State v. EllisState v. Ellis
James P. Ellis, pro se.
O P I N I O N.
Per Curiam.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant James P. Ellis appeals the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court‘s judgment overruling his “Motion for: ‘Sentencing,’ (to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice)” and “Motion for: ‘Issuance of a Final Appealable Order.’ ” We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
{¶2} In 1995, Ellis was convicted of aggravated murder and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed prison terms of life for the aggravated murder and ten to 25 years, with ten years of actual incarceration, for the aggravated burglary and ordered that those tеrms be served consecutively. We affirmed those convictions in the direct appeal. See State v. Ellis, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-950307, 1996 WL 496930 (Sept. 4, 1996), appeal not allowed, 77 Ohio St.3d 1518, 674 N.E.2d 371 (1997).
{¶3} In 2016, Ellis filed with the common pleas court a single documеnt captioned “Motion for: ‘Sentencing,’ (to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice)” and “Motion for: ‘Issuance of a Final Appealable Order.’ ” In his combined motions, Ellis asserted that his consecutive sentences are void and thus unenforceable because he had been “ordered” to serve his ten-to-25-year prison term аfter completing his life term, and that, in the absence of a lawful sentence, the judgment of conviction did not comply with
{¶4} In this appeal, Ellis presents a single assignment of error challenging the overruling of his motions. We do not reach the merits of the assignment of error, because we have no jurisdiction to review the judgment overruling the motions.
No Common Pleas Court Jurisdiction
{¶5} Ellis did not specify in either his “Motion for: ‘Sentencing’ ” or his “Motion for: ‘Issuance of a Final Appealable Order’ ” a statute or rule under which the relief sought might have been afforded. The common pleas court was thus left to “recast” the motions “into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion[s] should be judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12 and syllabus. Accord State v. Diol, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180249, 2019-Ohio-2170, ¶ 17; State v. Black, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070546, 2008-Ohio-3790, ¶ 4.
{¶6} But the motions did nоt allege a constitutional violation and thus were not reviewable by the common pleas court under the standards provided by
No Court of Appeals Jurisdiction
{¶7} Morеover, this court has no jurisdiction to review the entry overruling Ellis‘s postconviction motions for “Sentencing” and “Issuance of a Final Appealable Order.” Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), Ohiо Constitution, confers upon an intermediate appellate court only “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders оf the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district.”
{¶8} The common pleas court‘s entry overruling Ellis‘s postconviction motions is not a judgment of conviction. Therefore, the entry is plainly not reviewable under our jurisdiction under
{¶9} An appeals court has jurisdiction under
{¶10} An appeals court also has jurisdiction under
{¶11} The entry overruling Ellis‘s motions did not, for purposes of the grant of jurisdiction under
{¶12} Finally, a court always has jurisdiction to correct a void judgment. State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 18-19. And a judgment of conviction is void to the extent that a sentence is unauthorized by statute or does not include a statutorily mandated term or if the trial
{¶13} Ellis‘s sentences fully conformed with the 1995 versions of
{¶14} In his motions, Ellis sought relief on the ground that his sentences are void because of the sequence in which his consecutive prison terms had been “ordered” tо be served. His sentences, he asserted, were contrary to law, because he was “first ordered to serve a ‘non-specified’ life sentence * * * [and] to thereafter serve a ‘consecutive’ prison term of [ten to 25 years, ten] years of which must be served as ‘actual incarceration.’ ”
{¶15} The 1995 version of
three void sentencing errors—failing to impose a statutorily mandated term of
Appeal Dismissed
{¶16} We have no jurisdiction to review the common pleas court‘s judgment overruling Ellis‘s “Motion for: ‘Sentencing,’ ” and “Motion for: ‘Issuance of a Final Appealable Order.’ ” Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
MYERS, P.J., CROUSE and WINKLER, JJ.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own еntry on the date of the release of this opinion.