State v. FearsState v. Fears
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. ANTHONY FEARS DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-525172
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 3, 2011
Robert L. Tobik Cuyahoga County Public Defender
BY: Nathaniel McDonald Assistant Public Defender 310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200 Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Mollie Ann Murphy Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Anthony Fears, appeals from his conviction on counts of drug possession and possession of criminal tools, arguing that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of drugs seized during a traffic stop based on his failure to turn while his turn signal was activated. His primary argument is that the court erred by finding that the police could effectuate a traffic stop based only on a reasonable, articulable
{¶ 2} The facts are not disputed for purposes of appeal. Police officers on routine patrol saw a car driven by Fears make a left turn. After completing the turn, Fears activated his left turn signal. He drove through the next intersection with his turn signal activated, but did not turn. He then turned left at the second intersection he approached. The police stopped Fears because they believed that he had violated Cleveland Codified Ordinances 431.14 relating to signaling before changing course. Computer records indicated that Fears had a “possible” outstanding warrant, so the officers alerted him of this fact. They ordered him out of the car and conducted a pat-down search for their own safety. They found no weapons. Concerned that he might be concealing a weapon in his shoes, they asked Fears if he had anything in his shoes. Fears replied, “[i]f you want, go ahead and look.” The officers found a single rock of crack cocaine near Fears‘s left ankle.
{¶ 3} The court found that the officers had a reasonable belief that they had witnessed a traffic infraction, so they were justified in making the traffic stop. It also found that information showing that there was a “possible” outstanding warrant against Fears justified that pat-down search for officer safety. Finally, the court found that the officers were permitted to ask Fears
I
{¶ 4} Fears‘s first argument is that the court incorrectly applied the “reasonable, articulable suspicion” standard to justify the traffic stop. Acknowledging that Ohio courts are bound by Ohio Supreme Court precedent applying that same standard, Fears nonetheless argues that Ohio courts should apply the more stringent “probable cause” standard to determine whether a traffic stop is justified.
{¶ 5} “Reasonable, articulable suspicion” is a “less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow (2000), 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570. As Fears concedes, in State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “if an officer‘s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation, including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and articulable suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid.” Id. at ¶8. Mays is a decision by a superior court that we are bound to follow — we have no authority to deviate from it. It follows that the court did not err by applying the reasonable suspicion standard when reviewing the propriety of the traffic stop.
{¶ 7} Traffic stops are considered “seizures” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, and the “reasonable, articulable suspicion” standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, has for many years been accepted as the standard governing traffic stops. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (“officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.“); United States v. Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. In fact, the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard requires only a “minimal level of objective justification” to justify a Terry stop. United States v. Sokolow (1989), 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1.
{¶ 8} Fears argues that the United States Supreme Court changed the standard to “probable cause” in Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, when it stated: “As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
II
{¶ 9} The state concedes that Fears‘s conduct did not constitute a violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinances 431.14,1 but argues that the police
{¶ 10} In United States v. Miller (C.A.5, 1998), 146 F.3d 274, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered an identical fact pattern — Miller was erroneously stopped for having a turn signal on without changing lanes — and rejected the application of the good faith exception based on the arresting officer‘s good faith belief that Miller had violated the law. The court noted that regardless of what the arresting officer‘s subjective intent was in making the traffic stop, “legal justification [for the stop] must be objectively grounded.” Id. at 279. The court of appeals found no basis for concluding that Miller had violated the law. Thus, “no objective basis for probable cause justified the stop * * *.” Id.
{¶ 11} The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in a case where the police mistakenly stopped a driver for displaying a turn signal on a road with a 90-degree turn. Citing to Miller, the Seventh Circuit stated:
{¶ 13} The state concedes that the arresting officers made a mistake of law by concluding that Fears violated Cleveland Codified Ordinances 431.14. Whether they did so in good faith is immaterial. We therefore conclude that the officers’ mistake of law regarding Fears‘s use of a turn signal without turning meant that the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop. It follows that the court erred by denying Fears‘s motion to suppress evidence.
It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee his costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and LARRY A. JONES, J., CONCUR
Notes
“No person shall turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a highway unless and until such person has exercised due care to ascertain that the movement can be made with reasonable safety, nor without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.
“When required, a signal of intention to turn or move right or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.”
It is apparent that the ordinance only penalizes a driver who turns without giving an appropriate turn signal, not a driver who signals but does not make a turn.