State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard E. Enyart, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17AP-507 (C.P.C. No. 07CR-9135)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Rendered on March 23, 2018
[Cite as State v. Enyart, 2018-Ohio-1071.]
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
On brief: Law Office of Eric J. Allen, LTD, and Eric Allen, for appellant. Argued: Eric Allen.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
SADLER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Richard E. Enyart, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying appellant‘s motion to withdraw his no contest plea. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} This court set out the facts and procedural history underlying this appeal in State v. Enyart, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-184, 2010-Ohio-5623:
On August 24, 2007 the state indicted defendant on 13 counts of gross sexual imposition, six counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented material or performance, eight counts of pandering sexually orientated material involving a minor, ten counts of rape, one count of attempted rape, and one count of
tampering with evidence. The state subsequently indicted defendant on December 21, 2007 for 12 counts of gross sexual imposition, four counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity orientated material or performance, 12 counts of rape, and six counts of pandering sexually orientated material involving a minor. The victims of the offenses were girls between the ages of five and 12 years old. [O]n August 11, 2007 * * * four neighborhood sisters, ages seven to 13, went swimming at defendant‘s home. After swimming, the two older girls, ages ten and 13, went into defendant‘s bathroom to change out of their swim suits and back into their street clothes. * * *
After getting dressed, the oldest girl noticed a video camera, covered with towels, on the toilet seat. She knew the camera was operating because she could see herself move in the opened LED screen attached to the recorder, and she brought her younger sister in to see the camera. The [girls] immediately went home and advised their mother of what they saw in defendant‘s bathroom * * *.
* * * The girls’ mother called police and * * * awaited law enforcement‘s arrival [and] informed the arriving officers which house was defendant‘s residence and gave them defendant‘s address.
* * * Officers Edly and Waldenga * * * knocked loudly several times on front and side doors in an attempt to speak with defendant, announced they were Columbus police, but received no response. * * *
Detective David Phillips of the sexual assault squad * * * determined that it was critical that [h]e recover this camera before there was any opportunities to destroy[] the evidence. * * *
* * *
Officers entered the house through an unlocked side door; they were in the house three to five minutes and exited the house with only defendant. * * * Officers then took the defendant to police headquarters to interview him while other officers secured the scene until police obtained a search warrant.
* * * A Franklin County Municipal Court judge signed the warrant that authorized officers to search defendant‘s residence * * *. When the officers executed the search warrant that evening, they seized numerous digital video disks (“DVDs“) and VHS cassette tapes, DVD players, and a book about calculation of drug dosages. The videos revealed defendant “performing sexual acts on children who seemed to be not conscious.” * * * One of the first DVDs the officers watched depicted defendant engaging in sexual conduct with a five to six-year-old child. Based on the incriminating DVDs and tapes, police obtained another search warrant and re-arrested defendant.
Defendant filed three motions to suppress in the trial court. * * * The third motion sought to suppress the evidence taken from defendant‘s home; it alleged police had no probable cause to support the unconstitutionally overbroad search warrant. * * * The trial court denied all three motions.
{¶ 3} Following the trial court‘s ruling on his motions to suppress, appellant pleaded no contest to the charges in the indictment. The trial court found defendant guilty on all charges and imposed maximum, consecutive sentences. Appellant appealed to this court arguing that his plea was involuntary and that the trial court failed to comply with
{¶ 4} The record shows that appellant has also petitioned the trial court for post-conviction relief, but the trial court denied the petition. A federal district court
{¶ 5} On April 9, 2017, appellant filed his motion to withdraw his no contest plea pursuant to
{¶ 6} In opposition to the motion, the state argued res judicata barred appellant‘s claims, and, alternatively, appellant‘s self-serving affidavit was insufficient to justify relief from his plea. The trial court denied appellant‘s motion, without a hearing, on finding appellant “failed to meet his burden of demonstrating manifest injustice,” the motion was filed “over nine years after * * * his no contest plea,” and “the arguments contained in the State‘s Memorandum Contra [are] persuasive.” (June 19, 2017 Decision at 2.)
