STATE OF OHIO v. ANTONIO FARANDA
No. 96807
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
November 23, 2011
[Cite as State v. Faranda, 2011-Ohio-6083.]
BEFORE: Keough, J., Boyle, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 23, 2011
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No.
Robert L. Tobik
Chief Public Defender
BY: Cullen Sweeney
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 400
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Daniel T. Van
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Antonio Faranda (Faranda), appeals the trial court‘s decision denying his motion to withdraw his plea. For the reasons that follow, we reverse his conviction and sentence.
{¶ 2} In 2004, Faranda was found delinquent of gross sexual imposition in Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court. Based on the delinquency finding, Faranda was classified as a juvenile sexually oriented offender under Megan‘s Law. As a sexually oriented offender, he was required to verify his address annually for ten years, a requirement with which to date, he has complied.
{¶ 3} In July 2007, the Ohio General Assembly through S.B. 10 enacted a new sex offender law, Ohio‘s Adam Walsh Act (AWA). As a result of the AWA, Faranda was reclassified by the Ohio attorney general as a Tier II juvenile sex offender. This new classification required Faranda to verify his address every 180 days for 20 years.
{¶ 4} In 2009, Faranda was charged with violating a provision of the AWA, i.e., failure to verify his address pursuant to
{¶ 6} In June 2010, and two weeks after the Bodyke decision was rendered, Faranda filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, Faranda contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because his conviction is predicated on an unlawful reclassification and he is actually innocent of the charge.
{¶ 8} The State contends that Faranda is not eligible to benefit from the Bodyke remedy because the juvenile court retains jurisdiction and authority to classify a juvenile under the AWA, and thus, there is no separation-of-powers violation. We disagree.
{¶ 9} In State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the AWA as applied to any other sex offender who committed an offense prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, violates
{¶ 11} We find no distinction between adult and juvenile defendants with respect to the Ohio Supreme Court‘s holding in Williams. In In re Smith, Allen App. No. 1-07-58, 2008-Ohio-3234, the Third District held that the juvenile defendant‘s constitutional rights were not violated when it reclassified him under Ohio‘s AWA. However, the Ohio Supreme Court summarily reversed the Third District‘s decision under the authority and application of Williams. See In re D.J.S., 130 Ohio St.3d 257, 2011-Ohio-3374, 957 N.E.2d 291. This decision by the Ohio Supreme Court demonstrates that its holding in Williams is not limited to adult defendants.
{¶ 12} Accordingly, Faranda‘s assignment of error is sustained
Judgment reversed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR