State v. EcholsState v. Echols
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 30, 2023
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
The Law Office of John D. Hill and John D. Hill, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶1} James Echols appeals his convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated murder, three counts of murder, eight counts of attempted murder, and eight counts of felonious assault, all with gun specifications. In five assignments of error, Echol argues that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court erred by allowing evidence of witness intimidation, the prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly attempting to portray Echols as a gang member, and the cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Factual Background
{¶2} On July 8, 2017, Cheyanne Willis was hosting a gender-reveal party in her home.1 Toward the end of the night, the remaining guests were in the living room watching movies when two men burst into the home and started shooting. One person was killed, and eight were wounded.
{¶3} Roshawn Bishop eventually admitted that he had hired James Echols, Vandell Slade, and Michael Sanon to kill Willis. Roshawn, who believed he was the father of Willis’s unborn child, owed her $10,000. Growing tired of her demands for repayment, Roshawn planned to murder her. Roshawn, Echols, and a third co-defendant Sanon2 were charged with the shootings.
{¶4} At the trial, the victims gave various, limited descriptions of the shooters. Bryan Garrett, whose wife was killed, testified that one shooter was wearing a gray hoody, and one was wearing a red hoody. Willis testified that both wore dark hoodies, green or blue. Some witnesses said that the hoods were up. Other witnesses
{¶5} Deborah Bishop, the wife of Roshawn, testified that she met Echols on July 7, the day before the murders. Echols was on the front porch of her home speaking with Roshawn. The following night, Deborah was at home with her husband, children, sister-in-law, Robert Howard (“Geezy”), and Kevin Barton. They had eaten dinner outside that evening, and the men were outside drinking, including Slade and Echols. Deborah testified that Echols put his clothes on the grill and burned them.
{¶6} Kevin Barton testified that he sold methamphetamine for Roshawn and Geezy in 2017. Barton grew up with Geezy, and he met Roshawn when both of them were in prison. Barton met Echols on July 7 at Roshawn’s home earlier that day. That evening, Barton went to Echol’s hotel on Central Parkway to drink and smoke marijuana. The next day, Barton went to Roshawn’s house for dinner. When he arrived, Echols was there. Everyone was standing outside and talking. A grill was burning. Slade was joking that someone wanted to burn his clothes, but Barton did not see anyone place the clothing on the grill or smell burning clothes. He did not know whose clothes were burned.
{¶7} Several days later, Barton learned about the shooting when Willis called Roshawn. Barton was with Roshawn when Roshawn met with Willis in a park in Price Hill. Barton could not hear their conversation, but observed Roshawn “going crazy.” Roshawn was concerned and crying about Willis and the baby.
{¶8} A week or two after the shooting, Barton was riding around with Roshawn and Geezy when Deborah called and told Roshawn that Echols and Sanon were driving to Roshawn’s home. When Roshawn knew they were coming, he
{¶9} Roshawn testified that he met Willis about a year before the shooting at a Boost Mobile store where she worked. The two became friends, and Roshawn had intimate relations with her on two occasions. Roshawn, who sold drugs with Geezy, had lost $10,000 in a drug transaction. In June 2017, Willis loaned Roshawn $10,000 so he and Geezy could restart their business. Initially, he was supposed to repay Willis in 30 days. When Roshawn did not return the money, Willis began calling him and Geezy demanding the money. Instead of repaying Willis, Geezy and Roshawn hatched a plan to kill her.
{¶10} Roshawn called his cousin Slade, who lived in Columbus and was a member of the Crips gang, and asked him to come to Cincinnati to commit a robbery and to take care of Willis. Slade drove to Cincinnati a day or two before the shooting with Echols and a female. Roshawn took them to a hotel on Central Parkway where they stayed. The day before the shooting, Roshawn drove Echols and Slade past Willis’s house.
{¶11} On the night of the shooting, Slade drove to Willis’s home, with Echols and Sanon, who were the shooters. While Echols and Sanon were walking back and forth outside of Willis’s house, Slade called Roshawn. Slade informed him that when they arrived at Willis’s home, they noticed the front door was open, and they saw people in the house. Roshawn testified that he told Slade not to enter the home. Later, the three returned to his home.
{¶12} While they were talking, Echols said they wrapped their shirts around their heads, opened the screen door, ran into the house, and started shooting.
{¶13} After the shooting, Roshawn, Willis, and Barton went to Mt. Echo Park, and she told him about the shooting. She told him details that were inconsistent with his understanding of what happened.
{¶14} A week after the shootings, Echols arrived at his home unannounced and demanded more money. Roshawn could not see who was driving the car. Roshawn was upstairs with his family and Barton when he learned Echols was on his way to his house. He grabbed a gun and called Geezy to come over. Roshawn went outside and met Echols at the door. Echols entered his home, and Roshawn gave him a few hundred dollars, and he left.
{¶15} Admittedly, Roshawn did not initially tell the police the truth, and his statements evolved over time. Roshawn had been threatened in jail and had been involved in multiple fights due to the situation and was scared for his family. While in pretrial confinement, Roshawn was awaiting a court hearing in JAX when he saw Echols. Roshawn testified that Echols made a threatening gun gesture toward him and wrote a threatening message on the wall. Roshawn testified that Echols’s nickname “Wopp” was at the top of the message, but not visible on the photo of the message. The message said, “Roshawn Bishop a rat and got 30 racks on his head.” Roshawn interpreted the message to mean that he was a cooperating witness and anyone who harms him would get $30,000. Roshawn was concerned by the threats and afraid that harm could come to him or his family because of his decision to testify.
{¶17} The state introduced a letter that Echols had written while incarcerated to a person named S. Parks. In the letter, Echols asks Parks “to get like 4 or 5 people to say they seen me at The Rise on July 8, 2017 between 10:45 p.m. and 12:00 a.m.” The letter specified the clothing Echols was allegedly wearing, individuals who should be contacted, what they should say, and emphasized that the alibis were “the only way [he would] shake this.” The letter also dictated that “Debbie * * * gotta go ASAP plus it might make her husband recant his statement like he said he would.” Echols included the names and personal information of several of the victims and promised to forward contact information for Roshawn’s wife and Kevin Barton when he received it.
{¶18} GPS data from Echols’s phone was also admitted into evidence. Special FBI Agent Lance Kepple, an expert in cell phone record analysis, testified about Echols’s whereabouts before and after the shooting based on the GPS data from his phone. On July 7, Echols’s phone left Columbus, arrived in Cincinnati around 4:00 p.m., and was present at a motel on Central Parkway. On the night of the shooting, Echols’s phone left Roshawn’s home at 10:47 p.m., and arrived “within a three meter radius” of Willis’s home at 11:09 p.m. After 11:30 p.m., Echols’s phone moved toward Roshawn’s home. The phone left Cincinnati for Columbus at 2:31 a.m.
{¶19} At the end of the trial, the jury found Echols guilty of aggravated burglary, aggravated murder, three counts of murder, eight counts of attempted
Sufficiency and Manifest Wright
{¶20} In his first and second assignments of error, argued together, Echols contends that his convictions for aggravated murder, murder, and attempted murder were not supported by sufficient evidence and were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Echols argues that the state failed to prove he was the shooter because no evidence established that he was present except the testimony of three of the state’s witnesses, who were not credible.
{¶21} In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶22} As to the weight of the evidence, we review whether the jury created a manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences, the credibility of the witnesses, and whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Bailey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140129, 2015-Ohio-2997, ¶ 59, quoting Thompkins at 387. We afford substantial deference to credibility determinations because the factfinder sees and hears the witnesses. See State v. Glover, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180572, 2019-Ohio-5211, ¶ 30.
{¶24} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we cannot say that the state presented insufficient evidence to establish that Echols entered Willis’s home, fired multiple shots injuring seven individuals and killing Autumn Garrett. Roshawn testified that he paid Echols to commit the shooting, and that Echols admitted to and described the shootings the night the shootings occurred. Roshawn further testified that Echols’s shirt was burned that night, and Deborah confirmed that clothing was burned. Echols’s letter sought alibis for that evening, and his cell phone data placed him near the house when the shootings occurred. With respect to the lack of physical evidence, the state is not required to present physical evidence to satisfy its burden. See State v. English, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180697, 2020-Ohio-4682, ¶ 29.
{¶25} In finding Echols guilty, the jury found Roshawn’s testimony to be credible. Because credibility is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we overrule the first and second assignments of error.
Evidence of Witness Intimidation
{¶26} In his third assignment of error, Echols argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his attempts to intimidate Roshawn by writing a message on the wall and making a gun gesture, and the letter he wrote while incarcerated.
{¶28} Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
{¶29} While in pretrial confinement, Roshawn was awaiting a court hearing when he saw Echols. Roshawn testified that Echols made a threatening gun gesture toward him and wrote a threatening message on the wall. The message, which included Echols’s nickname “Wopp,” said, “Roshawn Bishop a rat and got 30 racks on his head.” Roshawn interpreted the message to mean that he was a cooperating witness and anyone who harmed him would get $30,000. Roshawn was concerned by
{¶30} The letter written by Echols while incarcerated, included a threat against Roshawn’s wife, and said, “She gotta go ASAP plus it might make her husband recant his statement.” The letter included the names and phone numbers of several of the victims and a promise to forward personal information for Roshawn’s wife and Kevin Barton when he received it.