{¶ 7} Appellant timely appealed to this court from the trial court‘s judgment.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 8} Appellant sets forth a single assignment of error as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} A motion made, pursuant to
{¶ 11} This court, however, reviews questions of law under a de novo standard. Frye at ¶ 8. See also EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Jenkins, 164 Ohio App.3d 240, 2005-Ohio-5799, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.); Prairie Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Ross, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-509, 2004-Ohio-838, ¶ 12. For example, in determining a trial court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction, we employ a de novo standard of review as that determination is a question of law. State v. West, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-858, 2016-Ohio-7864. Furthermore, an appellate court may review, sua sponte, a trial court‘s jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a plea and that review is de novo. State v. Vild, 8th Dist. No. 87742, 2007-Ohio-987, ¶ 12.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶ 12} In appellant‘s assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his no contest plea. For the reasons that follow, however, we find the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain appellant‘s motion to withdraw his plea of no contest.
{¶ 13} In State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94 (1978), the trial court granted the defendant‘s motion to withdraw a guilty plea, pursuant to
[T]he trial court‘s granting of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and the order to proceed with a new trial were inconsistent with the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court‘s conviction premised upon the guilty plea. The judgment of the reviewing court is controlling upon the lower court as to all matters within the compass of the judgment. Accordingly, we find that the trial court lost its jurisdiction when the appeal was taken, and, absent a remand, it did not regain jurisdiction subsequent to the Court of Appeals’ decision.
* * * Crim.R.32.1 does not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to withdraw the guilty plea subsequent to an appeal and an affirmance by the appellate court. While Crim.R. 32.1 apparently enlarges the power of the trial court over its judgments without respect to the running of the court term, it does not confer upon the trial court the power to vacate a judgment which has been affirmed by the appellate court, for this action would affect the decision of the reviewing court, which is not within the power of the trial court to do. Thus, we find a total and complete want of jurisdiction by the trial court to grant the motion to withdraw appellee‘s plea of guilty and to proceed with a new trial.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 97-98. See also State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 61-62 (trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider motion to withdraw guilty plea where convictions were affirmed but the case remanded for limited purposes of resentencing on non-capital offenses); State v. Beal, 7th Dist. No. 11 BE 4, 2012-Ohio-1408, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Harack, 197 Ohio App.3d 157, 2011-Ohio-6021, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.) (” ‘Ohio case law is clear that a defendant cannot petition the trial court to withdraw his past plea on manifest injustice grounds when that defendant has appealed his conviction and such conviction has been affirmed by an appellate court.’ “); West at ¶ 27, quoting Special Prosecutors at 98 (
{¶ 14} In West, 2016-Ohio-7864, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery with a three-year firearm specification, and one count of rape. The trial court scheduled the sentencing hearing for May 25, 2011, but on May 20, 2011, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. On May 25, 2011, the trial court conducted an oral hearing to address the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced appellant to a prison term of 33 years. Appellant appealed to this court. This court affirmed appellant‘s conviction and sentence in State v. West, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-548, 2012-Ohio-2078.
{¶ 15} On April 1, 2015, appellant filed a second motion to withdraw his plea. The trial court determined it did not have jurisdiction to entertain appellant‘s motion because this court had previously affirmed appellant‘s conviction and sentence based on the plea. In his subsequent appeal to this court, appellant argued that Special Prosecutors does not bar motions to withdraw a guilty plea filed after the court of appeals has affirmed the conviction when the movant relies on newly discovered evidence. This court, in West, 2016-Ohio-7864, rejected appellant‘s argument and held, pursuant to Special Prosecutors, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant appellant‘s motion to withdraw his plea after this court affirmed the conviction. In so holding, we noted “[h]aving found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the arguments regarding res judicata and manifest injustice become effectively moot.” West, 2016-Ohio-7864, at ¶ 30.
{¶ 16} As noted above, this court affirmed appellant‘s conviction and sentence in his direct appeal. Enyart, 2008-Ohio-6418. Though this court subsequently granted appellant‘s motion to reopen his appeal, we overruled appellant‘s assigned errors and confirmed our prior judgment in Enyart, 2010-Ohio-5623. Thus, the trial court never regained jurisdiction of this matter following appellant‘s appeal from the trial court‘s
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we hold the trial court did not err when it denied appellant‘s motion to withdraw his plea, albeit for different reasons than those cited by the trial court.1 Appellant‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 18} Having overruled appellant‘s assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.