A)(1).
Both sides presented compelling arguments interpreting current case law State versus Woods and City of Westlake versus Kaplysh. As is often the case, this matter hinges on the facts of that particular evening.
The Court, having heard the testimony of both drivers and viewed the disc submitted showing the dash-cam of the cruiser, has come to a clear conclusion. The flick of the headlights by Defendant lasted perhaps a second and as such did not appear to create the type of visual impairment that is the concern of O.R.C. 4513.15. Therefore, the trooper was without sufficient grounds in this case to make a stop based solely on the violation of Failure to Dim Lights. Defendant‘s motion to suppress is granted.
(Emphasis sic.) Decision and Entry (Jan. 22, 2018), Clark County Municipal Court Case No. 2017-TRC-8720, Docket No. 33, p. 1.
{¶ 9} The State now appeals from the trial court‘s decision granting Fickert‘s motion to suppress, raising a single assignment of error for review.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 10} The State‘s assignment of error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS FINDING THAT THERE WAS NOT A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF R.C. 4513.15.
{¶ 11} Under its sole assignment of error, the State contends the trial court erred in finding that Sergeant Cadle lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop based on a violation of
Standard of Review
{¶ 12} In deciding a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Pence, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013 CA 109, 2014-Ohio-5072, ¶ 7, citing State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548, 679 N.E.2d 321 (2d Dist.1996). “The court of appeals must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence in the record.” State v. Isaac, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20662, 2005-Ohio-3733, ¶ 8, citing State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994). “Accepting those facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, as a matter of law and without deference to the trial court‘s legal conclusion, whether the applicable legal standard is satisfied.” Id.
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion
{¶ 13} The
{¶ 14} In determining whether there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and detain a motorist, the court must evaluate the “totality of the circumstances.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Heard, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19323, 2003-Ohio-1047, ¶ 14. “These circumstances must be considered ‘through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’ ” State v. White, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18731, 2002 WL 63294, *2 (Jan. 18, 2002), quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991).
{¶ 15} In this case, Sergeant Cadle testified that he conducted the traffic stop in question due to Fickert blinding him with the LED light mounted on top of her pick-up truck.
{¶ 16} The purpose of
{¶ 17} In State v. Hinton, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2833, 1992 WL 52764 (Mar. 16, 1992), this court addressed a situation similar to the case at bar. In Hinton, a state trooper initiated a traffic stop of the defendant‘s vehicle due to the defendant failing to dim his headlights as required by
{¶ 18} On appeal, we reversed the decision of the trial court on grounds that “the State had presented evidence, in the form of [the trooper‘s] testimony, that, if believed, would have established the existence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that [the defendant] was in violation of
{¶ 19} Like Hinton, in this case, there was nothing in the trial court‘s decision to suggest that the court disbelieved Sergeant Cadle‘s testimony. Instead, after watching the video evidence, the trial court found that “[t]he flick of the headlights by [Fickert] lasted perhaps a second and as such did not appear to create the type of visual impairment that is the concern of
{¶ 20} In order to have lawfully stopped Fickert, Sergeant Cadle was only required to have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Fickert‘s conduct amounted to a traffic violation, specifically a violation of
{¶ 21} For example, in Heien, the United States Supreme Court analyzed a case where a police officer stopped a vehicle because one of the vehicle‘s two brake lights was not working. The officer believed that the law in North Carolina required both brake lights to be operable. This belief turned out to be a mistake of law by the officer, as a single working brake light was all that the law required. After reviewing the language of the relevant statute, the United States Supreme Court determined that the officer‘s mistake about the brake-light law was objectively reasonable. Heien at 540. As a result, the court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. Id.
{¶ 22} Based on Heien, even if Fickert‘s conduct of momentarily flashing her LED light was not sufficient to constitute a violation of
{¶ 23} While there is case law holding that a “momentary flick onto high beam followed immediately by a return to low beam cannot be elevated into a violation of
{¶ 24} The State‘s assignment of error is sustained.
Conclusion
{¶ 25} Having sustained the State‘s sole assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether to credit Sergeant Cadle‘s testimony. In the event that the trial court decides to credit Cadle‘s testimony in full, Fickert‘s motion to suppress should be overruled.
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TUCKER, J., concurs.
FROELICH, J., dissenting:
{¶ 26} In contrast to most cases concerning
{¶ 27} I would find State v. Hinton, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2833, 1992 WL 52764 to be distinguishable. First, unlike in Hinton, the trial court had testimony from witnesses
{¶ 28} Finally, the crux of Hinton was that it appeared “that the trial court was under the erroneous impression that there was no evidence in the record from which it could find that the stop of Hinton was supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion.” Hinton at *1. We held that, in the absence of some indication that the court did not believe the trooper, the trial court‘s finding in Hinton that the State had failed to present evidence of a traffic violation was inconsistent with the undisputed evidence at the suppression hearing, which indicated that Hinton had failed to dim his headlights to an oncoming vehicle. In contrast, the trial court in this case indicated that it had considered the testimony of both witnesses and the cruiser video, found that “the flick of the headlights by Defendant lasted perhaps a second,” and that Fickert‘s actions “did not appear to create the type of visual impairment that is the concern of
{¶ 29} We have noted that “[f]lashing one‘s high beams is a common form of signal from one driver to another.” State v. Carlile, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17270, 1999 WL 301422, *4 (May 14, 1999). Fickert testified that she flashed her bright lights once for “just a second” because she believed Cadle‘s vehicle was traveling with its high beams illuminated. The trial court expressly found that Cadle activated her high beams for “perhaps a second” and that her actions did not cause the visual impairment to Sergeant
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Marc T. Ross
Patrick J. Conboy
Hon. Eugene S. Nevius