{¶31} Echols’s threats are evidence of his efforts to intimidate witnesses and reflect a consciousness of guilt. The threats were “designed to impede or prevent a witness from testifying,” and admissible to show consciousness of guilt. See Grimes, 1st Dist. Hamilton C-030922, 2005-Ohio-203, at ¶ 55. The threats were also relevant to explain why Roshawn was initially reluctant to tell the truth and why his story changed over time. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of witness intimidation.
{¶32} We overrule the third assignment of error.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
{¶33} Next, Echols asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly attempting to associate Echols with the Columbus Crips gang.
{¶34} “The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the remarks were improper, and if so, whether they prejudicially affected the accused’s substantial rights. The touchstone of the analysis ‘is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’ ” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 154. Where the trial court sustained objections to the testimony and provided a curative instruction to the jury, we must presume the jury followed the trial court’s
{¶35} During the direct examination of Roshawn, the prosecutor elicited testimony that Slade was a member of the Crips gang. The defense did not object to this testimony. When the prosecutor asked Slade’s rank in the Crips, the trial court sustained Echols’s objection, but the court allowed testimony that Slade was associated with the Crips.
{¶36} The prosecutor asked Roshawn if “the fact that [Slade] and his associates were in the Crips, did that have an impact with you at all?” Echols immediately objected, and the question went unanswered. The trial court instructed the jury that the “last statement is just not an appropriate question. So please just disregard what you heard there.” The court further instructed the jury “not to consider that last question even though there was no answer for it.”
{¶37} When the prosecutor asked whether Roshawn knew if Echols was a Crip, the objection was sustained before Roshawn answered the question. The judge again informed the jury that the question was improper and instructed the jury to disregard the question and to “not let that influence you in any way.” No further mention of the Crips occurred during the remainder of the trial.
{¶38} During jury instructions, the trial court reiterated that statements that it had been asked to disregard “must be treated as if you never heard them.” The court instructed the jury that it could not speculate as to why an objection was sustained, or to draw any inference from a question or what the answer may have been.
{¶39} Even assuming the questions were improper, Echols has not established that the questions affected his substantial rights. Echols immediately objected to the
{¶40} We overrule Echols’s fourth assignment of error.
Cumulative Error
{¶41} Echols claims that the cumulative effect of all of the errors denied him his right to a fair trial.
{¶42} “The doctrine of cumulative error allows a conviction to be reversed if the cumulative effect of errors, deemed separately harmless, deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial.” State v. Johnson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170354, 2019-Ohio-3877, ¶ 57. After finding no error in Echols’s assignments of error, we cannot find cumulative error. Consequently, we overrule the fifth assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶43} Having overruled Echols’s five assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
BERGERON, J., concurs separately.
KINSLEY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
BERGERON, J., concurring separately.
{¶44} I concur in the lead opinion but write separately to highlight an evidentiary issue that should warrant clarification from the Supreme Court of Ohio. Specifically, I believe that evidence of witness intimidation should be analyzed under
{¶45} Historically, federal courts considered the admissibility of evidence of witness intimidation under
{¶47} Interestingly, in Ohio, the rationale for allowing admission of witness intimidation evidence developed separately from the 404(B) approach adopted by most federal courts. In 1969, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “It is to-day universally conceded that the fact of an accused’s flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.” State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio St.2d 145, 160, 249 N.E.2d 897 (1969), citing 2 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 276, at 111 (3d Ed.1940). Later, in 1992, the Ohio Supreme Court expanded this proposition, holding that the defendant’s threats against a prosecutor “reflect a consciousness of [the defendant’s] guilt, similar to evidence of flight to avoid prosecution, or efforts made to cover up a crime or intimidate witnesses.” State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 357, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992), citing Eaton. The line of cases stemming from Eaton and Richey does not rely on
{¶48} Underpinning the rule in Eaton and Richey is, I submit, a false and outdated psychological assessment of criminal defendants. Why would a criminal defendant flee from police or intimidate a witness? Because he’s guilty, of course—so the reasoning goes. But I think it’s equally fair to presume that a defendant might take such measures because he believes he will be convicted, regardless of his guilt. In other words, many people charged with a crime may not trust the legal system to accurately sort out innocence from guilt, believing the deck to be unfairly stacked against them. I don’t mean to excuse flight or witness intimidation, of course, only to consider it with a fresh perspective consistent with the overall purposes of the Ohio
{¶49} In fact, a number of federal and state jurisdictions recognize that “flight does not create a presumption of guilt but, to the contrary, may be completely consistent with innocence.” United States v. Benedetti, 433 F.3d 111, 116 (1st Cir.2005); see Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1187 (D.C.Cir.2008) (Citations omitted.) (“[F]light does not necessarily reflect consciousness of guilt and may be motivated by a variety of factors which are fully consistent with innocence.”); Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 547 (Pa.2022) (“Such flight or concealment does not necessarily show consciousness of guilt in every case. A person may flee or hide for some other motive and may do so even though innocent.”). Developments in our understanding of wrongful convictions further lend credence to this point. See Gross et al., Race and Wrongful Convictions in the United States (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.pdf (accessed May 5, 2023).
{¶50} The same point applies to witness intimidation, as illustrated by the recent case United States v. Robertson, D.N.M. No. 17-CR-02949-MV-1, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82824, 13-14 (Apr. 30, 2021), in which the defendant made various strongly-worded calls trying to persuade people to testify on his behalf. While the government argued that the evidence of the calls should be admitted to establish consciousness of guilt, the court found that “[defendant’s] statements on the call * * * could just as easily reflect far less sinister motivations, such as a desire for the Court to see his family and community support as it makes decisions on critical issues such as his release.” Id. The court acknowledged defendant’s concern that “if people do not
{¶51} Therefore, it is time to anchor claims of witness intimidation and the like in a solid evidentiary foundation, and
{¶52} But that changed in September 2020, when the Ohio Supreme Court decided a pair of cases—State v. Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, and State v. Smith, 162 Ohio St.3d 353, 2020-Ohio-4441, 165 N.E.3d 1123—that together strengthened and clarified the role of
{¶53} While neither Hartman nor Smith specifically addresses the use of evidence of witness intimidation in the
{¶54} In light of Eaton and Richey, I believe the lead opinion correctly considers the admissibility of the witness intimidation evidence at hand. However, I believe that the admissibility result may well differ under an
KINSLEY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶55} I concur with the thorough lead opinion as to the first, second, fourth, and fifth assignments of error. However, I believe that the admission of two pieces of witness intimidation evidence in this case, namely (1) a letter Echols wrote his uncle while Echols was awaiting trial, and (2) an image of graffiti found by codefendant Roshawn Bishop in a holding cell before he testified at Echols’s trial, was improper under
I. Evid.R. 404(B) and State v. Hartman
{¶56} Echols argues in his third assignment of error that the introduction of the letter and graffiti violated
{¶57} Importantly, these cases substantially predate State v. Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651. In Hartman, the court established a detailed framework for lower courts to follow in resolving challenges to the admissibility of other acts evidence under
{¶58} At step one, the court must require the proponent of the evidence to identify a specific purpose from those enumerated in
{¶59} Assuming that test is met, at step two, trial courts must turn to
{¶60} If the evidence meets these threshold inquiries, trial courts admitting evidence of a defendant‘s other wrongful conduct under
{¶61} As the concurring opinion observes, we review errors at step one of the Hartman framework de novo. See id. at ¶ 22. We review errors at step two for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 30.
{¶62} The lead opinion does not address Hartman at all, apparently because its author believes
{¶64} It is a crime to intimidate a witness in a criminal case in Ohio. See
{¶65} Thus, because I believe
{¶66} Moreover, while I support the concurrence‘s call for reexamination of outdated assumptions in this area of law, I do not agree with the concurring opinion‘s stance that Hartman and the line of cases regarding consciousness of guilt are at odds with one another. This is because, unlike the concurrence, I do not read Hartman to
{¶67} For one thing, consciousness of guilt approximates knowledge that a person committed a crime, which is one of the listed purposes for which the state may present evidence of other acts under
{¶68} Synergizing Richey and Grimes with Hartman in this way allows the state to designate knowledge as the enumerated
{¶69} In addition to these practical benefits, reading the early cases admitting witness intimidation evidence to show consciousness of guilt into the knowledge component of
{¶70} Another way to read Richey and Grimes in alignment with Hartman is to treat consciousness of guilt as one of the “other purposes” outside of propensity for crime allowed by
{¶71} While true to the text of
{¶72} Thus, under my understanding of Ohio law, witness intimidation evidence may be admissible under
II. Factual Application
{¶74} None of that happened in this case. The state never tethered the admissibility of Echols‘s letter and the jailhouse graffiti to a specific, identified purpose authorized by
{¶75} As a matter of law, and reviewing the record de novo, I find the trial court‘s failure to apply Hartman and
{¶76} The trial court‘s failure to analyze the
{¶77} Aside from this error of law, I also note several factual problems that, in my opinion, and applying a de novo standard of review to the
{¶78} In general, witness intimidation evidence only proves a defendant‘s knowledge that he committed the crime with which he is charged if a number of evidentiary prerequisites exist. First, the defendant must be aware of the witness‘s status with respect to the crime at issue. See
{¶79} Focusing first on the letter, its meaning is ambiguous. In the letter, Echols provides his uncle with the names, dates of birth, social security numbers, and partial address information for some of the witnesses who may testify against him at trial. He says “see what you can do with this info,” but does not otherwise direct any specific action towards these individuals. The letter also contains a request that Echols‘s uncle “get like 4 or 5 people to say they [saw Echols]” at a particular location at a certain time, but does not identify the people, either by name or description. Elsewhere in the letter, Echols expresses doubts about the state‘s case, as well as his fear of being wrongfully convicted. He says that, to convict him, the state needs someone to say “this s***‘s true” to obtain a conviction, and he comments that the state‘s case is based on hearsay. At no point does he admit his own guilt or role in the offense.
{¶80} Viewed with the careful scrutiny Hartman requires, Echols‘s letter is not relevant to either knowledge or consciousness of guilt under
{¶81} With regard to the graffiti, a different problem exists. Hartman requires trial courts to carefully examine whether a defendant actually committed the alleged other wrongful act before permitting its admissibility. Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, at ¶ 28. For the evidence to be admissible, “there must be ‘substantial proof that the alleged similar act was committed by the defendant.’ ” Id., citing State v. Carter, 26 Ohio St.2d 79, 83, 269 N.E.2d 115 (1971).
{¶82} Here, very little foundation was laid to admit the graffiti into evidence. Roshawn Bishop was the only person who testified as to the image. Bishop indicated that he saw the graffiti in the holding cell where every person in confinement who is transported to court is housed and concluded that Echols placed it there. But Bishop also conceded that codefendants and those in protective custody awaiting court hearings are housed in a separate area, undercutting the notion that Echols was responsible for the graffiti. Remarkably, the state presented no surveillance video or testimony from corrections officers to document the origins of the graffiti, and no witness actually saw Echols—or anyone, for that matter—create the message. As a result, there was not substantial proof that Echols created the graffiti, and the trial court should have excluded it on this basis.
{¶83} Moreover, the graffiti also suffered from the same flaw that the letter did. While the person who created the graffiti clearly seemed motivated to discourage Bishop from testifying, what is lacking is the reason for that motive. Similar to the
II. Evid.R. 403(A) Weighing
{¶84} All of this says nothing of the required weighing of prejudicial impact and probative value that is required for all
{¶85} Although this is a closer call, given our deferential standard of review at this step of the Hartman framework, I believe the trial court abused its discretion in admitting what was clearly prejudicial evidence that offered very little in the way of probative value to the issues in dispute in this case.
{¶86} I share the concurring opinion‘s view that the letter and the graffiti were extremely prejudicial, particularly considering what little inculpatory evidence existed to tie Echols to the shootings. Because the jury was not given a limiting instruction, admission of these pieces of evidence invited the jury to surmise that Echols is a person who will resort to violence and concoct evidence to avoid accountability. In other words, this evidence encouraged the jury to convict Echols
{¶87} Further demonstrating the prejudicial impact of the witness intimidation evidence on Echols is the jury‘s split verdict in the case. The jury acquitted Echols‘s codefendant, Michael Sanon, who was tried at the same time based on the same evidence, of all but one attempted-murder charge. This outcome suggests that the jury harbored serious doubts about the prosecution‘s evidence. The only real difference in the evidence presented at trial between Echols and his codefendant was Echols‘s letter and the graffiti. Thus, it appears that this evidence had a direct and prejudicial impact on the verdict in Echols‘s case.
{¶88} On the other hand, compared to its prejudice, the witness intimidation evidence had very little probative value. Even assuming Echols created the graffiti, at most it demonstrated that he did not want Bishop to testify. That is not the same as showing that Echols was conscious of his own guilt. The letter was even more ambiguous and conveyed no clear meaning in terms of Echols‘s knowledge of his own participation in the crime. Thus, the value of these pieces of evidence to a purpose enumerated in
{¶89} Weighing the extreme prejudice to Echols against the value of the evidence to the question of Echols‘s participation in the crimes for which he was charged, I believe the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the letter and the graffiti at trial.
IV. Conclusion
{¶91} The events that took place at Cheyanne Willis‘s gender-reveal party were tragic, life-changing for the victims, and unquestionably wrong. We must follow the law in holding the perpetrators of those events accountable. Because I understand
Please note: The court has recorded its own entry this date.